

# NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

## Monterey, California



# THESIS

**ELUSIVE ARMIES & INVISIBLE HANDS:  
COMBINING CONVENTIONAL & GUERRILLA FORCES  
FROM 1776 TO THE PRESENT**

by

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December 1998

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& GUERRILLA FORCES FROM 1776 TO THE PRESENT**

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
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
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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the performance of hybrid forces – forces containing both irregular and regular components – in protracted, theater-level campaigns. It seeks to determine how the hybrid force commander should employ his force to achieve the highest probability of operational success. Accepting that force efficiency is the critical path to operational success, this research focuses on the role of two variables which are often in “tension” in hybrid forces: coordinating the efforts of the two components, and decentralizing the operations of the irregulars. It explores the influence of these variables in four historical hybrid campaigns.

This study demonstrates that the most efficient hybrid force is created by high degrees of both coordination and decentralization. Hybrid forces shaped by these variables maximize costs inflicted on the enemy, while minimizing costs incurred by themselves, by exploiting the enemy’s dilemma over whether to disperse to quell the hybrid irregulars, or to concentrate to defeat the hybrid regulars. This research also suggests, however, that coordination and decentralization will only produce the most efficient hybrid force possible when that force enjoys two preconditions in the theater of war: local popular support, and minimum strategic vulnerability for the regulars.



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the performance of hybrid forces – forces containing both irregular and regular components – in protracted, theater-level campaigns. It seeks the answer to a central question: how does the theater commander employ his hybrid force to achieve the highest probability of operational success?

Answering this question is relevant to U.S. policy makers and military leaders for at least three reasons. First, hybrid warfare can be a more efficient use of limited resources than traditional, conventional warfare. Second, emerging technologies are substantially increasing the firepower available to small units, and small units are at the heart of hybrid warfare. Finally, more frequent cooperation between special operations forces and general purpose forces means that the U.S. will increasingly rely on de facto hybrid forces to achieve its goals.

Thus accepting that the central question is relevant, this research initially demonstrates that the critical path to operational success is efficiency. Increasing efficiency – which is defined as the ratio between the costs inflicted on the enemy and the friendly resources employed to produce those costs – directly increases the chance that the enemy will suffer the requisite amount of damage which forces him to capitulate or permanently withdraw from the theater of war.

Because of this relationship between force efficiency and operational success, this research subsequently focuses on how to utilize a hybrid force most efficiently. It hypothesizes that the most efficient hybrid force is produced when the theater commander balances two independent variables which are often in “tension:” coordinating the efforts of the two components, and decentralizing

the operations of the irregulars. It explores the influence of these variables in four historical hybrid campaigns.

First, it examines the efficiency achieved by a hybrid force which is poorly coordinated and highly centralized – the Anglo-Arab hybrid force which fought in Palestine, Arabia, and Syria during World War I. It then examines the efficiency resulting from a coordinated and decentralized force – the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force which fought the Peninsular War. Next, it analyzes the performance of an uncoordinated, yet decentralized hybrid force – the Boers of the Second Boer War. Finally, it examines the efficiency of a coordinated, yet centralized hybrid force – the Northern Combat Area Command under General Joseph Stilwell in World War II Burma. Since these cases test every combination of the independent variables, one is confident that together they create a solid evaluation of the hypothesis.

These four cases demonstrate that the most efficient hybrid force is created by high degrees of both coordination and decentralization. Hybrid forces shaped by these characteristics maximize costs inflicted on the enemy – and minimize costs incurred by themselves – by exploiting the enemy's dilemma over whether to disperse to quell the hybrid irregulars, or to concentrate to defeat the hybrid regulars. This research also suggests, however, that coordination and decentralization will only produce the most efficient hybrid force possible when that force enjoys two preconditions in the theater of war: local popular support, and minimum strategic vulnerability for the regulars.

## I. INTRODUCTION

Yet we shall always find fierce enemies in front of us, and we leave even the worse ones behind. Our armies will pursue elusive armies that always flee and disappear toward the sea, only to reappear a few leagues beyond, while invisible hands destroy everyone who does not remain with the army.

~ Captain Jean Jacques Pelet, French Officer in the Peninsular War

With 2,000 years of examples behind us, we have no excuse, when fighting, for not fighting well....

~ T.E. Lawrence to B.H. Liddell-Hart, 1933

To many British commanders, the American Revolution was not only a political upheaval, but a military revolution as well. For the United States' nascent armed forces prosecuted a new kind of war upon their colonial masters. On the one hand, George Washington labored tirelessly to forge and field a conventionally-oriented force capable of meeting and defeating the British through the "well-executed set-piece maneuvers"<sup>1</sup> which were the essence of eighteenth century warfare. On the other hand, at the same time the colonials repeatedly confronted the British with "units which issued suddenly from the swamps or the forests, moving silently and quickly and behaving with touches of the savagery of the Indians whom they imitated."<sup>2</sup> Whether deliberate or not, this fusion of two disparate forms of war – European style conventional tactics and "frontier" style unconventional operations – presented the British with a dual threat which they could not overcome.

Following the Revolutionary War, a multitude of distinguished commanders have been bedeviled by, or benefited from, the merging of regular and irregular operations which George Washington and his lieutenants employed with such telling effect. Under the Duke of Wellington, the British (and their Iberian allies) employed the same combination which had defeated them in America to create an incurable "Spanish ulcer" for Napoleon. During the same period, the Russians employed both regular and irregular forces, with a significant assist from the climate, to defeat Napoleon's invasion. A century later, Arab irregulars unleashed by their Revolt of 1916, principally under the leadership of T.E. Lawrence, combined with the conventional campaign of General Allenby's British regulars to drive the Ottoman Turks from the Middle East. Similarly, from the 1950s to the 1970s, an alliance of Vietnamese Communist irregulars and

conventional North Vietnamese Army units eventually defeated both French and American efforts to subdue them.

But not all "hybrid" campaigns have achieved the successes of Washington or Wellington. The American Confederates of the 1860's, the franc-tireurs of the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-71, and the South African Boers at the turn of the century all conducted daring, and often highly successful, irregular operations during otherwise conventional campaigns. In the end, however, each of them was defeated.

## **A. PURPOSE**

The purpose of this research is to determine how the theater-level commander of a force containing both regular and irregular components – the hybrid force – employs his force to achieve the highest probability of operational success.

## **B. RELEVANCE**

### **1. A More Efficient Approach**

If a nation or coalition possesses relatively limited resources, hybrid warfare can be a more efficient use of those resources than traditional, conventional war. This assertion clearly hinges on the issue of "limited resources." Most likely, if given the choice, any combatant nation or alliance would prefer to have such overwhelming, widespread conventional combat strength that it could overwhelm or smother its opponent in short order. But reality – in the form of limited defense budgets, domestic political concerns, or multiple international threats – often places tremendous constraints on available military strength. Given such constraints, past hybrid campaigns suggest that a combination of regulars and irregulars can be the most efficient method of employing available resources. In other words, hybrid warfare has often been an outstanding example of "doing more with less." Indeed, if properly managed, a hybrid force can produce greater military results than an equal, or often greater, number of regulars or irregulars alone.

One cannot dispute the fact that militarily, the U.S. is in the midst of an era of limited resources. There is no prospect for significant DoD growth in the foreseeable future. In such an era, the U.S. military must capitalize on any methods which maximize the combat effectiveness of smaller force packages. It must place a premium

on “doing more with less.” As CinC, USSOCOM notes, “constrained resources...continue to demand improved levels of effectiveness and efficiency.”<sup>3</sup> Hybrid warfare’s efficiency can fulfill this demand. Consequently, studying hybrid campaigns is relevant because, given the dwindling resources of the U.S. armed forces, adopting the principal tenets of successful hybrid war will provide them with a most efficient fighting doctrine for the future.

## **2. Increasing Firepower in Small Units**

Hybrid warfare is also worthy of contemporary consideration because of what the future holds for the firepower of the small unit. Emerging “technology trends will provide an order of magnitude improvement in lethality.... Individual warfighters will be empowered as never before, with an array of detection, targeting, and communications equipment that will greatly magnify the power of small units.”<sup>4</sup> Small units are at the core of hybrid warfare, for the irregular components of historical hybrid forces have almost universally fought as company-sized units or smaller. Moreover, smaller units appear to also be at the core of the United States’ future military, for the limited resources emphasized above imply that we will have no choice but to rely on smaller force packages to accomplish missions. Fortunately, the increases in firepower provided by modern technology promise only to multiply the capabilities of such small, irregular units. This would in turn increase the efficiency of hybrid warfare, making it even more relevant for study.

## **3. Increasing Cooperation Between U.S. General Purpose & Special Operations Forces**

While the previous two factors recommend hybrid campaigns as a form of war which U.S. military analysts should *choose* to study, a third factor virtually *requires* them to do so. Namely, the “build down” of the U.S. military will compel U.S. special operations forces (SOF) and general purpose forces (GPF) to work together more often. Simply put, getting the most out of a shrinking military will demand more frequent combination of the distinct capabilities of SOF and GPF. In the words of former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, because “America’s Armed Forces are smaller than we have been in over 40 years, and....[because we are] faced with flat budgets and increasingly more costly readiness and modernization,...we will need to wring every ounce of capability from every source. That outcome can only be accomplished through a more seamless integration of Service capabilities.”<sup>5</sup>

If U.S. SOF are viewed as a rough equivalent to hybrid irregulars, then this more frequent cooperation between GPF and SOF means that the U.S. will increasingly rely on

what are essentially hybrid forces to achieve its military goals. Studying hybrid campaigns to ascertain the most efficient use of those forces thus becomes immediately relevant. For the cases examined in this study demonstrate how to make the interaction of regular and irregular/SOF units complementary instead of supplementary. This finding may be even more worthy of consideration since it is derived from studying the protracted, operational-level employment of irregulars. Up to this point, almost all studies of SOF or combined SOF/GPF operations have focused on the keys to achieving single mission, tactical success.<sup>6</sup>

## C. DEFINING THE ISSUE

Having demonstrated the relevance of hybrid warfare to current and future U.S. military operations, I will now establish the parameters of this study with some key definitions:

- *Hybrid Force*: a military force containing both regular and irregular components.
- *Conventional Opponent*: the hybrid force's opponent, usually composed of solely conventional units.
- *Regular Force/Unit/Element/Component*: Professional military forces employing the conventional tactics of their era. Regular forces are usually distinguished by characteristics like a common uniform, rank structure, and standard of discipline.
- *Irregular Force/Unit/Element/Component*: Other than regular military forces which are usually distinguished by four characteristics.
  - Stealth – irregulars are virtually “invisible” to the conventional opponent except while engaging him (either because they are local residents who can “melt” into a population at will, or because they are foreign detachments who retreat into “safe areas” located in inaccessible terrain, or a combination of both).
  - Mobility – irregulars are almost always light cavalry or light infantry type forces which have a limited range of mobility but are capable of traversing almost any terrain.
  - Logistics – irregulars typically require minimal logistics support, in contrast to the often vast logistics trains which accompany regular forces.<sup>7</sup>

- Firepower – irregulars, being light forces whose survival often depends upon their ability to disengage at will and to conceal themselves rapidly, typically possess much less firepower than similar sized regular detachments.
- Note: It is important to recognize that irregular units can be manned by professional or citizen soldiers. Furthermore, irregulars and regulars can, but usually do not, perform the same missions. Either for example, could perform a raid or an ambush. The key distinction, as described by the four characteristics above, is the ability of irregulars to strike unexpectedly much more often than their regular compatriots. Consequently, the presence of both irregulars and regulars in the same force compels the conventional opponent to focus simultaneously on the threat of a “visible” regular enemy possessing substantial conventional combat power and on a practically “invisible” irregular enemy who can strike almost anywhere.
- *Theater/operational-level*: this study will focus on the combined use of regulars and irregulars at the theater level of analysis/operational level of war. This is the most appropriate level of analysis because every conflict in which the U.S. has participated since WWII has been confined to single theater. Moreover, current U.S. doctrine lists the “theater of war” as the primary focus of a warfighting CINC.<sup>8</sup> This is consequently the level of analysis which could provide the most readily useful recommendations for employing U.S. military forces.
- *Operational success*: enemy capitulates or permanently withdraws from the theater.
- *Campaign-length*: what follows will address the best use of hybrid forces in terms of protracted, campaign-length operations. This is appropriate first because this study is focusing on theater-level employment of hybrid forces, and campaigns are at the heart of theater/ operational warfare.<sup>9</sup> It is also appropriate because the answers which this study seeks to provide about the best use of hybrid forces cannot be extracted from the result of a single mission, or even several operations, but only by reviewing the outcome of an entire campaign.<sup>10</sup>

## NOTES ON CHAPTER I

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<sup>1</sup> Forrest C. Pogue, *The Revolutionary Transformation of the Art of War*, Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1974, p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Pogue, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *SOF Vision 2020*, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Joint Vision 2010*, p. 13.

<sup>5</sup> *Joint Vision 2010*, p. 8-9.

<sup>6</sup> For examples, see William McRaven’s *Spec Ops* and Lucien Vandenbroucke’s *Perilous Options*.

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<sup>7</sup> Martin Van Creveld notes that one key difference between irregular and regular forces, "and one whose importance is becoming increasingly obvious, is the fact that [irregulars] do not require heavy weapons and large quantities of mechanized transport. As a result, their logistical load – including various kinds of supply maintenance, and administration – is cut by a factor of 90 percent or more. Of the commodities that constitute the remaining 10 percent, a great many can normally be found almost anywhere and taken away directly from the surrounding population...." "Military Strategy for an Era of Transition," in *Turning Point: The Gulf War and U.S. Military Strategy*, Boulder: Westview Press, p. 273

<sup>8</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 4-5.

<sup>9</sup> Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991, p. 45.

<sup>10</sup> For example, American Revolutionary General Nathanael Greene, who employed a hybrid force to reconquer almost the entire colonial South in only six months, did not enjoy a single tactical victory with his regular component during the campaign. Similarly, the Tet Offensive of the Vietnam War virtually destroyed the irregular component of the Vietnamese Communist's hybrid force, but played a crucial role in their eventual campaign success. Thus, it is not the success or failure of individual tactical operations but the overall results of the campaign which provide the most reliable indicators of how best to employ a hybrid force.

## II. METHODOLOGY

### A. DEVELOPING A HYPOTHESIS

Guided by the above parameters, I have sought to determine how a hybrid force should be employed to achieve the highest probability of operational success. Two modern metaphors serve as a departure point for developing my hypothesis.

- The Boxer: Just as hybrid force commanders have usually had to make do with limited resources, so a boxer is limited in advantages he has over his opponent. With the often decisive asset of size legislated away through weight classes, and assuming that both boxers enter the ring in excellent physical condition, a premium is placed on better employing available combat power – the left and right hand. Should a fighter possess a potent jab but a weak array of power punches – or vice versa – he is vulnerable to an adversary strong in both types of attack. Furthermore, even if a fighter possess robust jabs and devastating power punches, he must also link them together in effective combinations. If he does not, he will leave many openings for a more disciplined opponent to land telling blows. Victory thus appears to go not necessarily to the strongest fighter, but to the one who most efficiently combines the efforts of his two strike assets.
- Developing AirLand Battle Doctrine: Obviously, efficient employment of limited resources is even more important in a conflict fought outside the regulated confines of the boxing ring. U.S. military doctrine writers recognized this as they sought, just like many historical hybrid commanders, to develop a strategy for defeating a numerically superior foe – in this case, the Warsaw Pact of the late 1970's. The resultant U.S. strategy, AirLand Battle doctrine, emphasized that victory in modern war "will demand complete unity of effort and *thoroughly synchronized* air and ground action." Of even greater interest to my study of often outnumbered historical hybrid forces, the creators of AirLand Battle doctrine asserted that "*a fully synchronized* small force can defeat a much larger enemy force that is poorly coordinated."<sup>1</sup> Once again, albeit in a much deadlier level of conflict, victory seemed as closely correlated to efficiency as it did to strength.

Viewed together, these two examples of contemporary conflict illustrate many of the distinguishing characteristics of past hybrid campaigns. Just as a hybrid force has two offensive components – the regulars and the irregulars – so the boxer has two hands, and AirLand Battle has both air and ground assets. Additionally, boxing highlights one familiar hybrid force problem -- maximizing limited assets -- while the AirLand Battle concept underscores another – winning though outnumbered. Given these strong similarities, I deductively accepted that the emphasis in both cases upon efficiency would be of equal importance to a hybrid force. Consequently, my initial

answer to the central question of this study was that a hybrid (or any military) force would have the greatest likelihood of achieving operational success when it was employed to maximum *efficiency*.

### **1. What is Efficiency?**

The military definition of this term derives from two considerations. First, the objective of a theater commander is to achieve operational success in the least time at the lowest cost. Second, this objective is accomplished by inflicting enough damage (or costs) upon the enemy to force him to capitulate or permanently withdraw *before* he does the same to friendly forces. *Efficiency*, therefore, is the ratio between the costs inflicted on the enemy (output) and the friendly resources employed to produce those costs (input).<sup>2</sup> The more efficient the use of a given amount of friendly resources, the greater the costs inflicted upon the enemy. A senior American military historian accentuates the role of efficiency in military operations when he summarizes that the Allies, in World War II,

...[won] mainly through the application of overwhelming, unsubtle brute force. Not only did the Allies rely on sheer material and manpower superiority to overcome the Axis, but they did so clumsily, lumberingly, with at best mediocre and too often inept generalship.... The conclusion for the future is evident enough, but well worth pondering. "Unless our histories take full cognizance of just how big a margin was required in the Second World War, we shall leave ourselves without adequate capacity in any future war."<sup>3</sup>

### **2. The Relationship Between Operational Success & Efficiency**

Other things being equal, a more efficient use of a given amount of friendly resources will increase the costs inflicted on the enemy from those resources. Thus, efficiency increases the chance that the enemy will suffer the requisite amount of damage to force him to capitulate or permanently withdraw. Efficiency improves the chance of winning.

### **3. A Hypothesis**

If one accepts this relationship between operational success and efficiency, the central question for this study now becomes how the theater commander of a hybrid force utilizes it most efficiently, for utilizing a hybrid force most efficiently will give it the best chance for operational success. I contend that to produce the dependent variable of efficiency with a hybrid force – to inflict the most cost on the enemy with a given amount of friendly resources – one must provide the independent variables of *coordination of efforts* and *decentralization of the irregulars*. Consequently, I offer the following hypothesis:

Maximizing coordination of efforts *and* decentralization of the irregulars will produce the most efficient hybrid force. Given that only limited resources are available to a hybrid force, if that force coordinates its efforts, yet decentralizes its irregular operations, it will inflict maximum costs on the enemy for the least expenditure of friendly assets.

- *Coordination of efforts:* intentionally combining the actions of allied regular and irregular components into a single framework of operations in order to maximize the contributions of each.<sup>4</sup>
- *Decentralization of the irregulars:* granting the irregulars in a hybrid force the broadest discretion in planning, executing, and recovering from tactical operations. The hybrid force commander who decentralizes his irregulars will provide them with operational-level goals, but will place as few restrictions as possible on which tactical targets they attack in what manner, to the point that he may occasionally have to accept, from foreign irregulars, breaches of the law of war.<sup>5</sup>

## B. AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE

To illustrate an application of my hypothesis, I will examine a campaign from World War I. Over 29 months, a hybrid force of British regulars and Arab irregulars drove the conventional forces of the Ottoman Empire back from Egypt and Arabia to the southern borders of Turkey. First under a split military/civilian command, and then unified under British General Edmund Allenby, the Anglo-Arab hybrid force ably demonstrates the affect of both coordination and decentralization upon efficiency.

### 1. Formation & Initial Employment of the Hybrid Force

For over a year after Turkey declared war on the Allies, major operations in Europe and the Gallipoli Peninsula precluded large-scale military action in the Middle East. The British in Egypt, however, still sought ways to attack the Ottoman foe which confronted them in Palestine and Arabia. For over a year, British agents negotiated with Arab tribesmen in those provinces, trying to transform latent Arab nationalism into tangible military opposition to the Ottomans. These efforts bore fruit when the Arab Revolt erupted in "the Hejaz – the skinny Arabian province flanking the Red Sea" – in June, 1916.<sup>6</sup> So was born the Anglo-Arab hybrid force: approximately 20,000 British regulars under General Archibald Murray in the Sinai; and less than 10,000 Arab irregulars in the Hejaz. They faced a combined total of perhaps 35,000 Turks.<sup>7</sup>

At first fighting conventionally, the Arabs under Sharif Hussein captured Mecca and laid partial siege to the Turkish garrison at Medina. "But [Hussein's] force as well

as those commanded by his sons, Feisal, Ali and Abdullah, were badly organized and lacked arms and equipment. By September, Feisal's and Ali's armies were marking time southwest of Medina; Abdullah...hovered northeast of Medina with his warriors.<sup>8</sup> The Turks then counterattacked, seeking to capture the port of Yenbo through which the British were supplying the Revolt:

The hill tribes that formed Feisal's barrier forces [around Yenbo] gave way to the first major Turkish assault. A Turk cavalry column...pushed on, nearly captured young Prince Zeid's [Arab] force and now was looking hungrily at the Yenbo base. This unexpected success brought Feisal with his five-thousand-strong camel corps to screen Yenbo, but he in turn was attacked and driven back into the town, where he was protected by the guns of the hastily concentrated British warships. These proved too much for the Turks, who backed off to sit like a hungry dog, one eye on Yenbo, one eye on [its sister port of] Rabigh.<sup>9</sup>

To British observers, "the Revolt now seemed to be so near collapse that it was necessary to reconsider British policy towards it."<sup>10</sup> The British High Commissioner in Egypt, Sir Reginald Wingate, concluded "that the only hope was to send British troops as soon as possible."<sup>11</sup> One British advisor recently assigned to the Arabs, had a different view, however:

[Captain (CPT) T.E.] Lawrence talked Feisal into moving [from Yenbo] 200 miles farther north to the port of Wejh, which would give a base closer to Suez, making it easier for the British to bring in supplies. Despite an arduous march through the desert, Feisal's men arrived at Wejh after a seaborne attack by a small force of Arab infantry and British marines had seized the port [on 23 January 1917], with the help of six British warships.

The Turks had insufficient mobility to pursue such far-ranging groups of Arabs, aided by British sea-power, and fell back on Medina, where half the force guarded the city and the remainder protected [their only source of supply,] the [Hejaz] railway.<sup>12</sup>

Meanwhile, by early 1916 the British had diverted enough resources to Egypt for Murray to initiate an "eastward extension of [the] Suez Canal defenses into the Sinai...."<sup>13</sup> But while the Arabs launched the Revolt and proceeded to Wejh, he had only pushed the Turks out of the poorly defensible Sinai and stalled at Gaza on the Mediterranean coast.<sup>14</sup> Preparing to assault Gaza, he learned the town was about to be reinforced by Turks withdrawn from Medina via the Hejaz railway. Murray thus requested (he had no direct control over the Arabs) that Hussein's forces make "every effort" to prevent Turkish troops "from going north" along the railway.<sup>15</sup> Although the Arabs successfully "derailed" the reinforcements, Murray's assault failed. In two separate attacks in March and April, 1917, he lost over 10,000 troops without winning the Turkish position. "An exasperated [British] War Office...relieved Murray. In his

place came General Allenby...."<sup>16</sup> Before detailing how Allenby affected the conduct of the Anglo-Arab campaign, it is important to note the extent of the hybrid force's coordination and decentralization, as well as its overall efficiency, during Murray's command.

From its inception until Murray's relief, the hybrid force was largely uncoordinated. That this was primarily due to political concerns is evident in a reply by General Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, as to whether Murray should control the Arab forces:

There are many interests involved in the Arab [Revolt]. The Foreign Office, India Office, and the French and Russian[s]...are all interested and there are many ramifications of the question.... [M]ilitary assistance must for the present be confined to provision of munitions and supplies, and...I do not think the time has yet come to make a change as to the general control and supervision of the [Arabs'] operations.<sup>17</sup>

Hence, Murray controlled the British regulars in the Sinai, while the Arab Bureau of the High Commissioner for Egypt worked with the Arabs. But although it was the British government which originally imposed a split command on the hybrid force, one must also note that Murray did not protest the arrangement. "Sir Archibald Murray...wanted naturally enough, no competitor and competing campaigns in his area. He disliked the civil power [of the High Commissioner and sought]....to make the spectacle of the High Commission running a private war [look] sufficiently ridiculous....When he found opportunity he bent his considerable powers to crab what he called the rival show."<sup>18</sup> Consequently, excepting the Arab interdiction of Turkish reinforcements for Gaza, the British and the Arabs executed separate operational plans from the outbreak of the Revolt to Murray's relief.

A lack of close coordination, however, did not translate into freedom of action for the Arab irregulars. Far from encouraging them to operate in stealthy, mobile guerrilla operations, the "original purpose" of the first British advisors to the Revolt was to train the Arabs to fight as regulars.<sup>19</sup> This is not surprising given contemporary military doctrine: "The books gave it pat – the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy [should be accomplished] by the one process – [decisive] battle. Victory could be purchased only by blood."<sup>20</sup> Therefore, the "professional British and French officers raised in the Napoleonic tradition" serving as the Arabs' advisors saw as their ultimate objective training the Arabs to operate like a traditional European army.<sup>21</sup>

Moreover, while most of these advisors may have been conditioned by their military education to avoid decentralizing Arab operations, the French contingent had an ulterior motive for constraining Arab efforts – France sought to take over most of the

Ottoman Middle East after Turkey was defeated. France, capitalizing on the fact that the British valued French cooperation on the Western Front more than satisfying Arab nationalist concerns, had signed a secret agreement with the British which virtually guaranteed French control of Syria after the war. Looking to minimize difficulties in post-war occupation of her new Middle East possessions, France directed her advisors to contain the operation of Hussein's forces – and the spark of Arab nationalism – as far south in Arabia as possible. During General Murray's tenure, these surreptitious attempts at containment were often successful.

It is thus clear that Arab irregulars were not given broad discretion in planning and executing their tactical operations. They were restricted, by both the training program and the political intrigues of their European advisors, to conducting essentially conventional operations along the Red Sea coast. Combined with the lack of coordination also highlighted, this centralization of irregular efforts meant that the Anglo-Arab force during General Murray's command illustrated exactly the opposite of the qualities recommended by my hypothesis. One next asks, how efficient was this uncoordinated, centralized hybrid force?

As for costs suffered by the Turks, Murray's regulars had pushed them out of the Sinai and inflicted 11,000 casualties.<sup>22</sup> The Arabs meanwhile had taken over "the greater part of the Hejaz" and, according to a probably over-enthusiastic estimate of the Arab Bureau, eliminated the equivalent of a Turkish division.<sup>23</sup> But inflicting these costs had not come cheap. Murray's regulars had suffered 12,000 casualties, and two bloody repulses at Gaza emphasized that the Turks now occupied defensible terrain. Also, with the Revolt limited to the Hejaz, they faced little threat to their lines of communication north of Arabia. So while Murray had inflicted appreciable costs on the Turks, the resources he had expended in making only limited territorial gains suggest that the hybrid force had not been highly efficient. Allenby's appointment clearly sprang from a desire to inflict greater costs on the Turks for less expenditure by the Allies.

## 2. A New Approach

Not long before Murray's relief, the enigmatic CPT Lawrence had been musing over this very issue of improving Anglo-Arab efficiency. "The Arabs would not endure casualties," he said, because they "fought for freedom, and that was a pleasure to be tasted only by a man alive."<sup>24</sup> Worse yet, because they "had no generals skilled in conventional war and their tribal structure rendered them incapable of the military discipline and organization necessary to confront the Turks in open battle," they performed poorly as regular soldiers.<sup>25</sup> In early 1917, then, the consensus was that

"efforts to train and organize an Arab force capable of meeting the Turks in the field have been unsuccessful...."<sup>26</sup>

Even with these deficiencies, Lawrence still believed the Arabs were "the most elusive enemy an army has ever had, and inhabit[ed] one of the most trying countries in the world for civilized warfare."<sup>27</sup> Focusing on these assets, he "did not insist on grafting his... country's military standards on a body incapable of reception. Instead...[he] hit on a type of war compatible to [existing Arab] leadership, [and] capabilities...."<sup>28</sup> Rather than Arabs attacking "like an army with banners," which the Turks could stymie "by a trench line," Lawrence posed an alternative: "suppose we [the Arabs] were an influence, an idea, a thing intangible, invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas?...We might be a vapor, blowing where we listed.... It seemed a [Turkish] soldier might be helpless without a target, owning only what he sat on, and subjugating only what...he could poke his rifle at."<sup>29</sup> Instead of a building a conventional army *to drive the Turks out of Arabia into Syria*, the Arabs should operate as guerrillas and *pin the Turks down to Arabia and Syria*. For so pinned down,

The Turk was harmless....We wanted him to stay at Medina, and every other distant place, in the largest numbers. Our ideal was to keep his railway working, but only just, with the maximum of loss and discomfort. The factor of food would confine him to the railways, but he was welcome to the Hejaz Railway, and the Trans-Jordan railway, and the Palestine and Syrian railways for the duration of the war, so long as he gave us the other [999] thousandths of the Arab world....His stupidity would be our ally, for he would like to...think he held as much of his old provinces as possible. This pride in his imperial heritage would keep him in his present absurd position – all flanks and no front.<sup>30</sup>

Soon after developing these concepts, Lawrence independently led an Arab force to capture the vital port city of Aqaba. That "a force of Arab tribesmen had been able to take Aqaba without British foreknowledge or support" stunned the British high command in Cairo, and gained Lawrence an audience with Allenby less than a month after the latter assumed command.<sup>31</sup> At the meeting, Lawrence "sketched the future military value" of an extensive Arab guerrilla campaign. "There were rumors that the [British] Cabinet wanted Jerusalem captured by Christmas, and he stressed the contribution that the Arabs could make to such a victory...."<sup>32</sup> Lawrence also stressed that unlike the earlier limited employment of the Arabs, utilizing them on a vaster scale to gain greater results had to be tied to Allenby's conventional operations:

[Such] operations are entirely contingent on a decision to undertake major operations [by the British regulars] in Palestine with which the movement of the Arabs must synchronize. If minor [conventional] operations only are intended in Palestine, the Arab [guerrilla]

operations...would probably lead to the destruction of many of the Arab elements, and most certainly to that of the [Syrian Arabs], were they to take action. Unless operations of such magnitude as to occupy the whole of the Turkish Army in Palestine were undertaken the proposed Arab operations must be abandoned.<sup>33</sup>

Allenby saw "the possible benefits" of such a campaign "to British efforts in Sinai and Palestine were obvious," and requested the War Office approve Lawrence's plan (which would take the Arabs well north of Arabia).<sup>34</sup> Since possessing Aqaba placed the Arabs in a position to much more substantially assist the British regulars, the War Office – discounting French interests – approved the plan, and placed Allenby over the Arab forces as well. In planning to resume the offensive at Gaza, Allenby wrote that "the co-operation offered by [CPT] Lawrence," "if successfully carried out...in conjunction with [conventional] operations in Palestine, may cause a collapse of the Turkish campaigns in the Hejaz and in Syria and produce far-reaching results...."<sup>35</sup>

### **3. The Hybrid Force under General Allenby**

Thus, as the summer of 1917 waned, "Lawrence and Arab parties now commenced a series of blows against the [Turkish] railway[s], tearing up track, blowing up culverts, and occasionally stopping and assaulting trains."<sup>36</sup> While these attacks disrupted Turkish communications and distracted their attention, a reinforced Allenby massed 88,000 troops to attack 35,000 Turks in Palestine. His six week campaign culminated with the capture of Jerusalem on 9 December.<sup>37</sup>

Although drafts of Allenby's force to halt German offensives in France restricted him to "minor operations" around Jerusalem for much of 1918, "Arabia to the south and east was in flames." Arab guerrillas continued to play "hob with the Hejaz Railway....[keeping] more than 25,000 Turkish troops pinned down to blockhouses and posts along this line." When Allenby resumed the offensive in September with 69,000 British troops against 36,000 Turks, even closer coordination with the Arab irregulars overwhelmed the Ottoman forces and swept them all the way north to Aleppo.<sup>38</sup> Turkey surrendered on 30 October 1918.

### **4. Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Campaign**

#### **a. Increased Efficiency from Coordination of Efforts & Decentralization of Irregulars**

The hybrid force under General Allenby had clearly inflicted much greater costs on the Turks than they had under the split command of General Murray and the Arab Bureau. In the 10 months after the Revolt created an Anglo-Arab hybrid force, General Murray had gotten only to the walls of Gaza, and the Revolt had not left


the Hejaz. Even without factoring in the spectacular success of 1918, Allenby in just seven months of 1917 had advanced over the very defensible terrain of Palestine to capture Jerusalem, and inflicted 25,000 Turkish casualties. The Arabs which he unleashed throughout Syria and Arabia had at the same time "killed, captured or contained...some 35,000" Turks.<sup>39</sup> When the 1918 offensive is also counted, the Anglo-Arab force would go on to inflict a further 76,000 Turkish casualties and knock Turkey out of the war. At a total cost of less than 30,000 Allied casualties, Allenby had unquestionably improved the efficiency of the hybrid force. What had made the difference?

While the role of Allenby's numerical superiority cannot be discounted, one must also give considerable credit to the redesigned Allied strategy. Whereas Murray and the Arab Bureau had not coordinated the operations of the hybrid force's components, the very core of the concept which Lawrence advocated, Allenby adopted, and the War Office approved had been a unified strategy incorporating both the Arabs and the British. In this strategy, the Arabs "became the right wing of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force...and [their] task henceforth was to carry the war into Syria *in conformity with General Allenby's plans.*"<sup>40</sup> But they were not a right wing of the army in the traditional sense. Unlike the initial attempts to employ the Arabs, which focused on training them to fight with European tactics and constraining them to the Hejaz, under Allenby they were given great freedom to strike at the Turks throughout Arabia and Syria. Consequently, Arab irregulars conducting decentralized operations within a coordinated plan tied down or destroyed more than 30,000 Turkish troops. These Turks, if not so occupied, would have decidedly reduced Allenby's numerical superiority in Palestine. One thus sees that Allenby's strategy for employing his resources was just as important as his numerical advantage, if not more so, in improving his hybrid command's efficiency.

**b. Coordination & Decentralization Increase the Costs Inflicted (on the Enemy) Through the Dispersion/Concentration Dilemma**


Allenby's changes in the independent variables – coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars – increased the costs inflicted upon the Turkish opposition through the mechanism of the *dispersion/concentration dilemma*. This is the dilemma created when enemy is compelled to both disperse his forces to neutralize the threat posed by the hybrid irregulars yet concentrate his forces to defeat the threat of the hybrid regulars.<sup>41</sup> How did the independent variables cause the

dispersion/concentration dilemma? Relatively high levels of Allied *coordination* forced the Turks to deal with *both* Allenby's regulars and the Arab irregulars on the least favorable terms, and sometimes nearly simultaneously. Great *decentralization* of the of the Arab irregulars meant that the Turks faced two *distinctly different* types of threat: a British regular threat in Palestine requiring concentrated conventional combat power for traditional engagements; and an Arab irregular threat which could only be neutralized by substantial dispersion throughout Syria and Arabia. With their strength dissipated between these two opposing requirements, the Turks suffered greater losses of troops and terrain, regardless of whether they concentrated or dispersed (see diagrams below). Thus, by increasing the costs inflicted on the Turks, the dispersion/concentration dilemma, created by coordination and decentralization, increased the efficiency of the hybrid force.



**Figure 1. Costs to Turks of Concentration**

- “...guerrilla forces’ main importance is their ability to deny an enemy permanent or real control of any area not physically dominated by military presence, and to demoralise [sic] the foe by inflicting a steady drain of casualties. Whatever their possible contribution to regular operations, *their greatest use is to keep the foe off-balance and dispersed. A blow threatened is often more valuable than one delivered.*”<sup>42</sup>



**Figure 2. Costs to Turks of Dispersion**

### **c. Importance of Antecedent Conditions**

Two antecedent conditions, or preconditions, allowed Allenby's coordinated yet decentralized approach to produce such tremendous efficiency: local popular support and minimum strategic vulnerability for the regulars.

**(1) Local popular support.** As Lawrence wrote after the War, "irregular warfare....must have a friendly population, not actively friendly, but sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy."<sup>43</sup> Consequently, I contend that within the contested theater, the hybrid force requires a sizable portion of the civilian population which is at least neutral toward the force. Neutral is defined as a local population which *will not* oppose the movements of the hybrid force, but *will* sell or give supplies to the hybrid force. Furthermore, the local population must be willing to maintain these preferences over the course of a potentially lengthy campaign where the conventional opponent will probably subject them to hardship or reprisals. As popular support for the hybrid force increases – for example, if local inhabitants are willing to provide intelligence on the enemy to the hybrid force or if local inhabitants are willing to become combatants themselves – the maximum possible efficiency for the hybrid force increases.

**(2) Strategic vulnerability of hybrid regulars.** The hybrid force cannot present the dual-natured threat which is indispensable to employing the dispersion/ concentration dilemma without possessing both a regular and an irregular component. But while the irregulars can use their stealth to avoid significant losses, the hybrid regulars have no such option. Instead, hybrid regulars must avoid significant losses – must minimize their strategic vulnerability – through use of geography, transportation assets, or discriminating leadership.

If either of these preconditions do not exist for a hybrid commander, then his force *will* be negatively impacted in one or both of the following ways. First, the hybrid force may not be able to survive over the long term. Second, the hybrid force will not be able to achieve the maximum efficiency possible from its available resources. Moreover, the hybrid commander lacking one or both of the preconditions may find that his force produces its best possible efficiency (which, it must be stressed, will be less than the maximum efficiency possible for that force) through an alternative combination of the independent variables. For example, a hybrid force lacking local popular support may produce its best efficiency when its two components are coordinated, but irregular operations are centralized.

## C. METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY

### 1. Introducing the Hypothesis Matrix

This review of the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign appears to reinforce my hypothesis that coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars will produce the most efficient hybrid force. I now look to test my hypothesis against other cases of hybrid warfare. As an aid to selecting appropriate tests of my hypothesis, I constructed the following matrix:




Figure 3. Initial Hypothesis Matrix

Each of the independent variables forms an axis. On the grid created, one can then place various types of hybrid forces based on the degrees of coordination and decentralization which they possess. Hence, a highly coordinated, or "integrated," hybrid force whose irregulars are highly decentralized, or given great "freedom of action," would be placed in the upper right portion of the matrix (as represented by Allenby's force). According to the hypothesis, any such force would produce great efficiency. In contrast, a segregated and overcontrolled hybrid force would be placed in the lower left of the matrix (as represented by Murray's force) and be expected to achieve only moderate efficiency. Using this matrix, I selected three cases with which to test the tentative assertions drawn from the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign.

## 2. The Test Cases

First, I will test my hypothesis against a case demonstrating relatively high coordination and decentralization from the outset -- Wellington's campaign with the Spanish guerrillas against the French from 1809 to 1813. Second, I will examine a campaign demonstrating a "failure" in one variable – in this case a lack of coordination of efforts. I selected the Boer War of 1899 to 1902 for this case. Finally, I looked for a test demonstrating a "failure" in decentralization. A number of factors beyond a lack of decentralization recommended the Sino-Anglo-American campaign under General Stilwell in Burma during WWII. For example, this campaign appears worthy of contemporary U.S. consideration because it features the employment of an American hybrid force in a modern campaign with significant use of airpower. Moreover, half of the irregulars employed were U.S. SOF (i.e. Merrill's Marauders), not native irregulars. These points make the case an outstanding one for study, particularly for what it may suggest about the protracted use of SOF and GPF together in modern war.

I would like to emphasize that each of the cases selected also represents other historical hybrid forces which possessed similar degrees of coordination and decentralization. The high coordination and decentralization of the Spanish case correlate closely to the cooperation in Vietnam between Communist regulars and the Viet Cong. The segregation and decentralization of the Boers can also be found in the relationships between the southern partisans and Continental regulars of the American Revolution, the Confederate raiders and Confederate high command in the Civil War, and the franc-tireurs and French high command during the Franco-Prussian War. The integration and overcontrol of Stilwell's force is roughly analogous to the relationship between U.S. GPF and SOF in the Gulf War. Because the cases selected typify a great many other hybrid forces, this study will hopefully reach conclusions based not simply on three campaigns, but on the bulk of hybrid campaigns fought during the last two centuries.




Figure 4. Hypothesis Matrix with Selected Cases

Placing these cases, including the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, on my hypothesis matrix demonstrates how they test every combination of my independent variables. Hence, I am confident that in examining these cases together I will have conducted a solid evaluation of my hypothesis. To begin that evaluation, I move to my first case study – the Anglo-Iberian hybrid campaign against Napoleon.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER II

<sup>1</sup> Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982, p. 7-1, emphasis added.

<sup>2</sup> Efficiency "is the ratio of output to input. The...efficiency of a particular productive process is the ratio of useful productive output to useful input of resources." R.H. Leftwich, *The Price System and Resource Allocation*, New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960, p. 16.

<sup>3</sup> Russell Weigley paraphrasing the argument of John Ellis' *Brute Force*, in *Parameters*, Summer 1991, p. 111 and 113.

<sup>4</sup> Clausewitz was probably the first modern analyst to allude to the importance of coordination in a hybrid effort. Considering France's dismal defeats in campaigns against hybrid opponents in Spain (1808 – 1813) and Russia (1812 – 1813) prompted him to write of a new "phenomenon" – "the people in arms" – which described local irregular resistance to conventional conquerors.

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"Any nation that uses [people's war] will," he wrote, "as a rule, gain some superiority over those who disdain its use." But to have a "realistic" chance of success, he added "one must...think of a [people's war]...within the framework of a war conducted by the regular army, and coordinated in one all-encompassing plan." (*On War*, trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 479.) Combined with Webster's definition of coordination, Clausewitz's concepts form the basis for the definition I crafted.

<sup>5</sup> Decentralization affects the nature of an irregular force in three ways.

First, it enhances the irregulars' stealth by not orchestrating the conduct of their operations too closely. This makes it harder for the enemy to predict the irregulars' next course of action, and therefore, their exact location.

Second, it increases the irregulars' agility – their ability to adapt to a broad and varying range of conditions by reacting faster than the enemy. This agility is crucial for the survival of the irregulars who, usually operating in hostile or denied territory, must control their exposure to potential enemy attack to a much greater degree than a conventional force fighting a primarily linear conflict.

Third, *FM 100-5* points out that decentralization in general often degrades a force's ability to synchronize its operations (p. 2-6). But at the operational level of war which is the hybrid force commander's primary focus, this is not a major concern. At the operational level, as I will demonstrate below, the regulars and irregulars of a hybrid force can defeat an enemy with actions which are synchronized to occur only within days, if not weeks, of each other. Decentralization does not degrade the irregulars' ability to synchronize on this time scale.

One may note that decentralization is also required for successful conventional operations by the regular component of a hybrid force. If the regular component was decentralized to the same degree as the irregulars, however, it would lessen the regulars' combat power and their unit cohesion.

Sweeping decentralization – on the scale this study recommends for irregulars – would lessen the regulars' combat power by degrading their ability to synchronize at the tactical level. For the often outnumbered hybrid regular component, which seeks to balance its lack of stealth (i.e. as a conventional force it is relatively easy to locate and track) through maximum tactical firepower (making the opponent who can "easily" find them still reluctant to engage them) such loss of synchronization would unacceptably diminish the effects of that firepower.

At the same time, decentralizing the regulars to the same extent as the irregulars would threaten the former's discipline and cohesion. As C.E. Calwell notes in his classic work, *Small Wars* (3<sup>rd</sup> ed., 1906, rpt. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996, p. 88), because of the degree to which irregulars are decentralized, "in the [irregular] ranks there is no solid cohesion and no mutual reliance....As long as all goes well, irregular forces hold together and obey their chiefs, but in the hour of trial the bonds which keep the mass intact are apt to snap, and then the whole dissolves and disappears." For the regulars, who unlike the stealthy irregulars cannot simply "dissolve and disappear" should an engagement turn against them, a lack of discipline or cohesion could prove literally fatal.

For these reasons, while the proper amount of decentralization is still beneficial for regular forces, that amount will be no where near as great as that which should be granted to irregulars.

Sources consulted in constructing this definition of decentralization included *FM 100-5* (1993), *SOF Vision 2020* (undated), General Peter Schoomaker's *Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead* (1997), and *Webster's Dictionary*.

<sup>6</sup> Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume I*, New York: Doubleday, 1975, p. 280.

<sup>7</sup> R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, Fourth Edition*, New York: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 1048, 1055; and Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence*, New York: Atheneum, 1990.

<sup>8</sup> Asprey, p. 280.

<sup>9</sup> Asprey, p. 283-284.

<sup>10</sup> Wilson, p. 342.

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<sup>11</sup> Wilson, p. 343.

<sup>12</sup> Bevin Alexander, *The Future of Warfare*, New York, W.W. Norton, 1995, p. 123-124.

<sup>13</sup> Dupuy, p. 1054.

<sup>14</sup> Dupuy, p. 1055, 1065.

<sup>15</sup> Wilson, p. 378.

<sup>16</sup> Dupuy, p. 1066.

<sup>17</sup> Robertson telegram to Murray, 16 June 1916, as quoted in Wilson, p. 289.

<sup>18</sup> T.E. Lawrence as quoted in Wilson, p. 290.

<sup>19</sup> Wilson, p. 352

<sup>20</sup> T.E. Lawrence, *Seven Pillars of Wisdom, A Triumph*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1926, rpt. New York: Dell, 1962, p. 192.

<sup>21</sup> Asprey, p. 287. See also Wilson, p. 355.

<sup>22</sup> Dupuy, p. 1055, 1065, 1066.

<sup>23</sup> Arab Bureau summary for October 1916, as quoted in Wilson, p. 305.

<sup>24</sup> Lawrence, p. 192, 194.

<sup>25</sup> Alexander, p. 119.

<sup>26</sup> Report of British High Commissioner for Egypt Reginald Wingate to the British Foreign Office, 14 December 1916, as quoted in Wilson, p. 342.

<sup>27</sup> Lawrence from December, 1917, as quoted in Wilson, p. 367.

<sup>28</sup> Asprey, p. 289.

<sup>29</sup> Lawrence, p. 195.

<sup>30</sup> Lawrence, p. 228.

<sup>31</sup> Wilson, p. 420.

<sup>32</sup> Wilson, p. 420.

<sup>33</sup> Head of the Arab Bureau Sir Gilbert Clayton's summary of Lawrence's proposals, 15 July 1917, as quoted in Wilson, p. 423.

<sup>34</sup> Wilson, p. 423.

<sup>35</sup> Allenby, 19 July 1917, as quoted in Wilson, p. 426-427.

<sup>36</sup> Alexander, p. 125.

<sup>37</sup> Dupuy, p. 1066.

<sup>38</sup> All citations this paragraph from Dupuy, p. 1080-1081.

<sup>39</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1938, p. 231.

<sup>40</sup> Antonius, p. 223, emphasis added.

<sup>41</sup> For Allenby, or any hybrid force commander, to force his opponent to truly disperse, the hybrid irregulars must be employed in wide spread, sustained operations across the theater. Thus, if a contemporary commander of a hybrid SOF/GPF force seeks to duplicate Allenby's accomplishments, the modern commander would have to achieve depth in both space and time with his SOF operations. Classic limited duration SOF actions -- such as the German glider assault at Eben Emael or Allied airborne operations on D-Day -- would *not* have the same effect.

<sup>42</sup> David Chandler, *On The Napoleonic Wars*, London: Greenhill Books, 1994, p. 178 [emphasis added].

<sup>43</sup> Lawrence, "Guerrilla Warfare," in *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1957, Volume 10, as quoted in Asprey, p. 292.

### III. THE PENINSULAR WAR, 1808 - 1814

#### A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY

##### 1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?

The Iberian Peninsula:

Much of the area is an immense plateau of between 2000-3000 ft [sic], bordered by [mountains] .... The main ranges run east to west.... So movement from east to west is easier than from north to south. The rivers, partly navigable, conform.... The barren nature of much of Spain -- "a country where small armies are defeated and large armies starve" (Henry IV of France) makes only a few areas suitable for cavalry action....

In sum a rugged, barren country of few roads....

As for Portugal, the barren frontier regions restricted practicable routes for invasions [from Spain] to five.... Two-thirds of the area is mountainous -- only south of the Tagus [River] is there any really fertile country....

To summarize - the Peninsula was well-suited in geographical terms for a desperate last-stand, war-to-the-death against a foreign conqueror....<sup>1</sup>

##### 2. The Combatants

###### a. Who Were They?

The conventional opponent were the French. Under Napoleon's direct command from October, 1808 until January, 1809, French forces were otherwise under the nominal command of his brother Joseph, the King of Spain. "The French forces...fluctuated between a peak of 340,000 (1810) and a low of 200,000 (1812 and after)."<sup>2</sup>

The hybrid force was composed of British and Portuguese regulars under the command of the Duke of Wellington,<sup>3</sup> and Spanish irregulars under numerous leaders.<sup>4</sup> "Wellington's English [regular] army never surpassed 40,000 men, perhaps plus a further 25,000 attached and trained Portuguese and Spanish 'regular' forces."<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, "it is calculated that never were more than 50,000 guerrillas under arms in global terms: some sources assert that there were only 36,500 at most."<sup>6</sup>

###### b. Why Were They Fighting?

The Spanish Insurrection began in early 1808, when Napoleon moved to take over the governments of Spain and Portugal so as to strengthen his position relative to Britain. Napoleon initiated the takeover by deploying almost 100,000 troops into Spain and Portugal. When some members of the Spanish royal family refused his


"invitation" to negotiations in Bayonne, France, Napoleon ordered French troops to forcibly transport them there.

Learning that members of the monarchy were about to be kidnapped, citizens of Madrid took to the streets to attack their French occupiers. About 150 French were killed, but they ruthlessly restored order the next day. Word of the uprising, and of the Spanish civilians executed by the French in reprisal, spread like wildfire across Spain. "Proud, easily offended, and spurred on by the minor clergy, the Spanish were obsessed with the idea that the French were instruments of the devil."<sup>7</sup> Consequently, "spontaneous popular insurrection" erupted across the countryside as the fiercely independent Spanish fell upon the occupying French.<sup>8</sup>

While the Spanish and Portuguese fought to free themselves from French oppressions, Britain may also have seen her own survival entangled in the developing Iberian conflict. The prospect of French success in Spain and Portugal presented England with the danger "which her foreign policy had striven for centuries to avert. The European mainland, with its manpower, wealth and shipyards, was dominated by a single nation, indeed by the will of a single man."<sup>9</sup> Thus, Britain chose to intervene in the Iberian conflict because, while her earlier attempts to eliminate this "danger" had been mere "pinpricks on Napoleon's hide," the "outbreak of risings in [the Peninsula]...offered the British the opportunity to wound him hurtfully."<sup>10</sup> This opportunity was legitimized by "the *junta* of Seville's appeal to the British government for armed and financial support...."<sup>11</sup> Alternatively, B.H. Liddell-Hart contends that intervention "was undertaken by the British government more from the hope of saving Portugal," one of Britain's oldest allies, "than from any deep appreciation of its grand-strategic potentialities in aggravating [Napoleon's position]...."<sup>12</sup> Taken together, these contrasting views cover the major explanations for Britain's participation in the Peninsular War.

### **c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?**

Napoleon's army was the finest in Europe. "In the three years before Wellington went to Portugal, Napoleon had entered Vienna [and] Berlin...as a conqueror."<sup>13</sup> Thus, the army which Napoleon "brought into the Peninsula in the autumn of 1808...was....composed of his finest old regiments from the Rhine and Elbe, the flower of the victors of Jena and Friedland."<sup>14</sup> Wellington fully appreciated the French army's prowess:



THE PENINSULAR WAR

**Figure 5. The Peninsular War**  
 (from David Chandler's *On the Napoleonic Wars, Collected Essays*)

I have not seen them since the campaign in Flanders [in 1794], when they were capital soldiers, and a dozen years of victory under Buonaparte [sic] must have made them better still. They have besides, it seems, a new system of strategy which has out-manoeuvred and overwhelmed all the armies of Europe. 'Tis enough to make one thoughtful....<sup>15</sup>

In contrast, as they seized upon the opportunity to "wound" Napoleon "hurtfully," the British dispatched a mediocre army to the Peninsula. Although "Wellesley's infantry...were the best England had assembled in memory,"<sup>16</sup> "best" was altogether relative:

The record of the British Army since 1793 had been patchy at best; some successes had been achieved, [but] the years after these...had been littered with dismal failures and farcical tragedies, Egypt (1807) and Buenos Aires (1806-07) being amongst the more infamous examples.... When the British Army under... Wellesley landed in Portugal in August 1808 it was still reeling from these failures.... The army was inexperienced and largely untried....<sup>17</sup>

Even after initially defeating a French force at Vimeiro in August, 1808, Wellington would still rate his army the next spring as "a rabble who cannot bear success any more than Sir John Moore's army could bear failure."<sup>18</sup>

The Spanish army, characterized as it was by "undrilled and half-clothed soldiery,...unhorsed squadrons,...empty arsenals,...[and] idle and ignorant subalterns,"<sup>19</sup> was a significant step down in quality from the British. As Charles Oman writes,

Summing up the faults of the Spanish army,...we find that its main source of weakness was that while the wars of the French Revolution had induced all the other states of Europe to overhaul their military organization and learn something from the methods of the French, Spain was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of the eighteenth century.<sup>20</sup>

Since the Spanish guerrilla forces would be composed of former members of this archaic army, and peasants, one certainly feels justified in rating their quality as unknown at best. Similarly, at the outset of the campaign, the quality of the Portuguese armed forces was comparable to that of the Spanish.

### **3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive Events?**

In attempting to summarize the Peninsular War, particularly when assessing the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force, one is acutely aware of "the traditional tendency of historians to become obsessed with battles."<sup>21</sup> "Indeed, by treating the Peninsular War as a chronicle of Wellington's battles and sieges it becomes meaningless."<sup>22</sup> Instead, a more profitable approach is to view the campaign in phases, each delineated by the character of the Anglo-Iberian resistance. This method reveals those erstwhile focal

points – Wellington's battles – as only the conventional indicators of what was actually a vast hybrid resistance to the French.

**a. Phase I – Conventional Defeat, 1808**

The first phase of the Peninsular War, ironically, is a tale of conventional battles. In 1808, the Anglo-Iberian resistance took the form independent conventional campaigns against the French:

[T]he waves of spontaneous popular insurrection...provided Great Britain with the opportunity to...send Sir Arthur Wellesley and a small British army...to the region in early August of 1808. Within three weeks he had broken the French hold on Portugal and induced the French to evacuate....Meanwhile the as yet unaided Spanish armies (amalgams of regular units and local militias)...had driven King Joseph and his armies back beyond the Ebro [River]. These unpropitious events...caused Napoleon to intervene in person in October...and in a whirlwind campaign of conquest the Emperor defeated a clutch of half-trained and ill-led Spanish armies, restored his *fratello* to his throne in Madrid, and forced Sir John Moore (Wellesley's temporary successor) precipitately to evacuate the British army through Corunna...before leaving the Peninsula for ever to turn his attention to new central European crises...handing over the final stages of pacification to a group of his marshals.<sup>23</sup>

With every English or Spanish regular force which had opposed him either decisively defeated or withdrawn from the theater, Napoleon cannot be readily faulted for proclaiming, as he departed for France after defeating Moore, that "the Spanish business is finished."<sup>24</sup>

**b. Phase II – Establishing the Hybrid Force, 1809 through 1811**

Yet even before Napoleon had finished with Moore, irritants which would fester into his "Spanish ulcer" were already at work. In "December 1808, the Supreme Junta... gave legal existence to what they called a 'new kind of militia' -- the *partides* or *guerrillas*, and the 'little war' was born."<sup>25</sup> Hence, hard on the withdrawal of Moore's army – what the French assumed was the end of Anglo-Iberian resistance -- what is often called the first modern guerrilla war was born.<sup>26</sup>

So began the second phase of the Peninsular War. "Hitherto the defeat of an enemy's main army and the occupation of his capital had always proved decisive. But Madrid had been conquered, the Spanish armies were smashed, the legitimate sovereign was in the hands of the French; and yet the struggle continued."<sup>27</sup> Two subsequent events combined to characterize the surprisingly resilient Anglo-Iberian resistance during this phase.

First, the British introduced another regular Army to the campaign in April, 1809. Under Wellington again, the redcoats arrived to challenge the

"pacification" forces Napoleon had left behind. Wellington quickly "established his base near Lisbon...won the battle of Oporto, drove the French out of Portugal, followed them into Spain and fought the bitter but successful battle of Talavera."<sup>28</sup> Wellington's success clearly indicated that the bitterly disappointing withdrawal of Moore's army nine months earlier had not marked the end of British commitment to the conflict.

Second, as Wellington prepared to defend his gains at the end of 1809, the reconstituted Spanish regular forces were eliminated. In "November, this [last] Spanish army was utterly broken to pieces at the battles of Tamames and Ocana."<sup>29</sup> These defeats served to finalize the composition of the Anglo-Iberian force for the rest of the campaign. Britain would provide the regular component under Wellington,<sup>30</sup> while the Portuguese and Spanish, with their hordes of guerrillas, would provide the irregular component. As Liddell-Hart notes somewhat sardonically,

The worst misfortune for Spain, and hence for England, was the temporary success of [Spanish] attempts to form fresh regular forces. Fortunately these were soon beaten [at Tamames and Ocana], and as the French dispersed them so, coincidentally, did they disperse their own good fortune. The poison spread again instead of coming to a head.<sup>31</sup>

At the outset of this phase, the two components of the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force did not demonstrate substantial cooperation. This was primarily due to the extremely disjointed nature of the Spanish and Portuguese popular resistance. A weak central government (the Junta), ruthless French occupiers, and the independent nature of the Spanish people combined to produce a myriad of guerrilla bands operating without coordination.

[G]uerrilla attacks proliferated rapidly in many areas of the country, but with a wide variety of leaders and in a wide variety of forms. Owing to the strongly particularist proclivities of the proud Spaniards, regional and local loyalties predominated over any sense of a "nationalist" cause, making coordination all but impossible to achieve.<sup>32</sup>

But soon after he landed back in Portugal, and initiated the maneuvers which would achieve the victories of Oporto and Talavera, Wellington set about taking best advantage of the guerrillas for the overall Anglo-Iberian cause. "Wellington himself was the first to appreciate" these irregulars' untapped potential for supporting his conventional efforts.<sup>33</sup> At first, Wellington's contact with various irregular bands was limited to "clear, simple advice...which proved effective when taken."<sup>34</sup> Simultaneously, he also began "to provide [them with] money, arms, ammunition and vital supplies. He rapidly came to receive better cooperation from reward-seeking guerrilla chieftans...."<sup>35</sup>

While these early efforts at coordination gradually increased the overall combat power with which the Anglo-Iberians could confront the French, Wellington

focused on causing the most damage to the enemy arrayed directly against him. After Talavera, a concentration of French manpower forced him on the defensive. Accordingly, he "undertook the construction of a fortified system around Lisbon, the Lines of Torres Vedras...and fought the battle of Busaco to cover his retreat inside the Lines. Starvation outside drove the French back across the Spanish frontier...."<sup>36</sup> During this retreat and defensive stand, only a year after Wellington's return to the Peninsula, his efforts at coordination were already paying off. Portuguese irregulars "proved their value in carrying out the 'scorched earth' policy...during the retreat to Torres Vedras, and then harassed the French mercilessly through the late autumn and winter in...operations...which eventually induced Massena [the French commander] to retreat."<sup>37</sup>

Although the English and French "armies fought inconclusively against each other throughout 1811...Wellington, by the victories of Fuentes de Onoro and Albuera...had the better of things strategically."<sup>38</sup> More importantly, this lack of spectacular gains by the regulars masks the growing strength of the Anglo-Iberian hybrid approach:

In the summer of 1811...the French used 70,000 troops to maintain the lines of communication in the zone of guerrilla activity between Madrid and the French border. Many of the men diverted to this task had been intended for Marshal Massena at one of the war's most critical junctures. Massena lost Portugal, while his reinforcements chased guerrillas fruitlessly around...[Spain].<sup>39</sup>

In other words, Wellington's regulars got "the better of things strategically" only because of the strain the Spanish irregulars placed on the French in other regions. The Anglo-Iberian force had progressed significantly from the dark days of Corunna.

#### **c. Phase III – The Hybrid Offensive, 1812 through 1814**

In the third phase of the war, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was characterized by greatly improved, often closely orchestrated, cooperation between the two components:

In early 1812 -- as Wellington at last prepared to go onto the offensive as Napoleon ordered large transfers from the Peninsula to swell his armies in eastern Europe -- extensive plans were made for utilizing the guerrillas for diversionary attacks. The aim in 1812 was to isolate the target – Marmont's Army of the North in north-central Spain – from reinforcement once Wellington launched his offensive. An orchestrated furore of guerrilla attacks was inspired not only by British supplies but also by British soldiers and sailors in direct cooperation with them. Guerrilla attacks – and threats of naval activity from the sea – kept Soult in Andalusia and Suchet in Valencia off-balance and apprehensive....Even [King] Joseph's Army of the Center was effectively

pinned down by...bands of *mounted* guerrillas who for twelve days captured every dispatch sent out either by Jourdan or Marmont. At the time of the battle of Salamanca, the two forces were *only fifty miles apart* but neither had the least idea where the other was situated. This guerrilla-induced isolation permitted Wellington to fight and win on equal terms in numbers at Salamanca: but whereas he had 70 per cent of the total Allied regulars in the Peninsula on that battlefield, Marmont had barely 20 percent of his overall French forces present.<sup>40</sup>

While the French finally "achieved a superior concentration of force [which]... obliged [Wellington] to retreat to the Portuguese frontier where he spent the winter,"<sup>41</sup> the events of 1812 demonstrated a pattern which made eventual Anglo-Iberian victory almost certain.

Although [Wellington] was back once more on the Portuguese frontier, and thus, superficially, no further forward, actually the issue of the Peninsular War was decided. For by abandoning the greater part of Spain to concentrate against him, the French had abandoned it to the Spanish guerrillas -- and lost the chance of shaking their grip. On top of this disaster came the news of Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, which led to the withdrawal of more French troops from Spain. Thus when the next campaign opened the situation had completely changed.<sup>42</sup>

1813 brought further cooperation with the guerrillas, as well as reinforcements of British regulars, which allowed Wellington "to resume the offensive, retake Madrid, win the victories of Vitoria and Sorauren and so drive the French across the Pyrenees into France."<sup>43</sup> When Wellington resumed operations in the spring of 1814 in southern France, he "soon had to decide to send the Spanish formations back to Spain, for their actions on French soil were hardly commendable. So ended the long relationship of Wellington and the Spanish guerrillas."<sup>44</sup> And so ended the Peninsular War as a hybrid campaign.

## B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

### 1. Applying the Hypothesis

#### a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander *coordinate*<sup>45</sup> the efforts of his Force?

David Chandler argues unequivocally that Wellington sought to combine the actions of the British regulars and the Spanish irregulars: "it is today quite clear that he...set the greatest store on exploiting the opportunities offered by the guerrilla war."<sup>46</sup> Elizabeth Longford's synopsis of Wellington's own papers show that his intention to do this was a key tenet of his plan for victory: "The conditions of [ensuring British] success [on the Peninsula], he continued, were 20,000 British troops ...; a reconstituted

Portuguese army; and *the Spaniards to keep at least some of the huge French armies pinned down in their country.*<sup>47</sup> More importantly, it is just as clear that Wellington *acted* on his intention to combine the actions of his regulars with the guerrillas. "Only two days after his arrival [in April, 1809]," he was already focusing his attention on just *one* of the major French forces which confronted him while leaving the other, under Marshal Ney, "to the war of the peasantry which has been so successful...."<sup>48</sup> As recounted in the summary of the war above, Wellington continued to pursue coordination throughout the conflict. Without question, he "was well aware of the central significance of the [irregulars'] War of Independence and [through]...1813 *adapted his strategy accordingly.*"<sup>49</sup>


**b. Did the Hybrid Commander decentralize the Irregular Component?**

Yes. "Wellington set himself to exploit the advantages the widespread popular resistance...could confer."<sup>50</sup> Note that Wellington sought to "exploit the advantages" of a "widespread popular resistance" as a *popular resistance*, not as a source of recruits for additional regular armies. This was undoubtedly due in part to the fiercely independent nature of the Spanish guerrillas. He himself wrote that the typical Spaniard "'obeys no law, despises all authority, feels no gratitude for benefits conferred or favours received and is always ready with his knife or firelock to commit murder."<sup>51</sup> Wellington would most likely have had little success in conscripting such people for regular formations even if he had tried. But for the most part, Wellington did not "regularize" the guerrillas.<sup>52</sup> He instead sought to make the most out of what the Spanish seemed naturally adept at, irregular operations. As Longford writes,

Wellington despised 'enthusiasm' in the Spanish army and government; he prized it in the irregulars. Indeed the partisans represented the one form of 'irregularity' which he not only prized but paid for, whenever an intercepted French despatch [sic], often gruesomely bloodstained, was brought into his camp.<sup>53</sup>

**c. What level of efficiency would one expect from this Hybrid Force?**

Due in large part to Wellington's efforts, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was increasingly coordinated and, in the end, often integrated. Additionally, the independent nature of the Spanish people, and Wellington's tolerance, ensured that the irregulars had great freedom of action in conducting their operations. Consequently, this hybrid force is placed in the region where I hypothesize that it would achieve a high level of force efficiency.



**Figure 6. Expected Efficiency of the Anglo-Iberian Hybrid Force**

**d. How *efficient* was the Hybrid Force in *actuality*?**

When evaluating the efficiency of any military force, one must first select a point from which to begin measuring the costs inflicted on the enemy. For the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force, the most logical starting point is the spring of 1809. Given the almost complete destruction of the Iberian regulars late in the previous year, the reintroduction of a British regular contingent in April, 1809, marks the first time when both components of the hybrid force were operating in the theater.

The next step in estimating efficiency is calculating the costs a force inflicts upon its opponent. Prior to April, 1809, in almost any measure of cost – conventional battle victories, troop casualties, or territory controlled are examples -- the Anglo-Iberian forces had accomplished little against the French. With the withdrawal of Moore's army in January, the French controlled the entire Iberian peninsula. Although the British and Spanish had caused French casualties, the total number was minor when compared to French forces remaining. From this inauspicious beginning, the thoroughly outnumbered Anglo-Iberian hybrid force ended up bleeding the French white and reconquering the entire Peninsula.<sup>54</sup>

There is no question that the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force inflicted far greater French casualties than any comparison of their initial strengths would have predicted.<sup>55</sup> As King Joseph's aide-de-camp, General Bigarre, bitterly remarked: "The guerrillas...caused more casualties to the French Armies than all the regular troops during the whole course of the war in Spain; it has been proved that they murdered a hundred of our men daily. Thus, over the period of five years they killed 180,000 French Soldiers

without on their side losing more than 25,000."<sup>56</sup> Additionally, Wellington's regulars "gave" far more than they "got," although perhaps in an unexpected fashion:

...Wellington's battles were materially the least effective part of his operations. By them he inflicted a total loss of some 45,000 men only...on the French during the...campaign..., whereas Marbot reckoned that the number of French deaths alone during this period averaged a hundred a day. Hence it is a clear deduction that the overwhelming majority of the losses which drained the French strength, and their morale still more, was due to the operations of the guerrillas, *and of Wellington himself, in harrying the French and in making the country a desert where the French stayed only to starve.*<sup>57</sup>

In total then, this hybrid force achieved a tremendously efficient casualty ratio:

It is estimated that the eight-year...struggle cost the French 240,000 casualties.... This was certainly an economic cost-effective effort considering [the relative size of the forces]....These [relative force sizes] speak for themselves. The "Spanish Ulcer" tied down a wholly disproportionate amount of the French and their allied forces -- and bled them white: with dire psychological repercussions.<sup>58</sup>

But Vietnam demonstrated the pitfalls of measuring efficiency solely in terms of casualties. Consequently, it is important to note that the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was also efficient when measured by a number of alternate means:

Armed peasants made *chaos of French communications* and performed other tasks of value to both the English and Spanish regular forces. Partisans scoured the countryside of French spies and sympathizers and brought *a continuous stream of information to the Allies*....In the regions of insurgency, where each peasant was a potential guerrilla, there could be no campaigning season, no safe havens, no truces. Everywhere and always there existed the possibility of a hostile encounter. This constant terror made the Spanish war uniquely exhausting to Napoleon's armies and *ruined their effectiveness in battle.*<sup>59</sup>

Furthermore, the hybrid force was efficient in obtaining the ultimate goal of the fighting – control of terrain. Essentially, the hybrid force controlled whatever terrain the French did not physically occupy. For, as a French cavalry officer later recalled, as soon as French forces departed an area, "the partisans immediately reorganized the country we had abandoned."<sup>60</sup> This imposed tremendous costs on the French: "In Spain, the guerrillas denied the enemy systematic peaceful contact with much of the countryside, making the collection of taxes fitful, costly, and in some areas, impossible for the French....When[ever French] troops were withdrawn, the territory reverted to the guerrillas, becoming valueless to the French, *if not a positive drain on their resources.*"<sup>61</sup> Eventually, of course, the hybrid force proceeded from controlling little terrain in early 1809 to controlling all of the peninsula less than five years later. Indeed, once the Anglo-Iberian alliance had regained control of the peninsula at the end of 1813,

they were able in the following year to carry the war into France proper. Could there then have been a more complete contrast between the military efficiency gained by the hybrid force and its conventional predecessors?<sup>62</sup>

In summation then, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was tremendously efficient in not only destroying enemy combat power, but in numerous other measures to include controlling terrain. As Liddell-Hart aptly concludes about the force's overall efficiency, "as a strain on Napoleon...it bore fruit tenfold."<sup>63</sup>

**e. Was the high degree of *coordination* and *decentralization* responsible for the efficiency achieved?**

One thus comes to the critical question in relationship to testing my hypothesis against the Peninsular War. On the one hand, the components of the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force were increasingly coordinated, with great freedom of action given to the irregulars as well. On the other, the hybrid force was highly efficient. Quite simply, to what degree are these relatively high levels of coordination and decentralization responsible for the high level of efficiency?

In brief, the significant coordination and decentralization of this hybrid force were the decisive factors in producing its tremendous efficiency. John Tone reveals the causal relationship, from high coordination and decentralization to high efficiency, when he ponders how Wellington's (at most) 60,000 troops could escape destruction at the hands of a French opponent several times their size:

The answer to this riddle is that the Allies never faced the bulk of Napoleon's armies. Most of the time, French troops were not fighting Wellington or the Spanish regulars. Rather, they were assigned to the occupation of a nominally pacified Spain, where a guerrilla insurgency threatened the French regime at its roots. Spanish guerrillas forced Napoleon to expend hundreds of thousands of French troops in occupation duties, eliminating the emperor's numerical superiority over the Allies....The implications of French military dispositions in garrisons, requisition parties, convoy duty, and antiinsurgency units rather than in facing Allied concentrations cannot be mistaken. Guerrillas, in *symbiosis* with the regular Allied armies, destroyed Napoleon...in Spain.<sup>64</sup>

A coordinated, dual-natured threat thus confronted the French with the same dilemma which plagued the Turks fighting Allenby and the Arabs: simultaneously disperse to deal with the guerrillas *and* concentrate to deal with Wellington. This instance of the dispersion/concentration dilemma stemmed almost entirely from the coordination and decentralization of the Allied hybrid force. *Decentralization* ensured that the French faced not only an identifiable, potent regular threat, but an almost invisible, resilient irregular one as well. *Coordination* repeatedly forced the French to confront each of these threats on the least favorable terms. As the war progressed, the

efficiency produced by this dilemma – itself the direct result of high coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars -- became more strikingly evident.

In early 1810, as the French prepared to drive Wellington back after Talavera, they “had concentrated nearly 300,000 men in Spain -- with more to come. [But] Of this total, [only] 65,000 were assigned to Massena for...driving the British out of Portugal. While the number is large, its small proportion to the whole is illuminating evidence of the growing strain of the guerrilla war in Spain.”<sup>65</sup> Thus, less than a year after the hybrid campaign opened, the French were already constrained by the dispersion/concentration dilemma. The following year, as already mentioned, simultaneous requirements to disperse troops to quell the guerrillas, yet mass troops to defeat Wellington, left the French without enough power to defeat the latter “at one of the war’s most critical junctures.”<sup>66</sup>

By 1812, Wellington was skillfully manipulating the French dilemma, as evidenced by the coordination of guerrilla offensives which paved the way for his triumph with the regulars at Salamanca.<sup>67</sup> 1813, the final full year of the hybrid campaign, demonstrated perhaps the most efficient returns from the dispersion/concentration dilemma. After Wellington drove the French from Madrid for the final time, they “withdrew over a period of several months through the territory controlled by the [guerrilla] Division of Navarre, making the presence of the guerrillas more important than ever, as they disrupted the retreat, [and] pinned down thousands of troops that would otherwise have entered the fight against Wellington....”<sup>68</sup> When Wellington finally caught the retreating French and defeated them at the battle of Vitoria, guerrillas “had succeeded in occupying 19,000 troops that could have turned the tide against Wellington. Another 35,000 troops in Aragon had been similarly entertained....”<sup>69</sup> “Once again, two French armies in central Spain were kept apart until...” one -- Jourdan’s (“in fact the remnants of *three* former ‘armies’”) – was “eliminated as an effective force at Vitoria.”<sup>70</sup>

Thus, “it was in cooperation between the two *very different types* of struggle that were being waged simultaneously and the high degree of *coordination of effort* achieved -- sometimes consciously and sometimes almost unconsciously -- that the secret of [Anglo-Iberian] success ultimately lay.”<sup>71</sup> In short, an integrated hybrid force, which gave great freedom of action to its irregulars, repeatedly confronted its opponent with the dilemma of simultaneously having to disperse *and* concentrate.<sup>72</sup> Moreover, that hybrid force inflicted costs on the opponent in either type of deployment.

On the one hand, guerrilla activity forced the French "to disperse into town-garrisons, convoy-escorts, bridge guards, and 'seek-and-destroy' punitive units."<sup>73</sup> Yet even dispersed, the French were still subject to losses. For as the bitter remarks of General Bigorre testified earlier, "the basic force of 200,000 veterans which Napoleon was compelled to keep, year after year, in Spain, would never be safe from the noon-day ambush and the things that went bump in the night."<sup>74</sup> At the same time, offensives by the British regulars made lengthy dispersion impossible. For "when Wellington undertook a strong probe, raid or serious invasion from his secure sanctuary of Lisbon into Spain...the French were compelled to concentrate...."<sup>75</sup> One comes to recognize, when considering these guerrilla-inflicted losses and the opportunities such dispersion presented Wellington, that "the wider and the longer the French were dispersed throughout Spain, the more sure and more complete would be their ultimate collapse."<sup>76</sup>

On the other hand, however, there were also costs associated with French concentration. First, there was the loss of territorial control already discussed. Whenever French troops pulled out of a region to mass elsewhere against Wellington, the vacated territory immediately became guerrilla-controlled -- and stayed guerrilla-controlled -- until the French, if ever, returned. Moreover, lengthy concentrations of sizable French forces were not sustainable logistically -- the hostile, barren countryside did not provide enough food for a French supply system dependent on foraging.<sup>77</sup>

In the end, it was "the *inter-action* of regular and irregular warfare that posed the French an insoluble politico-military problem."<sup>78</sup> A relatively small hybrid threat, coordinated and decentralized, forced the French to pay high costs -- in troop casualties and terrain controlled -- for either dispersing to quell the guerrillas or concentrating to defeat Wellington.<sup>79</sup> While the French may have had enough troops to defeat either of the Anglo-Iberian threats singly, neither Wellington nor the guerrillas remained dormant long enough for the French to eliminate the other. Consequently, after April, 1809, the French had to defeat both threats simultaneously. Simply put, with the troops available, "the French could not both contain the guerrillas *and* win the conventional war against Wellington: as a result, they lost both struggles, and the result was cataclysm."<sup>80</sup>

## **2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging From This Hybrid Campaign**

### **a. Necessity of Local Popular Support for the Hybrid Force**

As in the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, three aspects of the Anglo-Iberian effort reinforce the necessity of steadfast popular support to both sustaining a hybrid

force and maximizing its efficiency. First, it is certain that Wellington's outnumbered army alone -- which was only exempt from imminent destruction when embarked upon the ships of the Royal Navy -- could not have survived to conduct extended operations without the crucial advantage of accurate, timely intelligence – an advantage only local civilians could provide. As John Tone notes, popular support meant that “the Allied armies could rest securely in the midst of a vigilant peasantry.”<sup>81</sup> Second, the irregular combatants forming almost one half of Wellington's highly efficient force could only have come from the local population; Britain did not have any extra manpower to provide, even if they could have been employed as irregulars. Third, the Iberian irregulars could not have survived without further substantial popular support. Spanish and Portuguese peasants, despite ruthless reprisals, had to continue to provide the guerrillas with supplies, information, and anonymity. Taken together, these three points demonstrate the necessity of local support for a hybrid campaign to succeed.

**b. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of Hybrid Regulars**

The Peninsular War also reinforces the imperative for preserving the regular component of the hybrid force. If the regulars are permanently eliminated or driven from the theater, the conventional opponent no longer will face the dispersion/concentration dilemma, and stands a good chance of defeating the irregulars. In this case specifically, “with a maximum of 340,000 troops (as in mid-1810) at their disposal, the French might have been able to combat the guerrilla war on its own and overwhelm it.”<sup>82</sup> Therefore, the maintenance of a regular threat was imperative to Anglo-Iberian success.

Wellington recognized this fact and “deemed it...his supreme duty to preserve [his regular army].”<sup>83</sup> Thanks to his judicious leadership, he never had to call upon the ultimate guarantor of his strategic invulnerability, the Royal Navy. But even if Wellington had been forced to withdraw from the Peninsula, such a withdrawal would likely have had little effect on the eventual outcome of the campaign. Command of the seas would have allowed Britain to land Wellington and his regulars back on the Peninsula at a subsequent time to resume the fight. The only concern would have been reintroducing them soon enough to prevent the destruction of the presumably hard-pressed irregulars.

**c. Impact of Conventional Opponent's Efficiency**

Although the Anglo- Iberian hybrid force achieved high efficiency as a result of its coordination and decentralization, the same cannot be said of the French. Actually, in this campaign, the conventional opponent's inefficiency aided the hybrid

cause in at least two ways. First, as the Peninsular War progressed, French leadership became ever more factious and disjointed. After Napoleon's departure from Spain, "the history of the French command in the Peninsula is a study in itself. Even though [King] Joseph and [his Chief of Staff] Jourdan had nominal command for some long time, Napoleon had in fact been exercising overall control of half a dozen armies from Paris. This was ridiculous during active campaigning, for dispatches could take a month or more each way."<sup>84</sup> An example from 1812 serves to demonstrate how significantly this "remote control" command system diminished the efficiency of French operations. For in that year,

...[even though Napoleon] told Joseph that, with the assistance of Jourdan, he was to have the supreme command of all the French armies in Spain....the Emperor failed to make the king's supremacy clear to the various army commanders, and the Army of the North...received no orders on this subject. Suchet, commanding the Armies of Aragon and of Catalonia, claimed that the orders could not apply to Catalonia since most of that province had been annexed by France.... [His] attitude [was] also adopted by Marmont with the Army of Portugal. Soult, with the Army of the South, paid less attention to Madrid than anyone else.<sup>85</sup>

1812, one will recall, opened of the third phase of the war – a phase distinguished by more and more effective coordination of the Anglo-Iberian force – and culminated in the thorough defeat of Marmont at Salamanca. As these passages reveal, the isolating effects of the guerrillas prior to Wellington's regular victory were only enhanced by the fractured French leadership. Undoubtedly, such inept French command and control reduced their efficiency not just in 1812, but throughout the campaign. One can only wonder how successful Wellington's efforts at exaggerating the French dispersion/concentration dilemma would have been against a more resourceful commander with unchallenged control of all French forces in theater.

Second, the inefficient French handling of the Spanish and Portuguese populations also helped the Anglo-Iberian cause. At the start of the campaign, the portion of the Spanish population sympathetic to the rule of France was "*not* negligible in size."<sup>86</sup> As guerrilla activity intensified, however, the French sought to destroy the irregulars by discouraging the population through reprisals. Such violence had the exact opposite effect from what the French intended. "Their attempts to terrorize the Spanish and Portuguese populations failed lamentably....French depredations and severity bred hatred, mounting resistance and ever more brutal atrocities – which in turn led to counter-atrocities and an ever-increasing level of violence."<sup>87</sup> Violent resistance to the French was further encouraged by Napoleon's edict that "war must nourish war"<sup>88</sup> -- that the Spanish and Portuguese would provide, without compensation, food and

workers to French units. One wonders what would have happened if the French had sought instead to win over the Iberians with reforms based on those Napoleon had enacted in France. After all, winning them over just to neutrality would have drastically curtailed the effectiveness of any remaining guerrillas and perhaps have freed up enough French troops to make Wellington's position untenable.

**d. Most effective use of indigenous manpower**

Both the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Iberian hybrid forces illustrate that exploiting the dispersion/concentration dilemma requires both a regular and an irregular component. Unlike preserving the regular component, however, fielding an irregular component does not appear to be an issue of minimizing strategic vulnerability (a lá the British withdrawal at Corunna), but rather an attitude of command. While the importance of an attitude which decentralizes the irregulars has already been addressed, the hybrid commander must also recognize that in some cases, like the Arabs or the Spaniards, choosing to employ his indigenous combatants as irregulars is far more effective than employing them as regulars.

In 1808, Spain fielded close to 100,000 combatants, all as *regulars*.<sup>89</sup> They were crushed, without inflicting significant costs to the enemy, within six months. Following these regulars, less than 50,000 Spanish irregulars went on to exact nearly 200,000 French casualties from 1809 to 1813. The implied conclusion is that an equal number of indigenous irregulars will be significantly more effective than the same number of regulars.

What accounts for this increased effectiveness? For one, regular forces possess little of the "stealth" of irregulars, and therefore made a much easier quarry for Napoleon's forces to track, corner, and defeat in detail. The dreadful quality of the Spanish regular army accounts for yet a further portion of the difference. While Oman highlights the contribution of poor training, poor equipment, and poor leadership to creating such a deficient army, the nature of the individual soldier also played a role. The Spanish peasants, like the Arab tribesmen, were fiercely independent and strongly resistant to the harsh discipline which had been the lot of a conscript for centuries. Neither was willing to undergo the rigorous training which preceded battles, the shock of close range infantry combat, or the often austere conditions of the long periods between engagements. Thus, the character of the individual Spaniard was much more suited for irregular, rather than conventional, warfare. A rueful reflection by French Peninsular commander Gouvion St. Cyr explains this:

[The Spanish] formed irregular corps, chose their leaders, operated by whim, attacked anywhere that numbers or conditions favoured them, fled without shame whenever they were not strongest, and disappeared by a combined dispersion...In the long term, such a system of implacable hostility must suffice to destroy the most numerous and valiant of armies, obliged as they were to fritter their strength away in mobile columns and convoy escorts.<sup>90</sup>

In this case, then, there were at least two reasons that made local combatants more efficient as irregulars than as regulars. One, they were ill-suited by nature for service as traditional soldiers. Consequently, training them for, and using them in, high casualty conventional engagements was a waste of assets. Two, employing local combatants such as the Spaniards or Arabs as irregulars not only plays to their strengths but, as St. Cyr complains, presents an opponent with a quandary which even multiple, credible regular threats could not. The opponent must fight two different wars simultaneously -- one against an identifiable regular threat possessing powerful, but localized, combat potential; and one against an invisible irregular threat with less combat potential but virtually no geographical limits.

#### e. Importance of Cultural Awareness for the Hybrid Commander

Given that local popular support is a requirement for hybrid force success, Wellington's actions in this case demonstrate how a commander's cultural awareness can cultivate such support. From the outset of the Peninsular War he demanded, with the threat of severe punishment or even execution, that his troops respect the customs and property of the Portuguese population.<sup>91</sup> Additionally, in stark contrast to Napoleon – whose “war must nourish war” edict meant that French “armies lived off the country, by forcible requisitioning amounting to robbery” – Wellington refused to advance across the Peninsula until he had enough cash in his war chest to purchase supplies from the locals.<sup>92</sup> Only through essentially honest dealings with the Portuguese and Spanish did he believe he could maintain their indispensable support. Judging by their active resistance, and the wealth of intelligence they provided him over five years, his measures were effective.

Cultural awareness similarly loomed large in getting the most out of his guerrilla allies. Wellington, as discussed previously, did not dismiss the Spanish for their obstreperousness or savagery, but accepted their culture and sought to motivate them to assist him. Comparable views played an equally important role in maximizing the contribution of the Arabs in the Anglo-Arab hybrid force. Many British officers working with the Arabs came to share the viewpoint of a Major Garland, who wrote that,

It is of course obvious to anyone knowing Arabs at all, that military work of any kind is difficult with the best of them. The majority of them show no respect, tending rather to insolence....In military operations they continually incur unnecessary risks by their stupid conduct....[I]t is quite useless for the Britisher to endeavor to introduce military ideas, or in any way to command; he can only make tactful suggestions, and hope by example to get them to do as he wants.<sup>93</sup>

Had men with Garland's appreciation for the potential contribution of the Arabs toward British victory continued to supervise their fighting, it is likely that the Turks would have held most of Palestine and Arabia until the Armistice. It took an awareness of Arab culture, and a willingness to rethink the Arab mission, to create an irregular component which so masterfully complemented the British Army's conventional efforts in driving the Ottomans almost back to Turkey. These two examples suggest that a hybrid commander must be culturally perceptive to obtain the greatest results from foreign irregular allies.

#### **f. Hybrid Warfare as the only Viable Means of Resistance**

A final conclusion from the Peninsular War is that a hybrid force may not only be the most efficient method of inflicting costs upon the enemy, it may also be the only method capable of inflicting costs at all. In other words, the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force was the only type of force which could have survived over the long term.

Recall that as 1808 came to a close, Napoleon had trounced every Spanish regular formation, and chased the British off the peninsula entirely. At that point, the only available method of resisting the French was guerrilla war by the Portuguese and Spanish populations. But, as pointed out above, guerrilla resistance alone was a tenuous proposition at best. History shows that "guerrillas cannot win against a determined enemy unless they are supported by a foreign regular force...or unless they solve the difficult task of creating regular units of their own."<sup>94</sup> Napoleon was determined, and the Spaniards had no hope of creating effective regular units of their own. Consequently, it is at least questionable, and possibly improbable, that Iberian guerrillas alone could have mounted sustained, widespread resistance to a French army undistracted by a British regular force. Thus, when compared to the efficiency of the conventional forces which preceded them, and to the solely irregular forces which could have operated in their stead, the hybrid force waged not only an efficient fight, but an otherwise unsustainable one as well.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER III

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<sup>1</sup> David Chandler, *On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected Essays*, London: Greenhill Books, 1994, p. 172.

<sup>2</sup> Chandler, p. 173.

<sup>3</sup> Wellington was not in command of the Anglo-Iberian forces for a brief period from late 1808 to early 1809. Also, given the intricacies of the British peerage system, I will always refer to Wellesley as the Duke of Wellington. For clarification, he became *Wellington* in 1809, and the *Duke of* in 1814.

<sup>4</sup> Spanish regulars also participated in the campaign. They provided the initial opposition to Napoleon, but were soon defeated. "However, as Dr. Charles Esdaile has recently revealed,...Spanish regular forces continued to make a considerable (if often unsung) contribution to the war in Spain." (Chandler, p. 171-172) Despite Esdaile's work "...championing the claims of the Spanish regular forces...and an article [by him] qualifying the importance of the guerrillas..." Chandler still claims that "much work remains to be done in this area." (Chandler, p. 261) Recognizing this, I chose to discount the contributions of the Spanish regulars until their role is further clarified in the future.

<sup>5</sup> Chandler, p. 173.

<sup>6</sup> Chandler, p. 173.

<sup>7</sup> Chandler, p. 176.

<sup>8</sup> Unless noted, the previous two paragraphs are paraphrased or quoted from Chandler, p. 167-8.

<sup>9</sup> Piers Mackesy, "Wellington: The General," in *Wellingtonian Studies*, Michael Howard, Ed. London, 1959, p. 25.

<sup>10</sup> John Keegan, *The Mask of Command*, 1st ed., 1987, rpt. Norwalk: Easton Press, 1994, p. 108.

<sup>11</sup> Chandler, p. 157.

<sup>12</sup> B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy*, New York: Signet, 1967, p. 111.

<sup>13</sup> Mackesy, p. 27.

<sup>14</sup> Charles Oman, *A History of the Peninsular War, Volume I: 1807-1809*, 1st ed., 1902, rpt. New York: AMS Press, 1980, p. 107.

<sup>15</sup> Wellington to J.W. Croker, June, 1808, as quoted in Elizabeth Longford's *Wellington: Years of the Sword*, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 139.

<sup>16</sup> Longford, p. 143.

<sup>17</sup> Ian Fletcher, *Wellington's Regiments: The Men and Their Battles 1808 - 1815*, Staplehurst: Spellmount Publishers, 1994, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Wellington, 31 May 1809, in Longford, p. 184.

<sup>19</sup> Oman, p. 98.

<sup>20</sup> Oman, p. 96.

<sup>21</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 110.

<sup>22</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 110.

<sup>23</sup> Chandler, p. 168.

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<sup>24</sup> Napoleon in a letter to his brother Jerome, 16 January 1809, quoted in Michael Glover's "Jourdan: The True Patriot," in *Napoleon's Marshals*, David Chandler, Ed., New York: Macmillan, 1987, p. 164.

<sup>25</sup> Chandler, p. 170.

<sup>26</sup> For examples citing the Spanish Insurrection as the modern world's first guerrilla war, see Jan Read, *War in the Peninsula*, London: Faber & Faber, 1977 or John Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994. But, as discussed earlier, Asprey highlights that previous guerrilla resistance had occurred in Europe even in the 1700s. Moreover, Chandler notes that "the French found similar problems elsewhere -- Hofer's revolt in the Tyrol, the rebellion against their rule in Calabria in southern Italy, the partisans of Davydov in Holy Russia, to mention but three." (p. 180) Perhaps the key to the Peninsular War's enduring notoriety as a guerrilla conflict is that it was the first large scale popular resistance. In addition, it may be incorrectly remembered as the first modern *guerrilla* war because the word itself "stems from the duke of Wellington's Iberian campaigns, when Spanish-Portuguese irregulars...[were called] *guerrilleros*...." (Asprey, p. xi).

<sup>27</sup> Mackesy, p. 28.

<sup>28</sup> Keegan, p. 109.

<sup>29</sup> Longford, p. 210.

<sup>30</sup> One should note that Wellington, through the able hand of Beresford, dedicated significant effort to building a Portuguese regular army. "From April 1809, Wellesley effectively took over all Portuguese males capable of bearing arms aged between sixteen and sixty. Part...he formed into regular units which contained about 20 per cent British officers, and trained them with British NCOs. This task he largely confided to Beresford, who did so good a job that within a year the new Portuguese formations... were deemed capable of standing beside the British divisions at Busaco in the regular line of battle." (Chandler, p. 170) But these regulars, which perhaps numbered as many as 25,000 by the end of the campaign, were always directed by and fought with Wellington's British regular army. Hence, the division between a "regular component under Wellington" and an Iberian irregular component seems appropriate.

<sup>31</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 110.

<sup>32</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>33</sup> Longford, p. 211.

<sup>34</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>35</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>36</sup> Keegan, p. 109.

<sup>37</sup> Chandler, p. 170-171.

<sup>38</sup> Keegan, p. 109.

<sup>39</sup> Tone, p. 4.

<sup>40</sup> Chandler, p. 177.

<sup>41</sup> Keegan, p. 109.

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<sup>42</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 118-119. While Napoleon's Russian campaign unquestionably reduced the French force available to confront Wellington and his irregulars, one cannot therefore say that the French were defeated in Spain because they gave up too many troops to fight in Russia. For one thing, Napoleon and the French were unable to eliminate the Anglo-Iberian force in either 1810 or 1811, when the former were not engaged significantly anywhere else in Europe. Furthermore, even outnumbered "only" 3 to 1 (as he was from 1812), Wellington could not have simply conducted a traditional campaign and won. The French would have concentrated against him and either defeated him or driven him off the Peninsula. No, even facing "only" 200,000 troops, the Anglo-Iberians still had to employ something other than a traditional approach to win. Finally, even if the Russian campaign had not occurred, and the French could have continued to field 300,000 to 400,000 troops against the Anglo-Iberians, the campaigns of 1809 to 1811 showed that Wellington could fight even this many French to a standstill. Consequently, the best characterization of the influence of the Russian campaign on the fighting on the Peninsula is not to claim that the Russian campaign was responsible for Wellington's victory, but to say that the reduction of French forces caused by the Russian campaign allowed Wellington to transition from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. The Russian campaign reduced French troops available in Spain to the point where the amount of Anglo-Iberian forces available *could* defeat them. Whether they would or not depended entirely on their efficient employment.

<sup>43</sup> Keegan, p. 109.

<sup>44</sup> Chandler, p. 178.

<sup>45</sup> Defined as "intentionally combining the actions of the allied regular and irregular components into a single framework of operations to maximize the contributions of each."

<sup>46</sup> Chandler, p. 158.

<sup>47</sup> Longford synopsis of a Wellington memorandum dated 7 March 1809, emphasis added, p. 172.

<sup>48</sup> Wellington, letter of 24 April 1809, as quoted in Longford, p. 177.

<sup>49</sup> Chandler, emphasis added, p. 160.

<sup>50</sup> Chandler, p. 159.

<sup>51</sup> Wellington as quoted in Chandler, p. 164.

<sup>52</sup> As already noted (footnote 30), Wellington sought to regularize a portion of the Portuguese population as soon as 1809. Also, by 1813, he "was cautiously allowing...guerrilla forces to carry out semi-regular operations...with his [regular] Army. Thus at Vitoria it was Longa who cut the road...that severed the French line of retreat. In every successful guerrilla war, the time comes when the loose organization has to be tightened. Wellington achieved this by easy stages." (Chandler, p. 177-178.) One could then argue that with a larger British regular force, he might have devoted more manpower to training up Iberian regular formations. But whatever his hopes, the reality is that he allowed the great majority of the Iberian populations to conduct largely unfettered irregular warfare.

<sup>53</sup> Longford, p. 211.

<sup>54</sup> Chandler, p. 173.

<sup>55</sup> All of the casualty counts that follow reflect total French losses for the entire length of the war, including the period prior to April, 1809. Although this credits the hybrid force with causing some of the casualties actually inflicted during the conventional campaigns of 1808, that number is extremely small in comparison to total French losses. Consequently, the conclusion that the hybrid force achieved great efficiency remains valid.

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<sup>56</sup> Bigarde as quoted in Chandler, p. 173.

<sup>57</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 110-111 [emphasis added].

<sup>58</sup> Chandler, p. 173. Although it may have hampered their operational efficiency, this citation indicates that the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force also inflicted *strategic* costs that are worth noting. Specifically, "as damaging to France as the number of casualties...was the burden of maintaining large numbers of troops in the peninsula for six years" (Tone, p.3). The Anglo-Iberian operations tied down thousands of soldiers which Napoleon could have put to good use elsewhere. Oman outlines some of the resultant strategic costs to Napoleon:

In the Essling-Wagram campaign of 1809 he found that he was barely strong enough to conquer the Austrians, precisely because he had left so many men...in the Peninsula. In the Russian campaign of 1812, vast as were the forces that he displayed, they were not yet over numerous for the enterprise, because such an immense proportion of them was composed of unwilling allies and disaffected subjects. If the masses of Austrians, Prussians, Neapolitans, Portuguese, Westphalians, Bavarians, and so forth had been replaced by half their actual number of old French troops from Spain, the army would have been far more powerful. Still more was this the case in 1813: if the whole of the Peninsular army had been available for service...the effect on the general history of Europe might have been incalculable. Truly...did the Emperor call the Spanish War "the running sore" which had sapped his strength ever since its commencement. (p. 107)

One finds it hard to imagine that the English recognized just how "hurtfully" they would end up wounding Napoleon when Wellington landed back in Portugal four months after Corunna.

<sup>59</sup> Tone, p. 5 [emphasis added].

<sup>60</sup> de Rocca, Albert J.M., *In The Peninsula With A French Hussar*, 1st ed., 1815, rpt. London: Greenhill Books, 1990, p. 105.

<sup>61</sup> Tone, p. 5 [emphasis added].

<sup>62</sup> The hybrid force's efficiency in controlling vast amounts of terrain played an often overlooked role in the Anglo-Iberian victory. If the French had been able to proceed after the withdrawal of Moore's army to squelching an essentially peasant-based popular uprising, they stood a reasonable chance of winning. This was because "the collaborationist sections of the Spanish population...were *not* negligible in size, especially in the towns. Indeed, most of the liberal, educated and aristocratic sections of the Spanish people were more pro-French than anti... (Chandler, p. 171). Hence, if the French had been able to control the terrain where pro-French sentiments were concentrated, they might have been able to then turn their efforts to swaying opinion in surrounding areas. But such ends would not be accomplished through brute force of arms. As Piers Mackesy notes, "nothing would reconcile the Spaniards to the rule of the Bonapartes except a long period of good government" (p. 28).

But the very nature of the Anglo-Iberian hybrid force prevented the French from controlling terrain and, thus, from cultivating these pro-French sentiments. The hybrid force created by the arrival of the British regulars in 1809 compelled the French (as detailed in the next section) to face both an irregular and regular threat. This stretched their resources too thin and left them unable to protect those Spaniards who supported them. For whenever the French concentrated to face Wellington, the guerrillas "immediately swarmed out of their hillside sanctuaries to occupy all areas evacuated by the French and to terrorize the collaborationist sections of the Spanish population..." (Chandler, p. 171). The outcome of the campaign might have been quite different if the French could have controlled more terrain and better protected collaborationists. See Section 2c below.

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<sup>63</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 111.

<sup>64</sup> Tone, p. 4, emphasis added.

<sup>65</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 114.

<sup>66</sup> Tone, p. 4.

<sup>67</sup> See note 40 above.

<sup>68</sup> Tone, p. 140.

<sup>69</sup> Tone, p. 145.

<sup>70</sup> Chandler, p. 177.

<sup>71</sup> Chandler, p. 160 [emphasis added].

<sup>72</sup> The campaigns of 1812 and 1813 clearly raise the question addressed in the Introduction about “limited resources.” Specifically, looking at the Anglo-Iberian successes, one might ask whether multiple conventional threats, as opposed to a small regular and widespread irregular threat, could have created the same dilemma for the French. Given enough conventional threats, the answer could be yes, but in this case, the hybrid force commander did not have the option of fielding multiple, credible regular threats which would have forced his opponent to disperse in a similar fashion. After the final Spanish regular armies were defeated in November, 1809, Wellington had no hope that the Spanish would ever field credible regular threats (Longford, 211). Moreover, Great Britain had no further troops to provide him with, and he was limited in the number of effective Portuguese regulars which he could raise. He had, and could only ever look forward to having, one regular field force with which to threaten his more numerous opponent.

Thus, there is no contradiction in this case to the point made in the Introduction. Most likely, if given the choice, any combatant nation would prefer to have such overwhelming, widespread conventional combat strength that it could overwhelm or smother its opponent in short order. But reality often places tremendous constraints on available military strength. Hybrid warfare, utilizing coordination and decentralization to maximize the threat posed by each of its components – as demonstrated by the Peninsular War – aims to make the most of limited means.

<sup>73</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>74</sup> Longford, p. 211.

<sup>75</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>76</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 119.

<sup>77</sup> Mackesy, p. 29.

<sup>78</sup> Chandler, p. 179 [emphasis added].

<sup>79</sup> Thus, a relatively small amount of friendly resources (input) produced a significant amount of enemy costs (output). This fulfills the definition of high efficiency proposed in Chapter II.

<sup>80</sup> Chandler, p. 179.

<sup>81</sup> Tone, p. 5.

<sup>82</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>83</sup> Chandler, p. 158.

<sup>84</sup> Jac Weller, *Wellington in The Peninsula, 1808-1814*, London: Nicholas Vane, 1962, p. 207.

<sup>85</sup> Glover, p. 166.

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<sup>86</sup> Chandler, p. 171.

<sup>87</sup> Chandler, p. 179-180.

<sup>88</sup> Mackesy, p. 28.

<sup>89</sup> Oman, p. 89-90 and Chandler, *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars*, New York: Macmillan, 1979, p. 332.

<sup>90</sup> St. Cyr as cited by Chandler, 1994, p. 175.

<sup>91</sup> Longford, p. 147.

<sup>92</sup> Longford, p. 186.

<sup>93</sup> Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence*, New York: Atheneum, 1990, p. 375.

<sup>94</sup> Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, p. 91.



## IV. THE SECOND BOER WAR, 1899 – 1902

### A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY

#### 1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?

Essentially present day South Africa. When the war opened, the British occupied the southern half of South Africa with two colonies, Cape Colony and Natal. The Boers controlled the northern half with their two republics, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

#### 2. The Combatants

##### a. Who Were They?

The British were the conventional opponent. In 1899, their commander "Sir Redevens Buller commanded a dispersed British army of about twenty thousand [men] supported by some ten thousand ancillaries – colonials, volunteers, and police."<sup>1</sup> By the time the war came to a close, however, "it ended as the greatest British military effort hitherto made on land. Nearly 450,000 soldiers ultimately served on the British side."<sup>2</sup>

In this case, a single nationality – the south African "trekboers" or Boers – provided both components of the hybrid force. Opposite Buller's initial strength, at the war's outset the Boers "mustered a total force of about fifty thousand, mostly mounted men thoroughly at home in the vast land [of south Africa]."<sup>3</sup> But while British strength would steadily grow, "the Boers never mobilized more than some 87,000 men."<sup>4</sup>

##### b. Why Were They Fighting?

Put briefly, "the prize of victory was political supremacy in South Africa...."<sup>5</sup> About 5000 Boers – descendants of Dutch, German, and French immigrants who arrived in the second half of the seventeenth century – had left Cape Colony after the British outlawed slavery there in 1834. These emigrants formed the two republics of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. Although the British recognized the independence of both states by 1854, they still harbored visions of a British-controlled greater South Africa. Consequently, "in 1877 Britain annexed the Transvaal as the first step in an attempt to federate South Africa."<sup>6</sup> This precipitated the First Boer War, fought from 1880 to 1881. Predominantly a conventional war, it culminated "in the defeat of the British at [the battle of] Majuba [Hill]. The Transvaal's independence was restored, subject to conditions, including British supervision of its foreign policy."<sup>7</sup>


After this settlement, the Boers "might have existed indefinitely on their livestock and grain farms without British interference except for the discovery of enormous deposits of gold near Johannesburg in Transvaal in 1886."<sup>8</sup> While "the Boers wanted to maintain their way of life, limit rights to 'uitlanders' or foreign whites who flocked in, and preserve their domination of the blacks," the British "wanted control of the gold."<sup>9</sup> "Thus a...confrontation became inevitable and it commenced in October, 1899."<sup>10</sup> What popular history commonly knows as *the* Boer War was thus actually the Second Boer War.

### **c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?**

At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain "stood at a point in history and occupied a place in world affairs analogous to that of the United States sixty years later. She was, or conceived herself to be, the greatest power in the world: a belief as yet uncontested and thus uncontested."<sup>11</sup> When one considers the large numbers of British troops across the Empire available to be deployed to South Africa, one understands that British "strength consisted of their much larger army with much greater firepower."<sup>12</sup> Compared to the previous case study, "the British [facing the Boers] were in the same situation as the French in Spain during the Napoleonic wars...."<sup>13</sup>

The British and many contemporary observers considered the Boers as "an enemy hardly...superior to warlike Indian mountaineers."<sup>14</sup> Such disdain is not surprising in view of the fact that the "Boers possessed no officer corps. Their leaders were almost wholly amateurs and their armed forces consisted simply of all males aged sixteen to sixty...."<sup>15</sup> Moreover, "they enjoyed (or endured) neither formal military training, [nor] discipline...and their ranks bore little resemblance to European standards."<sup>16</sup>

But the British could so disparage the Boers only by ignoring available evidence to the contrary. "That the Boers could fight and fight well was already proved by the first Boer War...when mounted settlers had run rings around Sir George Colley's small British army."<sup>17</sup> Indeed, three years *prior* to the Second Boer War, British Colonel C.E. Callwell, in his widely distributed work *Small Wars*, described an adversary far more potent than Indian mountaineers:



**Figure 7. The Second Boer War (from Byron Farwell's *The Great Anglo-Boer War*)**

The Boers [of the 1881 war] were armed with excellent firearms, were educated and were led by men of knowledge and repute, but they had at that time no real organization. They were merely bodies of determined men, acknowledging certain leaders, drawn together to confront a common danger....As a rule adversaries of this nature prefer guerrilla warfare, for which their weapons and their habits especially adapt them, to fighting in the open. The Boers, however, accepted battle readily and worked together in comparatively speaking large bodies even in 1881.<sup>18</sup>

### 3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive Events?

The war is usually divided into two parts, a conventional fight followed by a guerrilla struggle. Bevin Alexander's depiction is typical: "The war started out as a conventional affair between two European peoples. But the Boers...lost quickly when they challenged British arms head to head. Only...after they abandoned traditional warfare...were they able to bewilder and defeat British regular forces. From then on, the [Boer] guerrillas dictated the pace and the course of the action."<sup>19</sup> But I found that an overlap between these two parts of the Second Boer War actually created three phases: an almost purely conventional phase; a hybrid phase; and an almost purely guerrilla phase.

#### a. Phase I - Conventional Resistance, October, 1899 to March, 1900

The Boers opened the war following Transvaal President Paul Kruger's strategy: attack the "British forces immediately at hand. In short order, [Boer] commandos invested British garrisons at Ladysmith, in the Northeast, and Mafeking and Kimberley, in the Northwest. These moves, Kruger reasoned, would bring the British north, where he could fight them on his own terms."<sup>20</sup> The British reacted per Kruger's prediction by dispatching one column of troops to relieve Kimberley, another to relieve Ladysmith, and a third to capture the Orange Free State capital of Bloemfontein.<sup>21</sup> British progress, however, was far from smooth:

Buller's....columns had to cross an area the size of France and Germany. Lack of animal transport and almost no roads tied infantry to single-line railroads. Lack of communications and distance between railways caused Buller to forfeit tactical control. Lack of training and dubious command procedures caused columns to proceed without flank or frontal security.<sup>22</sup>

Surmounting these formidable obstacles proved much less deadly for the British, however, than overcoming their own doctrine. For when they finally brought their forces to bear against the Boers, the British expected to win handily with "conventional field-day tactics, the Aldershot set-piece in three acts."<sup>23</sup>

First, the artillery duel and the preparation of the ground. Second, the infantry attack and the infantry charge. Third, the cavalry charge to cut off the enemy's retreat....These were the tactics in which all regular armies of the period were trained, on the Continent as well as in Britain and India. And they were the tactics that had served Germany well enough against France in 1870, and Britain well enough against the ill-armed tribesmen of the North-West Frontier.<sup>24</sup>

Unfortunately for the British, the Boers refused to fight in this fashion. First, they employed technologies, like the Mauser rifle, which the British had never faced. "In the whole of Europe there was no body of soldiers that had ever seen the concentrated fire of the magazine rifle, with the muzzle end facing them: The people who knew this end of the rifle best from personal experience were the Dervishes of Omdurman – those that survived."<sup>25</sup> At Omdurman, *just one year earlier*, Dervish frontal assaults against British magazine rifle-armed troops had resulted in over 20,000 Dervish casualties with only 500 British losses. Moreover, thanks to another new technology – Boer rifles and artillery "fired the new smokeless powder, only invented in the late [eighteen] eighties"<sup>26</sup> – the British faced an invisible enemy. This was a "characteristic of the new smokeless war" which the British would discover "to their cost."<sup>27</sup>

Second, the Boers employed unanticipated tactics. They complicated the first act of the Aldershot script – the artillery duel – by refusing to deploy their artillery pieces on open ground. "This was the first basic tactical principle of late nineteenth-century warfare – British, French or German. It was assumed that the field-guns would fight it out in the open. But [Boer] field-guns were...concealed behind emplacements...."<sup>28</sup> Such concealment made British counter-battery fire virtually impossible. The Boers also upset Aldershot' second and third acts by evacuating their positions when the situation became too threatening.<sup>29</sup> This meant that British infantry and cavalry charges all too often fell upon nothing but abandoned terrain.

Thus, when Buller's columns finally overcame the inhospitable south African terrain and launched their initial assaults, they found an even more implacable obstacle in the Boers themselves. The Boers repeatedly dug in at the top of small hills, or kopjes, and "looking out on superb fields of fire for their Mausers, dared the British to evict them."<sup>30</sup> "The fundamental error of the original British generals was to send their infantry directly against these kopjes."<sup>31</sup> To correct this error, the British paid substantial costs in both time and lives.

At the first battle of the eastern front, Talana Hill on 20 October 1899, the British lost 51 killed and 203 wounded frontally assaulting a Boer position.<sup>32</sup> In the first major clash in the west a month later, they suffered 460 casualties in a frontal assault at

the Modder River, while inflicting only 80 on the Boers.<sup>33</sup> These losses represented over three percent of the initial British regular force in the field, yet they were still well short of their primary objectives. Such stiff losses for such incomplete accomplishment were a rude awakening, but the British plight would get worse.

The British columns resumed the advance, but in the second week of December, each "was badly mauled and...stopped short of its goal."<sup>34</sup> The twin reverses of frontal assaults at Magersfontein and Colenso, occurring in the same week, shocked British military leaders and the public. The British lost almost 300 dead and another 1500 wounded, compared to fewer than 400 Boer casualties, in the two defeats which the "press lumped...together in the eye-catching term 'Black Week.'"<sup>35</sup> The final blow occurred in January 1900, when the British suffered a further 1800 casualties -- to less than 400 for the Boers -- in the campaign which led to the bloody draw at Spion Kop.<sup>36</sup> One assumes that at least the surviving British infantrymen no longer equated their opposition to "Indian mountaineers."

At the highest levels of command, British generals also began to recognize that defeating the Boers would require fundamental reassessments. "Victory," the British commanders learned, "...was a question of method. From their mistakes, humiliating as they were, Buller's nineteenth-century army -- GOC [the CINC], generals, officers and men -- were all learning how to fight a twentieth-century war."<sup>37</sup> A new British GOC, Field Marshal Roberts, arrived in January, 1900 with two commodities which would quickly compel the Boers to change their approach -- better tactics and fresh reinforcements. As for tactics, "Roberts...and his chief of staff, Major General...Kitchener, saw the futility of direct assaults and broke the static war on the march to relieve Kimberley with a wide flanking movement to the east."<sup>38</sup> As for reinforcements, "the sheer scale of [Roberts's] army...took away one's breath. Roberts and Kitchener had five divisions -- about forty thousand men, with one hundred guns, including a whole division of cavalry...."<sup>39</sup> The British were well on their way to the overwhelming numerical superiority so common amongst the opponents of hybrid forces.

Roberts' new tactics and troops produced results quickly when, in response to the British flanking maneuver, "the commander opposing Roberts, Piet Cronje, refused to move from his 'impregnable' position on the railway above the Modder River until it was too late....The result was inevitable: Cronje's force was surrounded and...Cronje surrendered 4,100 Boers east of Paardeberg in the Orange Free State on February 27, 1900."<sup>40</sup> The Paardeberg disaster so demoralized the Boers that

even those in the east "streamed back in confusion and disorder, abandoning the siege of Ladysmith, and climbing up on the heights of the Drakensberg Mountains, forming the Transvaal-Natal frontier."<sup>41</sup>

"Boer morale collapsed everywhere. Except for [one] fierce fight..., the Boers put up only sporadic resistance during the subsequent British march to the Orange Free State capital, Bloemfontein, seized by Roberts on March 13, 1900."<sup>42</sup> But just as in the Peninsular War, the apparent end of conventional resistance did not signal, as many assumed, the end of the war. Instead, a new form of resistance emerged and the war entered its second phase.

**b. Phase II – Hybrid Resistance, March, 1900 to December, 1900**

After the fall of Bloemfontein "Marthinus...Steyn, president of the Free State, and some of the younger [Boer] leaders prepared to wage guerrilla war. Their decision changed the nature of the conflict...."<sup>43</sup> Soon, Kruger also agreed to guerrilla operations, "although [the Boers] did not abandon conventional strategy."<sup>44</sup> Thus, a hybrid force was born. Steyn and Kruger worked to rally the morale of the Boer regulars and "Boer spirits, always mercurial, rebounded."<sup>45</sup> As for the irregulars, Free Stater Christiaan De Wet now gave, "less than three weeks after the fall of Bloemfontein, a sensational demonstration of what [guerrilla warfare] meant, by taking a mere fifteen hundred men to operate on the flank of the British army of thirty thousand."<sup>46</sup>

In two raids on the eastern flank of the British advance, De Wet's men killed or wounded over 200 British and captured nearly a thousand.<sup>47</sup> When Roberts resumed his advance out of Bloemfontein to eliminate the rejuvenated Boer regulars, guerrilla attacks by De Wet and other Free Staters "caused more than 1,500 casualties...."<sup>48</sup> Pursuing the retreating Boer regulars, and tormented by growing irregular resistance,

[Roberts' advance] began to resemble Halleck's and Grant's march through Tennessee with Forrest and Morgan tearing at their lines of communication. As fast as Roberts' soldiers repaired the tracks, Boer guerrillas tore them up. Out of seventy five thousand troops, Roberts was forced to use nearly half guarding his single line of communications! And these were none too many. Upon reaching Johannesburg,...his troops '...were living from hand to mouth,' the result of short supply.<sup>49</sup>

While Roberts' numerical superiority allowed him to eventually resupply and resume the advance, when he finally captured Transvaal's capital of Pretoria in early June, he allowed the Boer regulars to withdraw from the town unmolested. Roberts was "confident that this was a gentleman's war," and that his capture of both enemy capitals "had won it."<sup>50</sup> The Boers, however, had no intention of giving up the

fight. Roberts' confidence had served only to ensure that both components of the Boer hybrid force would survive. Consequently, as 1900 wore on, the British began to face the same dilemma which had plagued French commanders in Spain. As Thomas Pakenham paraphrases Roberts' letters of early August:

Six weeks ago, he had been convinced that the war was virtually over. Now he was not so sure. Once again, there were *two* basic choices. Give priority to rounding up the guerrilla leaders...west of Pretoria? Or press on with regular warfare: that is, march against the last real Boer army in the field, Botha's army,...and push on eastwards along the railway towards Mozambique?<sup>51</sup>

Unlike the Anglo-Iberians, however, the Boer hybrid force lacked a foreign ally who could provide support and a regular component which, at this point, could pose a serious threat. Indeed, "just as the guerrilla war was emerging from its gestation, the conventional war was coming to an end."<sup>52</sup> Hence, when Roberts "decided to attempt both a round-up of [the irregulars] *and* [to] try to push on to the Portuguese border,"<sup>53</sup> he was able to accomplish what the French never could – conclusive success against one of the hybrid elements. Botha's regulars conducted a fighting withdrawal through October but, with the irregulars operating far to the west, saw no prospect for the dispersal of the British army which pursued them. By late October, the British had split the remaining Boer regular force in two: Botha's northern component, "now only 2,500 strong, concentrated on flight;"<sup>54</sup> and the southern component "surrendered to the Portuguese colonial authorities after making a spectacular bonfire of fifteen hundred railway trucks and their contents – and abandoning their last [artillery pieces]."<sup>55</sup>

Just over a month later, Roberts pronounced to an audience in Durban\* that the war was "practically" over.<sup>56</sup> And "so it was: the war of set-piece battles. But a new war – just as costly in time and money and human lives, and far more bitter, because it directly involved civilians – had only just begun."<sup>57</sup> For Roberts had casually disregarded the combat power "of the thirty thousand Boers still at large in the Free State and the Western Transvaal...."<sup>58</sup> These guerrillas put the lie to Roberts' pronouncement the very month he made it by raiding into the British Cape Colony and by inflicting almost a thousand losses on various British detachments in the Boer states.<sup>59</sup> The final phase of the war had opened. But the Boers, thanks to tactical blunders like Paardeberg and to increasingly energetic British pursuit of their regular forces, would fight this last phase of the Second Boer War with only their irregulars.

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\* Durban was a port in the British colony of Natal. Natal bordered the Cape Colony to the east.

c. **Phase III – Irregular Resistance, January, 1901 to May, 1902**

Still convinced the war was over, Roberts departed for England in January, 1901, turning command over to Lord Kitchener. As Kitchener soon discovered, however,

Far from being over, the war was heating up. Living off the land, the Boer commandos, sometimes separately and sometimes in harmony, continued to strike throughout the Transvaal and the Free State, blowing bridges, pulling up railway tracks and derailing trains, falling on isolated garrisons, burning stores, destroying convoys – all in mocking denial of a British claim to victory.<sup>60</sup>

Confident of the British people's resolve, however, "Kitchener knew that ultimately he would win...."<sup>61</sup> Thus, after the failure of an early peace initiative from Botha, Kitchener devoted his efforts to subduing the Boer irregulars by turning "the entire vast territory into an armed camp – a British camp."<sup>62</sup> His first step was to build blockhouses. He did so for two reasons. First, to protect the railroads, whose importance to sustaining "the British forces in South Africa had been obvious to all commanders from the beginning."<sup>63</sup> Second, the British unexpectedly discovered that the initial line of blockhouses "served as a barrier of sorts which restricted the mobility of the Boer commandos."<sup>64</sup>

Kitchener saw that his task would be made easier if he could prevent the Boers from moving freely about, if he could prevent them from combining forces and hinder their communication with one another. By extensive use of blockhouses... he could divide the sea of the population in which the guerrillas swam (to use Mao Tse-tung's analogy) into polders which could be drained of supplies and population and in which the fighting burghers might more easily be caught. So the blockhouse system was extended until some 8,000 were built, stretching for 3,700 miles along the railways. By November 1901 some 14,700 square miles of the Transvaal and 17,000 square miles of the Orange Free State were enclosed.<sup>65</sup>

With the construction of the blockhouses well underway, Kitchener enacted the next measure of his campaign to destroy the Boer irregulars – "mounted 'flying columns'....on 'drives' of the increasingly segregated [countryside]...."<sup>66</sup> Kitchener himself "did not expect great bags of prisoners" from these forays.<sup>67</sup> Rather, their value lay in keeping "the commandos off balance and out of touch with each other."<sup>68</sup> At this, the blockhouse-and-column combination was eventually quite successful, as "the Boer commandos were kept on the move, worn down and defeated in detail."<sup>69</sup> One wonders how the existence of a substantial Boer regular force may have impacted the operation of the blockhouse-and-column system. If the French experience in Spain is any indication, such a force could have compelled the British to either

abandon great sections of the blockhouse line as being too vulnerable, or reinforce them to the point that the columns were too weak to chase irregulars.

Finally, to deprive the remaining irregulars of intelligence and food, Kitchener cleared "key areas of people, moving women and children into concentration camps....[and] burned farms in the best Sherman tradition."<sup>70</sup> Consequently, though the Boer irregulars continued to conduct successful raids, they "lacked food, mounts, and medicine. Continual hardship, desertions, [and] pursuit had flagged once-ebullient spirits. Peace seemed inevitable and...even enviable. They quit in the spring of 1902."<sup>71</sup>

## B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

### 1. Applying the Hypothesis

#### a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander *coordinate* the efforts of his Force?

No. The Boers' very nature worked against the establishment of a single overall commander and the coordination of their forces. They "suffered from an inefficient council-of-war system which itself reflected their entire socio-political structure, with its insistence on *decentralization* and popular control."<sup>72</sup> This made "the commandos...awkward in conventional war," in large part because they lacked "a command hierarchy that could control and deploy commandos when several came together."<sup>73</sup> Such lack of coordination had long been a characteristic of the Boers, as even in the First Boer War, they had "no real organization. They were merely bodies of determined men...."<sup>74</sup> Consequently, other than Kruger's initial directive to besiege the three British garrisons, the Boers did not coordinate their operations during the first phase of the Second Boer War. Their failure to coordinate continued into the hybrid phase, with "the commandos having fought more or less separately for months."<sup>75</sup> Not surprisingly, the switch to solely guerrilla operations brought no improvement, for the commandos continued to strike "sometimes separately and sometimes in harmony...."<sup>76</sup>

#### b. Did the Hybrid Commander *decentralize* the Irregular Component?


Yes, although this was due once again not to the decision of an overall commander, but to the nature of the Boers, whose "entire socio-political structure" insisted on decentralization. Thus, while Boer "laws supposedly governed call to action, desertion, and leaves," they "were seldom enforced."<sup>77</sup> Instead, "the Boer army was volunteer in the full sense of the term....A commandant could never be sure precisely how many men he had, but the system emphasized self-reliance and thinking for

oneself. Indeed, Boers simply disregarded orders if they found them unacceptable."<sup>78</sup> This decentralization became, according to Bevin Alexander,

a strength when the conventional war failed and the commando returned to its local base [to conduct irregular operations]. There it could operate on its own, requiring little or no direction. Its independence encouraged members to exploit opportunities to attack small British detachments or posts, while it could mobilize, strike, and disappear or disperse within hours.<sup>79</sup>

c. **What level of *efficiency* would one *expect* from this Hybrid Force?**

Due almost entirely to the nature of the Boer people, the Boer forces were segregated throughout the Second Boer War. That same nature ensured, however, that the Boer irregulars had complete freedom of action in conducting their operations. Consequently, this hybrid force is placed in a region where I hypothesize it would not achieve a high level of force efficiency.



**Figure 8. Expected Efficiency of the Boer Hybrid Force**

d. **How *efficient* was the Hybrid Force in *actuality*?**

Evaluating the efficiency of the Boer hybrid force again begins with the selection of a starting point. For the Boers, that starting point occurred in March, 1900. Urged on by younger commanders like De Wet, after the fall of Bloemfontein the senior Boer leaders agreed to sanction guerrilla warfare. De Wet's initial raids later that month marked the first time the Boers had employed both components of a hybrid force.

The next step in estimating efficiency is calculating the costs a force inflicts upon its opponent. Unlike the Peninsular War, where the French suffered minimal losses prior to facing a hybrid force, the Boer regulars had extracted a significant toll from the British invaders during this war's conventional phase.

Additionally, the Boers had sustained their resistance far longer than the British imagined that a “trumpery little State” filled with “impudent burghers” ever could have.<sup>80</sup> Given this background, what further costs did the Boer hybrid force extract from the British?

On the positive side, outnumbered no less than 5 to 1 (and from the second half of 1901 onward about 12 to 1), the Boers sustained a fight for over two years after adopting a hybrid approach.<sup>81</sup> Also, by the war’s end the Boers were directly or indirectly responsible for “over a hundred thousand [British] casualties....”<sup>82</sup> Perhaps most importantly, the Boers inflicted some political costs on the British:

Although Britain finally won the South African War in theory, it actually granted the Boers what they had been fighting for: ultimate independence; guarantee that their Dutch-dialect language, Afrikaans, an essential element of their cultural identity, would be retained, and an agreement not to allow the overwhelmingly more numerous blacks in South Africa to gain political rights.<sup>83</sup>

On the negative side, however, the enormous amount of resources employed to inflict costs on the British reduced the Boers’ overall military efficiency.<sup>84</sup> The South Africans “lost an estimated 4,000 killed, [and] thousands more wounded....”<sup>85</sup> Another 25,000 Boer combatants were captured and deported overseas.<sup>86</sup> But the Boers lost some of their greatest resources off the battlefield. For example, Kitchener eventually “herded 120,000 Afrikaners, mostly women and children, into filthy concentration camps... where more than 20,000 people died....”<sup>87</sup> Moreover, by war’s end, Boer “survivors returned to homesteads devastated almost beyond recognition.”<sup>88</sup> As a British officer wrote in September, 1901: “The country is now almost entirely laid waste. You can go for miles and miles – in fact you might march for weeks and weeks and see no sign of a living thing or a cultivated patch of land – nothing but burnt farms and desolation.”<sup>89</sup>

On balance then, one cannot argue that after adopting a hybrid approach, given the great amount of Boer resources employed, the Boers inflicted great costs on the British.

- e. Was the Boers’ minimal *coordination*, yet tremendous *decentralization*, responsible for the mediocre efficiency achieved?

One again reaches the most important question in evaluating my hypothesis: to what degree was the Boers’ lack of coordination, yet great decentralization, responsible for the relatively mediocre level of efficiency achieved by

their hybrid force? In short, while the Boers' decentralization enhanced their irregular operations, their lack of coordination crippled their overall efficiency.

Because the size of the Boer regular component had been greatly reduced by the time they adopted a hybrid approach, one would think they had a hard time employing the dispersion/concentration dilemma. The British mitigated this Boer handicap, however, by almost always remaining concentrated to attack the Boer regular component, regardless of its dwindling relative strength. This presented aggressive guerrilla commanders with outstanding opportunities. In late June 1900, for instance, a series of attacks by De Wet "caused panic along the line of Roberts's communications."<sup>90</sup> De Wet experienced such success that Roberts decided that "the main advance had now become of secondary importance to the task of hunting down the twin leaders and symbols of the Boer resistance, Steyn and De Wet."<sup>91</sup> But the lack of coordination amongst Boer commandos meant that other guerrillas did not follow up on De Wet's success. Boer irregular operations thus became independent and aggravating, instead of orchestrated and threatening. De Wet's June raids excepted, they did not compel the British to drain troops away from the effort to destroy the remaining Boer regulars. One can only imagine what a sequence of coordinated guerrilla strikes back along Roberts' line of communication, and perhaps into the Cape Colony, might have done to the British campaign. Such a campaign would almost certainly have slowed, if not halted, the pursuit of Botha.

Yet even on those few occasions during the early months of the Boer hybrid approach when irregular attacks actually threatened the British, the lack of coordination also meant that Botha did nothing with his irregulars to exploit the opportunity. Thus, after De Wet's attacks refocused the British in June, Roberts' forces were free to hunt down and capture more than 4,300 Boer irregulars.<sup>92</sup> Botha's regulars east of Pretoria apparently did nothing to improve their situation. Without question, the Boer commandos' tendency to fight "more or less separately for months" crippled their ability to inflict costs on the British foe.

It is thus evident that the Boers' lack of coordination reduced their efficiency – their ability to use their limited resources to inflict costs on the British. But a more important influence on the Boer hybrid force's inefficiency may have been just how limited their resources were. When hybrid operations began, the British fielded tens of thousands of regulars – a force "that took away one's breath" -- while their Boer counterparts numbered no more than 7,000.<sup>93</sup> The ratio only got more lopsided as 1900 wore on. Consequently, the Boer regulars did not possess enough combat power to

make the British pay for concentrating. Aside from suicidal attacks, which Boer soldiers would have refused to conduct,<sup>94</sup> Botha could not take the offensive even if a coordinated irregular offensive had been effective enough to force Roberts to disperse. Hence, the British simply remained concentrated in overwhelming numbers until they destroyed Botha's regulars. Then the British dispersed in similarly overwhelming fashion – over 8,000 seven man blockhouse squads were spread across the Boer states, and a further 60,000 men scattered in mobile columns – until they strangled the Boer irregulars.<sup>95</sup> Almost before it was launched, the Boer hybrid force was too weak, even had it been coordinated to the same degree as Wellington's, to employ the dispersion/concentration dilemma.

I believe that the overwhelming impact of British numerical superiority points toward the most important implication about efficiency one can draw from this case study – the Boers adopted the hybrid approach too late. In short, the Boers would have inflicted far greater costs with their given resources by adopting a hybrid approach from the start of the conflict. If they had also addressed their coordination problems, thus conducting integrated hybrid operations from the outset, they may very well have improved their efficiency to the point where they could have achieved operational success.

How could a Boer hybrid campaign, launched in October, 1900, have so influenced Boer efficiency? Essentially, this speculation envisions the Boers, simultaneous to besieging Ladysmith, Mafeking, and Kimberley, immediately launching irregular operations to attrit and slow the advancing British columns.<sup>96</sup> The initial British columns, already struggling without communications or "flank or frontal security," would have been extremely vulnerable to the same Boer raiders who seven months later "caused panic along the line of Roberts' [much stronger column's] communications." These then reduced columns would have marched into the disasters of Magersfontein, Colenso, and Spion Kop and most likely received even a worse beating. As the Boer regulars withdrew from these initial battlefields, the irregulars could have fallen upon the British columns yet again. It is not hard to imagine a British halt well short of the besieged garrisons and the Boer capitals.

Significant evidence supports this counterfactual scenario from both the Boer and British perspective. For the Boers, such an approach would have played to the strengths of their national character. While the Boers performed poorly in conventional offensive operations, they excelled at tactical defense right up to the dissolution of their regular forces.<sup>97</sup> Similarly, they seemed naturally gifted at irregular operations; though

thoroughly outnumbered and virtually without refuge, they repeatedly scored guerrilla success until almost the day the war ended.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, the Boers did conduct successful *offensive* irregular operations into the Cape Colony, albeit later in the war.<sup>99</sup> Also, had the British advance still carried the war into the Boer homelands, despite the harassment of Boer irregulars and the staunch resistance of Boer regulars, the Boer people did demonstrate a willingness to endure tremendous hardship.

Postulating more British costs from an earlier Boer hybrid approach is also consistent with much of the British historical record. Gross inefficiency did characterize early British maneuvers as they advanced in vulnerable columns directly toward their besieged countrymen. Completely discounting Boer resolve and equipment, the British repeatedly launched high-casualty frontal assaults against entrenched Boer regulars. The British also had great difficulty in suppressing Boer irregulars, particularly during their first year of operations. During their early abortive operations against the irregulars, the British often found

...that they frequently became the hunted, for the Boers, who could usually outwit them, captured British scouting parties with great regularity. The British also suffered because they insisted that their hunts, often involving half a dozen or more columns, must remain under central command. By the time the leader could be found to make a decision, the quarry had often flown.<sup>100</sup>

Finally, history shows the British were weakened even by the Boers' tardily initiated, poorly coordinated hybrid approach. After Roberts' captured Bloemfontein, he was still "extremely short of supply...."<sup>101</sup> Worse yet, "he '...had no cavalry, no mounted infantry and no artillery with horses in effective condition.' Enteric fever continued its violent course and he had to clear Boer partisans from his right flank. He took *seven weeks* to put matters to his satisfaction before advancing north along the railway toward Pretoria."<sup>102</sup> Moreover, by the time Roberts' forces reached Pretoria, he himself admitted that they "...were living from hand to mouth."<sup>103</sup> One can only imagine the condition of Roberts' troops if, instead of experiencing only a few weeks of limited Boer guerrilla attacks, they had been subjected to relentless hounding from the beginning of their march over six months before. Botha's regulars, having suffered fewer losses from the reduced-strength British columns, may have even found it within themselves to pounce upon Roberts' exhausted force and score a conventional *offensive* victory.

Thus, this case study not only highlights the importance of *both* coordination and decentralization (as opposed to just the latter) to efficient hybrid warfare, but that hybrid warfare itself can be the most efficient form of war available.

As it was, the Second Boer War “proved to be the longest, the costliest, the bloodiest and most humiliating war for Britain between 1815 and 1914.”<sup>104</sup> Had the Boers adopted a hybrid approach from the start, the war could have become one of Britain’s most humiliating defeats of all time.

## **2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Hybrid Campaign**

### **a. Necessity of Local Popular Support for the Hybrid Force**

This conclusion, drawn from analyzing both the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Iberian efforts, is reinforced by the events of the Second Boer War. Boer “civilians” provided the commandos with intelligence, supplies, and anonymity. The beginning of the commandos’ admittedly protracted end occurred when Kitchener recognized this and, in 1901, “hit upon virtually the only method that will defeat a people who refuse to bow to an invader: their eradication one way or another.”<sup>105</sup> His combination of farm burnings and forced relocation aimed to “drain” the “sea of the population in which the guerrillas swam....”<sup>106</sup> Slowly but relentlessly, as Kitchener’s measures physically denied them a population for support, “the Boer commandos were kept on the move, worn down and defeated in detail.”<sup>107</sup> Consequently, it is once again clear that a hybrid force, particularly its irregular component, cannot survive without local popular support.

### **b. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of Hybrid Regulars**

Unlike the Peninsular War, where the Royal Navy and wise leadership preserved the outnumbered British regulars, in the Second Boer War, the Boer regulars’ strategic vulnerability either could not, or would not, be minimized. In regards to “could not,” “superior sea power allowed the British to defy all foreign sympathizers with the Boers.”<sup>108</sup> Playing the exact opposite role than it had fulfilled in the Peninsular War, the Royal Navy this time prevented either foreign regulars from reinforcing the Boers or the Boers from evacuating their own hard-pressed regulars. If the Boers could not augment nor save their regulars, and therefore could not for long employ the dispersion/concentration dilemma nor shield their irregulars, was their hybrid force not doomed? If so, is the counterfactual scenario presented earlier not fatally flawed?

One response to these legitimate questions is the possibility that an earlier hybrid approach may have ended hostilities before the British could destroy the Boer regulars. A second response arises from the “would not” mentioned above: namely, some Boer commanders sped up the destruction of the Boer regular component. Simply put, “Boer military leadership was [often] extremely unimaginative and hesitant.”<sup>109</sup>

General Cronje's poor moves prior to the surrender of 4,100 Boers near Paardeberg have already been mentioned. Similarly, General Prinsloo's resolute inaction led directly to the capture of 4,100 more Boers in the Brandwater Basin five months later.<sup>110</sup> Increasing Botha's strength with these more than 8,000 men, and avoiding two morale-crushing surrenders, could have markedly changed the progress of Roberts' advance to Bloemfontein and Pretoria, to say nothing of the course of the war. So, even given the dominance of the Royal Navy, the Boers could have done far more themselves to preserve the strategic vulnerability of their regulars. With or without the earlier adoption of a hybrid approach, such preservation would have undoubtedly improved their efficiency.<sup>111</sup>

### **c. Impact of Conventional Opponent's Efficiency**

The inefficiency resulting from the Boers' lack of coordination, inconsistent leadership, and late start of hybrid operations was certainly mitigated by British inefficiencies. The initial British inefficiencies in closing with and attacking the Boer regulars have already been emphasized. Lord Roberts addressed the most glaring of these problems by introducing maneuver to British operations. Similarly, as also detailed earlier, the British were also inefficient in the early months of the guerrilla war. Over time, however, Kitchener recognized how to defeat the guerrillas – essentially through severe population control measures – and then acted on his recognition. In the end then, unlike the French in Spain, the British addressed their inefficiencies with measures which reduced their own costs and increased the costs inflicted on the enemy.

It is hard to overemphasize, however, the combined effect that the sheer numbers of British troops and the great strategic vulnerability of the Boer regulars had on compensating for British inefficiency. Indeed, these two factors combined to make British inefficiency almost irrelevant because they were virtually certain of eventually destroying the Boer regulars. With no regular opponent left to threaten them, the British thus had the one luxury the French in Spain never possessed – a one dimensional enemy. They then proved the validity of David Chandler's comment cited in the previous chapter: freed from a regular threat, a conquering power might be "able to combat the guerrilla war on its own and overwhelm it."<sup>112</sup> So the point here is that Kitchener's efficient population control measures for defeating the guerrillas cannot be employed against a viable hybrid threat. While Kitchener, if he had been the French commander in Spain, may have recognized the inefficiency of reprisals for cowing a hostile population, the fact is that he could not have employed any of the population control measures which proved so effective in South Africa. Dispersing his troops to

man blockhouses and herd Spaniards into concentration camps would have given Wellington free rein to strike decisively anywhere on the Peninsula. Thus, the British may not have been any smarter than the French, they simply obtained a position of advantage (i.e. no regular opposition) which the former never enjoyed.

**d. Most effective use of indigenous manpower**

While both previous cases emphasized the impact on efficiency of *placing* indigenous manpower in its proper role (as regulars or irregulars), this case (with indigenous manpower filling both components) underscored the importance of utilizing manpower effectively once it was *in* the proper role. For example, stubbornly foolish leadership needlessly sacrificed Boer regulars at the surrenders of Paardeberg and Brandwater Basin. Also, a lack of vision among senior Boer leaders delayed implementation of hybrid operations until their opportunity to be decisive had passed. The problem in this case, then, was not manpower utilization, but operational leadership.

It is important to note, however, that a failure in either of these aspects of employing indigenous manpower produces similar results. Arab tribesmen and Spanish peasants misutilized as regulars achieved minimal efficiency. Alternatively, Boer farmers idly awaiting encirclement by superior forces, or passively allowing their enemy an unmolested approach march of several hundred miles, also achieved poor efficiency. Consequently, the most efficient use of indigenous manpower is not just a question of placing them in the proper role, but in competently employing them *within* that role.

**e. Hybrid warfare as the only Viable Means of Resistance**

On this issue, there are strong parallels between the Peninsular War and the Second Boer War. In both cases, the initiation of hybrid operations followed the virtual destruction of one side's regular forces. As such, it is unequivocally clear that neither Anglo-Iberian nor Boer regulars *alone* could have maintained long term resistance to their opponents. But unlike the Peninsular War – where British reinforcements replaced the defeated Spanish regulars – the Second Boer War portrays the fate of a hybrid force which could not replace its regular losses; a force which indeed eventually lost its regular component entirely. The fact that Boer irregulars *alone* were able to sustain resistance for only sixteen months, while Spanish guerrillas *with* British regular support were able to fight for five years, appears to reinforce the conclusion that a hybrid approach offers the only chance to maintain long-term resistance to a numerically superior foe.

But one could argue that this conclusion is suspect, drawn as it is from just two comparable, but far from exactly similar, cases. One could point to Britain's domination of the sea, her vastly superior numbers, and the inconsistent quality of Boer leadership and argue that even an earlier launched hybrid campaign would have done nothing to extend the life of the Boer resistance. While I cannot absolutely refute this contention, a closer examination of the course of the Boer resistance reveals that even an ineffective hybrid approach will sustain resistance longer than solely conventional or solely irregular efforts.

Boer regular resistance, one will recall, ended in late 1900. If doubtful that a hybrid approach extends a resistance's longevity, one could simply assume the Boers delayed launching irregular operations until that time. One could then make a reasonable argument that the war would still have continued for quite some time, because eliminating a guerrilla movement in a land as vast as South Africa was bound to be a lengthy process. Hence, one could conclude, the impact of the hybrid approach on lengthening the Boer resistance was minimal. The problem with such a scenario, however, is that without the irregular operations which commenced after Bloemfontein, Botha's remaining regulars would probably have been eliminated much more rapidly. And without the morale boost which irregular successes provided to the Boer people, Botha's defeat would have probably brought the Boers to the peace table in the middle of 1900, without ever launching irregular warfare. From this examination, it is clear that even the Boers' less than efficient hybrid force significantly extended the period through they were able to sustain the fight.

So on two counts, then, the Second Boer War recommends hybrid warfare as the only way to maintain viable long-term resistance against a numerically superior foe. First, the Boer guerrillas operating alone survived for less than a third of the life of the Spanish guerrillas operating as part of a hybrid force. Second, while the actual Boer resistance, bolstered by a period of admittedly inefficient hybrid operations, lasted for thirty months, it appears that a Boer resistance without any hybrid operations would have lasted for less than twelve.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER IV

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<sup>1</sup> Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume I*, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975, p. 230.

<sup>2</sup> Lewis H. Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 36.

<sup>3</sup> Asprey, p. 230.

<sup>4</sup> Gann, p. 36.

<sup>5</sup> Gann, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Pakenham, *The Boer War*, New York: Random House, 1979, p. xiv.

<sup>7</sup> Pakenham, p. xiv.

<sup>8</sup> Bevin Alexander, *The Future of Warfare*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, p. 88.

<sup>9</sup> Alexander, p. 88.

<sup>10</sup> Alexander, p. 88.

<sup>11</sup> Byron Farwell, *The Great Anglo-Boer War*, New York: Harper & Row, 1976, p. xii.

<sup>12</sup> Alexander, p. 96.

<sup>13</sup> Alexander, p. 96.

<sup>14</sup> Gann, p. 36.

<sup>15</sup> Alexander, p. 90.

<sup>16</sup> Alexander, p. 91.

<sup>17</sup> Asprey, 229.

<sup>18</sup> Callwell, C.E., *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1896, rpt. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996, p. 31.

<sup>19</sup> Alexander, p. 88.

<sup>20</sup> Asprey, p. 230.

<sup>21</sup> Asprey, p. 230.

<sup>22</sup> Asprey, p. 230.

<sup>23</sup> Pakenham, p. 130.

<sup>24</sup> Pakenham, p. 130-131.

<sup>25</sup> Pakenham, p. 132.

<sup>26</sup> Pakenham, p. 238.

<sup>27</sup> Pakenham, p. 238.

<sup>28</sup> Pakenham, p. 238.

<sup>29</sup> Alexander, p. 92.

<sup>30</sup> Alexander, p. 92-93.

<sup>31</sup> Alexander, p. 93.

<sup>32</sup> Pakenham, p. 134. The Boers suffered very few casualties.

<sup>33</sup> Pakenham, p. 205.

<sup>34</sup> Asprey, p. 231.

<sup>35</sup> Pakenham, p. 214, 250, and Asprey, p. 231.

<sup>36</sup> Pakenham, p. 320-321.

<sup>37</sup> Pakenham, p. 322.

<sup>38</sup> Alexander, p. 94.

<sup>39</sup> Pakenham, p. 326.

<sup>40</sup> Alexander, p. 94.

<sup>41</sup> Alexander, p. 95.

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<sup>42</sup> Alexander, p. 95.

<sup>43</sup> Alexander, p. 95.

<sup>44</sup> Pakenham, p. 409.

<sup>45</sup> Pakenham, p. 411.

<sup>46</sup> Pakenham, p. 409.

<sup>47</sup> Alexander, p. 99.

<sup>48</sup> Alexander, p. 102.

<sup>49</sup> Asprey, p. 232.

<sup>50</sup> Pakenham, p. 459.

<sup>51</sup> Pakenham summary of Roberts' papers of 18 August 1900, p. 476, emphasis added.

<sup>52</sup> Alexander, p. 101.

<sup>53</sup> Pakenham, p. 476.

<sup>54</sup> Pakenham, p. 484.

<sup>55</sup> Pakenham, p. 486.

<sup>56</sup> Pakenham, p. 486.

<sup>57</sup> Pakenham, p. 486.

<sup>58</sup> Pakenham, p. 486.

<sup>59</sup> Alexander, p. 105-106.

<sup>60</sup> Asprey, p. 234.

<sup>61</sup> Asprey, p. 234. Gann notes that while "disenchantment with the Boer War played a major part in weaning educated British people away from imperialism...as long as hostilities lasted, British national feeling was strong enough to insist on unconditional victory..." p. 40.

<sup>62</sup> Asprey, p. 234.

<sup>63</sup> Farwell, p. 350.

<sup>64</sup> Farwell, p. 350.

<sup>65</sup> Farwell, p. 350.

<sup>66</sup> Asprey, p. 235.

<sup>67</sup> Asprey, p. 235.

<sup>68</sup> Asprey, p. 236.

<sup>69</sup> Gann, p. 37.

<sup>70</sup> Asprey, p. 236.

<sup>71</sup> Asprey, p. 236.

<sup>72</sup> Gann, p. 38, emphasis added.

<sup>73</sup> Alexander, p. 92.

<sup>74</sup> Callwell, p. 31.

<sup>75</sup> Asprey, p. 233.

<sup>76</sup> Asprey, p. 234.

<sup>77</sup> Alexander, p. 91.

<sup>78</sup> Alexander, p. 91.

<sup>79</sup> Alexander, p. 92.

<sup>80</sup> British newspaper editorial characterizations of the Boers from October, 1899 as quoted in Pakenham, p. 110

<sup>81</sup> I recognize that the hybrid force existed only until late 1900 and, therefore, that continued Boer resistance after that point may not be attributable to the hybrid approach. I address this concern in the Other Tentative Conclusions section below.

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<sup>82</sup> Pakenham, p. 607.

<sup>83</sup> Alexander, p. 87. It is important to not overemphasize the political costs which the Boers forced the British to pay. While the South Africans maintained their language and their privilege over the black majority, they did not gain their independence until 1961. Moreover, two key rights which they held before the war, and for which they had fought, were lost: control of the gold mines and denial of political rights to the uitlanders.

<sup>84</sup> Since efficiency, as defined in Chapter II, is the ratio of costs inflicted on the enemy to friendly resources employed in producing those costs, the more friendly resources used, the less the efficiency value.

<sup>85</sup> Asprey, p. 237.

<sup>86</sup> Alexander, p. 114.

<sup>87</sup> Alexander, p. 97.

<sup>88</sup> Pakenham, p. 608.

<sup>89</sup> Lieutenant David Miller, September, 1901, as quoted in Farwell, p. 353.

<sup>90</sup> Pakenham, p. 462.

<sup>91</sup> Pakenham, p. 463.

<sup>92</sup> De Wet and 1,800 others escaped, see Pakenham, p. 469-471.

<sup>93</sup> Pakenham, p. 326.

<sup>94</sup> "There was one peculiarity about the Boers that dramatically limited their military capability: being a small minority in a huge land, they placed great value on human life and would not sacrifice a man for any purpose. Consequently, the Boers would retreat rapidly when a situation became dangerous, and, when cornered, would invariably surrender rather than fight to the last." Alexander, p. 92. Similarly, the Boers never demonstrated a willingness to press any kind of conventional offensive operation: "[W]hen it came to...storming defense works, Boer farmers could hardly compete with the British miners and technicians who turned Kimberley, for instance, into an impregnable stronghold." Gann, p. 38.

<sup>95</sup> Asprey, p. 235.

<sup>96</sup> This counterfactual scenario was first suggest to me by Professor John Arquilla of the Naval Postgraduate School. Its validity was reemphasized by Gann's comment that the Boers "needlessly" engaged in sieges when they would have been better served with a "war of movement," p. 36. Alexander also discusses the possibility of increasing the Boer emphasis on mobile warfare early in the struggle on p. 89.

<sup>97</sup> In the last two set piece battles of the war, Diamond Hill and Belfast, where the British outnumbered the Boers more than 3 to 1, and where the Boers knew there was no hope of strategic victory, the Boers still inflicted 300 British casualties to less than 50 of their own. See Pakenham, p. 459 and 482.

<sup>98</sup> "One of the worst British defeats occurred in western Transvaal, fewer than three months before the end of the war," when a Boer guerrilla force killed 68 British, wounded 121, and captured 600 more near Tweebosch. See Alexander, p. 112-113 and Farwell p. 389-391.

<sup>99</sup> In early 1901, "James Hertzog in charge of one and Pieter Kritzinger in command of another party invaded Cape Colony. They tore up railway tracks, destroyed communications, and ambushed small bodies of British. Hertzog got all the way to the coast 150 miles north of Cape Town, while Kritzinger turned south and penetrated almost to the ocean near Port Elizabeth. The spectacular invasion threw South Africa into a frenzy, infuriated the British, and greatly heartened the Boers." Alexander, p. 106.

<sup>100</sup> Alexander, p. 104-105.

<sup>101</sup> Asprey, p. 232.

<sup>102</sup> Asprey, p. 232, emphasis added.

<sup>103</sup> Asprey, p. 232.

<sup>104</sup> Pakenham, p. xix.

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<sup>105</sup> Alexander, p. 110.

<sup>106</sup> Farwell, p. 350.

<sup>107</sup> Gann, p. 37.

<sup>108</sup> Gann, p. 41.

<sup>109</sup> Alexander, p. 88.

<sup>110</sup> Alexander, p. 103.

<sup>111</sup> Two related issues regarding the strategic vulnerability of the Boer regulars deserve mention.

The first is whether, had they chosen to do so, the Boers could have withdrawn their regulars to a "sanctuary" to preserve them for later operations against the British. Excluding consideration of the coordination this would have required, geography makes it doubtful. On the eastern front, Britain demonstrated during the war that it would pursue the Boer regulars right to the border of Portuguese East Africa, where the South Africans surrendered rather than cross into foreign territory. Had the Boers instead chosen to go west, they would have run into the border of British controlled Bechuanaland, where, if they had not surrendered, the Kalahari Desert would have presented immense survivability issues.

This left only the north, which may have provided a potential sanctuary – "the Magaliesberg, a high, jagged, grey crescent of mountains running for a hundred miles west from Pretoria" (Alexander, p. 104). "[D]ominated by [Koos] De la Rey and 7,000 [Boer irregulars]...the British feared to enter [the Magaliesberg] without mounting a large expedition" (Alexander, p. 104). The Boers might have been able to retreat there and, given the rugged nature of the terrain, mount a stiff defense. One has to believe, however, that if the Magaliesberg held the only remaining Boer regulars, the British would have concentrated their overwhelming conventional strength and defeated them. Deft leadership, then, would seem the only "sanctuary" available to protect the Boer regulars.

The second issue is the impact that the lack of a geographical sanctuary and the fact of a naval blockade had on the disposition of British soldiers captured by the Boers. While the Boers, especially with their guerrilla raids, captured great numbers of British soldiers, "in most cases,...the Boers [had] to abandon their prisoners of war, because they could not move at the pace of the commandos – and there was no Boer sanctuary where prisoners could be held in compounds. The usual solution was to strip the captured men of clothing and weapons and send them marching towards the nearest British detachment. The likelihood that they would be released safely and soon, although shorn of their dignity, doubtless induced many British soldiers to surrender when they otherwise might have fought to the end" (Alexander, p. 101). Had the Boers been able to transport their POWs to holding areas, the not unsubstantial reduction in British troop strength could have affected the course of the war.

<sup>112</sup> Chandler, p. 171.



## CHAPTER V - THE CAMPAIGN FOR MYITKYINA, 1943 - 1944

### A. HISTORICAL SUMMARY

#### 1. What Was the Theater of Conflict?

Northern Burma. General Stilwell, the hybrid force commander, described the terrain traversed by the campaign as a "rat hole."<sup>1</sup>

The rat hole was a series of three valleys: the Hukawng, terminating in a ridge called the Jambu Bum; next the Mogaung valley leading to the main north-south railroad; and on the other side of the railroad the broad Irrawaddy [River] valley, Burma's central corridor. Myitkyina, the northernmost major Japanese garrison and air base, lay on the railroad and river 40 miles below Mogaung .... The slot assigned to NCAC,<sup>2</sup> thick with jungle growth and threaded by overgrown trails which allowed progress of sometimes as little as a mile an hour, and edged by mountain ranges carved in directionless ridges by the run offs from heavy rains, was as forbidding fighting country as any in the world.<sup>2</sup>

#### 2. The Combatants

##### a. Who Were They?

The conventional opponent was the 18<sup>th</sup> Division of the Japanese Fifteenth Army. Under General Shinichi Tanaka, the 18<sup>th</sup> Division and its supporting units apparently mustered less than 10,000 fighting men.<sup>3</sup>

The hybrid force was composed of Chinese<sup>4</sup> regulars and both American and British irregulars, all under the command of American General Joseph Stilwell. Organized into the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> Infantry Divisions, the Chinese regulars totaled approximately 24,000 men.<sup>4</sup> The British irregulars -- the Chindits -- numbered about three thousand men. They had been established in late 1942 to test the idea "that a relatively small force working behind enemy lines could cause damage out of all proportion to its numbers, confuse and demoralize the enemy, and wreck his communications."<sup>5</sup> The American irregulars, three thousand volunteer troops of the 5307<sup>th</sup> Provisional Infantry Regiment, were "America's answer to the Chindits" and were usually referred to either by their code name "Galahad" or by the popular moniker "Merrill's Marauders."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> NCAC, the Northern Combat Area Command, was the official designator of Stilwell's hybrid force.


<sup>2</sup> Unless otherwise noted, references in this study to China or Chinese refer specifically to Nationalist China and the forces under Chiang Kai-shek, and exclude the Communist forces under Mao Tse-tung.

### b. Why Were They Fighting?

In January, 1942, the Japanese, as part of their whirlwind offensive which launched the Pacific War, invaded Burma and swiftly defeated the defending British, Indian, and Chinese forces. By securing the British colony, the Japanese accomplished two objectives: they “cut off China [with whom they had been openly fighting since 1937] completely from surface communication with her allies,” and they “seize[d] an area which could...protect the western approaches to the[ir] Southern Resources Area.”<sup>7</sup> Once the initial Japanese onslaught in the Pacific and southeast Asia had run its course, the British set as their primary goal the recapturing of their most-prized colonial holdings in the Far East – Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Alternatively, the United States’ principal objective for that theater, as it had been before Pearl Harbor, was the maintenance of a land route over which to supply China – a route that could only run through Burma. Thus, the major impetus behind Allied efforts to reconquer Burma came not from its previous colonial master Great Britain, but from the United States.<sup>8</sup>

Prior to the Japanese conquest, Burma “was China’s last remaining land link to the outside world. Along the so-called ‘Burma Road’ – 700 miles of primitive dirt highway connecting Chungking with Burma through the jungles and mountains of south China – [had] flowed the lend-lease supplies and other outside aid which kept China in the war.”<sup>9</sup> Consequently, the United States, anxious to reopen the Road, had begun planning Burma’s liberation almost the moment the Japanese completed their conquest.<sup>10</sup> Out of this clash of mutually exclusive interests – the Japanese desire to hold Burma, versus the American desire to seize it – sprang the Allied hybrid campaign of 1943-44.

It is important to note at this point that, unlike the Spanish guerrillas or the Boer commandos, Burmese citizens did not contribute substantially as combatants. Most, because they “had been promised Burma’s independence from Britain,” supported the Japanese.<sup>11</sup> But although Burmese rebels “had some success in inciting minor uprisings against the British and in sabotage behind the British lines” during the Allied retreat of 1942,<sup>12</sup> collaborationist Burmese units “were not much use” to the Japanese for the rest of the conflict.<sup>13</sup> The Burmese’s greatest impact was, thanks to their support of the Japanese, to make the Allied effort to retake Burma an invasion of an



North Burma, 1944   Figure 9. Northern Burma (from Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China*)

essentially hostile country.<sup>14</sup> This lack of local popular support would significantly affect the efficiency of the Allied hybrid force, and will be addressed below.

**c. What Was the Relative Quality of Each Opponent?**

The Japanese "18<sup>th</sup> Division, veteran of the [the invasion of 1942] and the conquest of Singapore, [was] considered one of the ablest and best-trained divisions in the Japanese Army."<sup>15</sup> This reputation is even more impressive when one considers that by the time the Allied hybrid force invaded Burma in late 1943, the entire Japanese Army in southeast Asia had earned a reputation as nearly invincible jungle fighters.<sup>16</sup> As further evidence of the high quality of Japanese infantry, three other divisions which fought elsewhere in Burma during 1944 "never lost cohesion or combat effectiveness" despite suffering over fifty percent *killed* and being constantly "harassed from the air and by pursuing British troops."<sup>17</sup>

Stilwell's hybrid force demonstrated no such across-the-board reliability. Foremost among its weaknesses was the generally poor senior leadership of the Chinese regulars. Because Chiang Kai-shek was most concerned with preserving his political power, as opposed to defeating the Japanese, Chinese divisions "were commanded by officers chosen more for their loyalty to the generalissimo than for their military prowess."<sup>18</sup> This in turn meant that Stilwell's "physical presence" was often "the only thing that would impart real drive to his troops."<sup>19</sup>

As for the Chinese troops themselves, they displayed a frustrating mix of deplorable and admirable characteristics. Regarding the former, "measured time was of no concern to them and no plan based on accurate timing had a hope of success.... Familiar with the absence in the [Chinese] home army of any supply, transport or medical organization..., they were accustomed to keeping themselves alive by scavenging and would take or steal any object of any kind that lay loose."<sup>20</sup> More ominous than any larceny or dilatoriness was their "sense of military inferiority to the Japanese; they did not believe they could defeat them ...."<sup>21</sup> Not surprisingly, such troops often performed poorly in combat. As an American officer summarized after inspecting Chinese troops in 1941, "The will to fight an aggressive action does not yet exist in the Chinese Army."<sup>22</sup>

Before dismissing the Chinese regulars as the equals of the Spanish army discussed in Chapter III, however, one must know that they could also perform worthy service. From Barbara Tuchman, one learns that "they were the sturdiest walkers of any army in the world. They had in large measure...courage, stamina, willingness and an

eye for the country, and their dominant characteristic, as Wingate\* observed, was cheerfulness. 'Under conditions which would reduce Europeans to gloomy despair, smiles of pure joy break out constantly over the Chinese face.'"<sup>23</sup> Such unflappable soldiers had fought well around Shanghai in 1937, and offered "determined resistance" which "resulted in the bloodiest fighting of the war in China" in mid-1938.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, General Stilwell had established a training center at Ramgarh (in eastern India) for the Chinese troops who had escaped from Burma in 1942. There, "between 1942 and 1944, four Chinese divisions [including the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup>] were created and equipped...of an effectiveness never before known in Chinese history."<sup>25</sup> So, while the Chinese never completely shed their inadequacies, the quality of their equipment and their fighting in the early stages of the hybrid campaign would lead the Japanese to recognize "that they confronted a new enemy."<sup>26</sup>

Both of Stilwell irregular contingents, in contrast to the discouraging inconsistency of the Chinese, were comprised mostly of outstanding leaders and soldiers. The British Chindits were trained and led by veterans of their first large-scale infiltration of Burma. During that operation, from February to May, 1943, "the Japanese, heretofore regarded as invincible jungle fighters, had been bested at their own game. Wingate's Chindits had demonstrated that British...soldiers could...live and fight in the jungle and that, if supplied by air, they could be more mobile than the Japanese."<sup>27</sup> Although many of Galahad's soldiers were not equal to the Chindits in quality – the call for volunteers had brought some "hardened jungle fighters," but "also a good sprinkling of the bored, the restless, the adventurous, and the 'misfits of half a dozen divisions,'"<sup>28</sup> – a Chindit supervised training program soon created an aggressive "pride of unit and daredevil spirit" amongst the Americans.<sup>29</sup>

### **3. How Did the Campaign Progress & What Were the Decisive Events?**

Although professionally and personally committed to the ultimate goal of reopening the land route to China,<sup>30</sup> Stilwell established an interim operational objective for his hybrid offensive: "Myitkyina before the monsoon."<sup>31</sup> Myitkyina's importance stemmed from the fact that, because the Japanese occupation of Burma had "cut China off from all overland communications with her allies," "arms and supplies for China now had to be flown from India across the so-called 'Hump' of the 15,000 foot Himalaya Mountains in...over-worked transport planes. The pilots flew on oxygen, dodging bad

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\* British Brigadier Orde Wingate, the commander of the Chindits, see below.

weather and Japanese fighters to bring their cargoes to Kunming in southern China.<sup>32</sup> Seizing that part of Burma which lay between the Indian border and Myitkyina would not only bring the Allies much closer to reopening the Burma Road, but would also allow Hump flights "to use the shorter, safer, Myitkyina route."<sup>33</sup> Stilwell's operational plan to get to Myitkyina, which all other senior Allied leaders thought "could not succeed in the current combat season,"<sup>34</sup>

...employed the same hook [strategy] the Japanese had used in [their] 1942 [invasion] combined with the wide end-run envelopment which he had made his specialty in the [pre-war] maneuvers of 1940-41 [in the U.S.]. His design was to engage the enemy frontally while launching the real attack through the jungle from the flank, and at the same time dispatching an enveloping arm through the hills aimed at a point behind the enemy with the object of establishing a roadblock to cut off his retreat. The 18<sup>th</sup> Division was thus to be netted and annihilated in sections as NCAC advanced.<sup>35</sup>

Following this plan resulted in a hybrid campaign which is once again most easily reviewed in three phases: a conventional offensive; then, a hybrid offensive; and finally, a primarily conventional siege.

a. **Phase I – Conventional Offensive, October, 1943 – February, 1944**

Because both irregular units were still preparing for combat, the initial NCAC attack was launched with only the Chinese regulars. "The 38<sup>th</sup> Division pushed southeastward through the mountain spine of the India-Burma border into the Hukawng Valley. All supplies were dropped by air."<sup>36</sup> Once into the Hukawng Valley, lead elements of the 38<sup>th</sup> Division "were struck by a Japanese counterattack. [Near Yubang Ga] three battalions were surrounded and the [NCAC] advance came to a complete halt, though the Japanese were unable to overrun the 3 isolated units, which were maintained by American air supply."<sup>37</sup> In late December, Stilwell arrived at the front and "worked out plans for a serious attack on Yubang Ga..., arranged for artillery barrage and flank attacks and made a speech to the troops saying this was an important attack that must succeed."<sup>38</sup> Soon thereafter, the Chinese "won their first victory over the Japanese in Southeast Asia. It was not a very big fight, Chinese casualties were high, and most of the enemy escaped – but it convinced the Chinese soldiers that they were a match for the Japanese."<sup>39</sup>

After the Chinese resumed their advance in January, 1944, "effective resistance by the Japanese...brought the...38<sup>th</sup> and 22<sup>nd</sup> divisions to a virtual standstill."<sup>40</sup> Hesitant Chinese leadership only enhanced Japanese effectiveness. For example,

A planned maneuver by the 66<sup>th</sup> [Regiment of the 38<sup>th</sup> Division] failed when the regiment was discovered to be 'way off course' and could not be located. Liaison officers were bewildered, patrols threshed about in vain for two days....[Finally] Stilwell set out in person with [a small party]...to find the missing battalions. Marching by compass in uncertain proximity to the enemy, over [wretched terrain]...they found the lost 66<sup>th</sup> by evening. Stilwell listened to an unacceptable explanation by the commanding officer, ordered him relieved, [and] instructed his successor how to reach the objective....<sup>41</sup>

Worse yet for NCAC's pace was the rain. "So far there had been twelve days of rain in January and there were to be 18 in February, ten in March and ten in April although this was the 'dry' season. In this of all years an abnormal 175 inches of rain fell in north Burma."<sup>42</sup> Exasperated by the torpidity of the advance, "in February Stilwell determined to use the Galahad force, which had now joined him in Burma, to establish a block right across the Japanese line of withdrawal, trapping them between the Americans and the advancing Chinese."<sup>43</sup> With American irregulars now in the field with the Chinese, the NCAC campaign entered its second phase.

**b. Phase II – Hybrid Offensive, March through May, 1944**

"After a 60-mile trek through the jungle which took them eight days, Galahad came out to...seize the road at Walawbum [and establish the block]...but were heavily counterattacked the next day."<sup>44</sup> After a fierce five-day engagement, "the Japanese commander decided to give up his attempt to destroy the Galahad force....[and] sought to move his division south to safety."<sup>45</sup> Although, due to "various foul-ups and confusions and a too-cautious advance by one Chinese regiment, the main body of the Japanese got away," they had suffered another defeat.<sup>46</sup> "General Merrill told his tired but exultant commandos: 'Between us and the Chinese, we forced the Japanese to withdraw farther in the last three days than they have in the last three months....'"<sup>47</sup> This battle established a pattern which NCAC would repeat often during this hybrid phase of its offensive. Confident in his plan, but disappointed by the lethargic Chinese advance, Stilwell used his regulars only in frontal or short-range flank attacks to force a Japanese withdrawal. Galahad, however -- a unit he was convinced he could "count on" -- he ordered again and again to infiltrate behind the Japanese to establish blocking positions, against which Stilwell hoped to smash them.

At the same time -- early March, 1944 -- the Chindits joined the NCAC offensive. While Stilwell's blocking tactics frequently compelled Merrill's Marauders to fight from fixed positions like regulars, the Chindits were *supposed* to fight much more like guerrillas. "Operating separately [from Stilwell's main advance], but in accordance

with a coordinated plan," the air-inserted Chindits were "to cut the Mandalay-Myitkyina railroad, and generally... disrupt the rear areas of Japanese forces facing Stilwell's NCAC...."<sup>48</sup> To accomplish this mission, the Chindits' main body "moved to Mawlu [south of Stilwell's position], where a strong defensive position was established, blocking the railroad line." Only "a few columns spread out over Japanese rear areas to create confusion and destroy supplies...." While these dispersed "Chindit columns continued to harass Japanese rear areas," the Japanese made "a number of determined local attacks" against the railroad blocking position.<sup>49</sup> Thus, as March came to a close, Chindit "operations were effectively preventing attack on Stilwell's [southern] flank."<sup>50</sup>

To the north, after the somewhat encouraging results at Walawbum, "Stilwell resolved to send the Marauders" on two subsequent blocking position missions.<sup>51</sup> While the Marauders inflicted serious losses on the Japanese each time, the Chinese regulars could not finish off the remainder of the 18<sup>th</sup> Division. By this point,

The Galahad survivors had been through two arduous jungle campaigns. Their ranks were thinned by casualties and disease. The Army K-ration supplied to the[m]...as a routine diet was designed only for short-term combat situations and did not provide the necessary calories for an active adult. Among Merrill's men the average weight loss was over twenty pounds – and these men were already lean and hardened by arduous marching. According to the usual rules for jungle commando groups, [they] should have been relieved.<sup>52</sup>

Their Chindit brethren "were in even worse shape than the Marauders."<sup>53</sup> After Japanese attacks made the first railroad blocking position untenable, the British withdrew north up the line to establish a second position nearer Stilwell. "This was soon attacked by strong Japanese forces, and a violent battle raged. The hard-pressed Chindits, close to exhaustion and having suffered heavy casualties, withdrew again, this time to the relative safety of the mountains farther west."<sup>54</sup>

By this point in May, 1944, with the Chinese making only slow progress and the opening of the monsoon season just a month away, NCAC was still over fifty miles from "Myitkyina, the great prize and objective of the campaign in northern Burma."<sup>55</sup> Driven to reach his objective, but finding the Chindits unavailable and the Chinese unreliable, Stilwell turned to the only "force he could count on to obey orders," Galahad. "So the hungry, tired Marauders, weak with disease, set out on their final mission. They crossed the 6,000-foot Kuman Mountains on an end run to Myitkyina, accompanied by about 4,000 Chinese troops and several hundred Kachin Rangers. Less than three weeks later they emerged at Myitkyina and seized the airfield with little

difficulty from the surprised handful of Japanese defenders.<sup>56</sup> The campaign had entered its final phase.

c. **Phase III – The Siege of Myitkyina, May to August, 1944**

While the Allies held the Myitkyina airfield, and quickly flew in more troops, "the Japanese rushed reinforcements to Myitkyina town; attempts by Chinese units to take the place ended in fiasco."<sup>57</sup> On schedule, "the monsoon rains set in and the attempt to take Myitkyina settled into a long siege...."<sup>58</sup> To the west, the "Chinese 22<sup>nd</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> Divisions resumed a slow advance down the Mogaung Valley against Tanaka's continued skillful resistance."<sup>59</sup> On 26 June, with the assistance of "the worn remnant of the 77<sup>th</sup> Chindit Brigade" fighting as regulars, the Chinese took Mogaung.<sup>60</sup> With its capture, "the NCAC stood at last astride...the entrance to the Irrawaddy valley. Crippled by 50 percent casualties, the Japanese 18<sup>th</sup> Division was reduced to a shattered 3,000 who...succeeded in withdrawing toward Mandalay. Except for the short gap between Mogaung and Myitkyina, north Burma as far as the Irrawaddy was now regained...."<sup>61</sup>

While even the sluggish Chinese figured to be able to cross this gap against weakening Japanese resistance, the outcome at Myitkyina itself was still in doubt. "The Japanese, forced to yield ground inch by inch, exacted a heavy price in Allied casualties."<sup>62</sup> As Stilwell wrote, two days after nearly 1,900 Chinese casualties were flown out of Myitkyina, "the wear and tear on the nerves continues. Are we attempting to much? Can they hold us? Is there a surprise ready? Counterattack? Will our people stick it out? Casualties too heavy? I can tell that I've had nearly enough of this."<sup>63</sup> "Finally, satisfied that they had imposed sufficient delay on the frustrated Allies, 700 semistarving Japanese survivors...made their way south through the jungles to rejoin their main force, just as the final Allied assault, without opposition, swept over the city."<sup>64</sup> Thus, on 3 August Stilwell's hybrid NCAC "successfully completed a campaign which the British, and many Americans, had deemed impossible."<sup>65</sup>

## B. CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS

### 1. Applying the Hypothesis

#### a. Did the Hybrid Force Commander *coordinate* the efforts of his Force?


Yes, Stilwell consistently and intentionally combined the actions of the Chinese divisions with the Marauders and Chindits so as to maximize the contributions of each toward NCAC's objective. Obviously, each of Galahad's blocking missions were designed to escalate the impact of the Chinese regulars' more traditional assaults. Furthermore, in a reversal of typical roles, Stilwell utilized his regulars to occupy the bulk of the enemy while the irregular Marauders directly assaulted the hybrid force's ultimate objective, Myitkyina. Even the Chin- dits' more loosely controlled operations were nonetheless "in accordance with a coordinated plan...."<sup>66</sup> Consequently, this campaign showed deliberate linkages between the operations of the regulars and irregulars, perhaps to an even greater extent than Allenby's use of the Arabs.

#### b. Did the Hybrid Commander *decentralize* the Irregular Component?

Generally, no. Only the Chindits in their initial operations supporting NCAC from March to May, 1944, were given great freedom of action. Otherwise, Stilwell closely directed where and how his irregulars would conduct their operations. Previous hybrid campaigns examined saw irregulars used to weaken a conventional opponent by forcing him to disperse to deal with multiple irregular threats. Stilwell, on the other hand, repeatedly concentrated his irregulars into a single force – such as the Galahad blocking positions or the Chindit support at Mogaung – to supplement attacks by his regulars. Far from forcing the enemy to disperse by frequent and extensive operations in his rear areas, Stilwell's irregulars usually avoided enemy contact or massed in a single location to await enemy attack. Without yet evaluating the merit of this method, it is important nevertheless to recognize that Stilwell employed his irregulars in a manner wholly different from Wellington's or Allenby's.<sup>67</sup>

#### c. What level of *efficiency* would one *expect* from this Hybrid Force?

NCAC was a very well coordinated hybrid force which gave little freedom of action to its irregulars. Therefore, I hypothesize it would not achieve a high level of force efficiency.



**Figure 10. Expected Efficiency for NCAC Hybrid Force**

**d. How efficient was the Hybrid Force in *actuality*?**

As with the Boer campaign, the starting point for measuring NCAC's efficiency occurs well after the opening of the entire campaign. Only after early March, 1944, when the Galahad force fought the battle of Walawbum and the Chindits deployed into Burma, did Stilwell possess both elements of a hybrid force. Prior to March, the Chinese regulars had barely fought their way into the first valley of Stilwell's three-valley "rat hole." From this disappointing start, what costs did NCAC subsequently inflict on the Japanese?

Without question, Stilwell's hybrid force caused tremendous Japanese casualties. In addition to the 50% losses suffered by Tanaka's 18<sup>th</sup> Division, a further 3,000 Japanese died defending Myitkyina.<sup>68</sup> Also, in contrast to the near fruitless advance of the Chinese regulars alone, once the irregulars joined NCAC, the force achieved an objective most deemed impossible. British Admiral Mountbatten, for example, Supreme Allied Commander in the Far East, had asserted only a month before Galahad seized Myitkyina's airfield "that conquest of that area [before the monsoon season] was 'impossible,' and even if at later date was 'unsound and should not be attempted.'"<sup>69</sup>

Achieving this "impossible" mission inflicted costs on the Japanese beyond the casualties they suffered. First, "the capture of Myitkyina... enabled the air transports carrying supplies to China to fly the safer, shorter southern route to Kunming. Delivery rates soared. In all of 1942, the transports had brought a scant 3,700 tons to China. For 1943... 61,000 tons;...[by October, 1944] the figure stood at over

30,000 tons for a *single month*.<sup>70</sup> Second, NCAC's advance, by tying up the enemy's 18<sup>th</sup> Division, denied the Japanese the troops they desperately needed to succeed in an attack on Imphal and the rest of eastern India from western Burma – an attack "that could have been as devastating in effect as Pearl Harbor...."<sup>71</sup> "If it had not been for NCAC,' in the opinion of Colonel George Demetriadi, [British] liaison officer with Stilwell, 'the Japs would have succeeded at Imphal.'"<sup>72</sup>

But, in estimating the efficiency of NCAC, one must also recognize that Stilwell expended tremendous Allied resources to inflict these costs on the Japanese. A prime example is the fact that "the Allies had more than 5,000 casualties."<sup>73</sup> Specifically, the near-continuous exposure of the Chindits to the elements and to the Japanese had "ruin[ed] the fighting effectiveness of 5 fine British brigades."<sup>74</sup> Similarly, Stilwell's methods destroyed the Marauders. After fighting the blocking position battles, but *before* the march on Myitkyina, they were already "down to somewhat less than half their original strength...."<sup>75</sup> The fight for Myitkyina, where Marauders suffered casualties "at the rate of seventy-five to a hundred a day," finished them off. Even Stilwell had to admit, at the end of May, that "Galahad is just shot."<sup>76</sup> Thus, the hybrid force completely expended its two specially selected and trained irregular units in obtaining an *interim* operational objective. For even though air-delivered tonnage to China increased, the grievous casualties incurred by the hybrid force were not enough to open the land route to China. That would require another conventional Allied offensive in the fall.

In total then, the Allied hybrid force was not highly efficient. While it inflicted substantial costs on the Japanese, it expended considerable Allied resources to do so.

- e. Was NCAC's high degree of *coordination*, yet minimal *decentralization*, responsible for the mediocre efficiency achieved?

Yes, Stilwell's close coordination of his units, yet tight control of irregular operations, was wholly responsible for the ratio of costs inflicted by NCAC to resources expended by it. His unsparing destruction of half of the Marauders in recurrent blocking force missions, while it may not have eliminated the 18<sup>th</sup> Division as swiftly as intended, did progressively weaken Japanese resistance. Similarly, even though the bulk of the Chindits were chewed up fighting from fixed positions along the Mandalay railroad, they still drew off Japanese strength which could have otherwise been engaging Stilwell's regulars. Furthermore, without the employment of the remaining

Marauders as conventional assault troops at Myitkyina, and the surviving Chindits in the same role at Mogaung, it is unlikely that either of those important towns would have fallen to NCAC.

Nevertheless, centralized control of this hybrid force's irregulars did result in their destruction, which not only reduced the final efficiency of NCAC, but also the efficiency of any future Allied force in theater which may have benefited from Galahad or Chindit operations. In view of this extravagant expenditure of friendly resources – indeed, the destruction of Galahad led to a U.S. Congressional hearing<sup>77</sup> – one is clearly led to ask perhaps the most intriguing question about this hybrid campaign: could it have been more efficient? Specifically, would greater decentralization of the irregulars, aimed at forcing the Japanese to face a dispersion/concentration dilemma, have cut Allied losses without reducing, or perhaps even increasing, Allied gains?

Some evidence does indicate that decentralization of the irregulars may have forced greater Japanese dispersion. After all, the somewhat decentralized Chindit operations south of Stilwell early in the campaign did tie down Japanese units and prevent them from concentrating to attack the Chinese regulars' right flank.<sup>78</sup> One can thus reasonably contend that decentralized irregular operations north, east, and west of Myitkyina might have similarly occupied the Japanese units which were rushed to reinforce the town after the Allies seized the airfield.<sup>79</sup> Without these reinforcements, there would have been a shorter siege, fewer Allied casualties, and better NCAC efficiency.

Indeed, in contemplating whether Stilwell could have forced the dispersion/concentration dilemma on the Japanese through greater decentralization of his irregulars, one is struck by the similarities between NCAC's position in Burma and Wellington's in Iberia. Both campaigns featured a tri-national hybrid force. Additionally, both commanders sought to drive an occupying enemy from an invaded country. Also, both forces sallied forth from a semi-secure base along a defined line of operations to tackle the enemy. While Stilwell had less time than Wellington to accomplish his objectives, NCAC's objectives were of a correspondingly smaller scale. One wonders then, if these parallels suggest that Wellington's coordinated, decentralized campaign offered a better strategy for the fight to reach Myitkyina than Stilwell's coordinated, yet centralized, approach. A closer examination of the two preconditions forwarded in Chapter II, however, demonstrates that the two campaigns are not as comparable as a first glance might indicate.

First, Wellington's British regulars were, thanks to his own leadership and the Royal Navy, strategically invulnerable. As Marshal Bessieres, commander of the French Army of the North after 1811, wrote, the British could accept or refuse battle "as they please[ed]."<sup>80</sup> Could Stilwell exercise the same flexibility with his Chinese regulars? No, the realities of geography, transportation, and leadership prevented him from doing so. As for geography, the few passes through the rugged mountains of the India-Burma border meant that Stilwell could only retreat by the same route he had advanced. Wellington, on the other hand, could have retreated to numerous ports on the Iberian coast. Moreover, rapid withdrawal on even the one route open to NCAC was not possible. It was merely a trace, transformed whenever rain fell into a "quagmire" in which "even jeeps became stuck."<sup>81</sup> Finally, even a successful retreat out of Burma might not have preserved Stilwell's regulars. As it was, a Japanese invasion of eastern India in the spring of 1944 almost captured the very bases into which NCAC would have withdrawn. Stilwell was thus continuously concerned about "a Japanese breakthrough behind him."<sup>82</sup>

Neither could Allied transportation assets provide Stilwell's regulars with strategic invulnerability. Although the Allies had command of the air, withdrawing the two Chinese divisions from any potentially disastrous situation in hostile territory was beyond the aviators' means. Simply airlifting a single British division from one location in the Allied rear to another, for example, had taken eleven days!<sup>83</sup> Finally, unlike Wellington's regulars, Stilwell's did not unblinkingly comply with the will of the theater commander. The uncertain response of Chinese commanders, and the uncertain discipline of Chinese soldiers, made bold advances risky. Stilwell could not take his regulars deep into enemy territory, as Wellington had, and count on being able to bring them back out while under enemy pressure. Thus, the constraints of geography, transportation, and leadership combined to make the Chinese regulars strategically vulnerable. Consequently, Stilwell, instead of making deep, swift forays into Burma, had to make a methodical advance which ensured the security of his single line of communication (LOC).

Second, Stilwell's campaign differed from Wellington's because Stilwell did not have popular support in the country he was trying to "liberate." Admittedly, Burmese combatants did not cause serious damage to the Allies during the retreat of 1942. But a hostile Burmese population did deprive them "of reliable intelligence, [and] threaten their communications..." to such an extent that Stilwell listed a "hostile population" first in his catalog of reasons for that Allied defeat.<sup>84</sup> Such hostility

continued throughout the war, with Burmese collaborating with the Japanese throughout NCAC's offensive.<sup>85</sup> Obviously, an unsympathetic local population meant that NCAC's regulars, unlike Wellington's, could not "rest securely in the midst of a vigilant peasantry."<sup>86</sup> Perhaps more importantly, it meant that Stilwell's irregulars, operating in hostile territory, were denied not only intelligence, but logistic support and anonymity as well. The lack of these advantages contributed directly and substantially to the high attrition rate of both the Chindits and the Marauders.

One now understands that Stilwell's forces enjoyed neither relative strategic invulnerability nor local popular support. Recognizing these limitations, one can return to answering the question of whether decentralizing NCAC's irregulars, in an attempt to employ the dispersion/concentration dilemma, would have improved Allied efficiency. The answer is no, for two reasons.

First, NCAC's irregulars, even if extensively decentralized, could not have conducted operations compelling greater Japanese dispersion. Faced with hostile natives, they lacked any source for the pinpoint, real-time intelligence on local enemy activities which can so enhance guerrilla operations. Also, lack of local subsistence made the NCAC irregulars dependent on aerial resupply, so they had to find and defend drop zones. Finally, denied anonymity by a watchful, antagonistic local populace, they had to traverse exhausting terrain to avoid detection, while remaining massed to have enough firepower to survive if detected. Thus, instead of fanning out to conduct widespread raiding, NCAC's irregulars could conduct only an initial set of raids. They then had to go into static, defensible positions. Such operations obviously drew Japanese concentration, not dispersion.

Second, even if the Chindits or Marauders had been able to force the Japanese to spread their forces, Stilwell's Chinese regulars – whose strategic vulnerability made protecting their own LOC their primary concern – would not have been able to react swiftly enough to capitalize on such dispersion. As the British regulars of the Anglo-Arab and Anglo-Iberian hybrid forces demonstrated, swift exploitation of such enemy dispersion is a crucial component in the dispersion/concentration dilemma. As General Nathanael Greene – American Revolutionary hybrid commander who utterly defeated his British opponent in the Carolinas – wrote about employing regulars in conjunction with guerrillas, "[it was important to be able to] run as fast forward as backward, to convince the Enemy that we were like a Crab, that...[could] run either way."<sup>87</sup> Consequently, given the limitations on Stilwell's employment of his regulars, greater decentralization of NCAC's irregulars

would still not have allowed him to employ the dispersion/concentration dilemma to great effect.

In the end, one thus concludes that Stilwell's technique of close coordination between regulars and irregulars, yet tight control of the irregulars, probably achieved the *best* efficiency the situation allowed for his hybrid force. NCAC inflicted great costs on the Japanese, but a lack of the preconditions introduced in Chapter II forced him to expend a tremendous amount of friendly resources to do so. This case therefore emphasizes the importance of those preconditions to achieving the *maximum* efficiency *possible* with a given hybrid force. Because his regulars were strategically vulnerable, and because he lacked local popular support, Stilwell could not have improved NCAC's ratio of costs inflicted to resources expended by loosening his control over the irregulars. If the preconditions had instead favored Stilwell, there was clear potential for NCAC to have inflicted the same costs with fewer losses, thus achieving greater efficiency. Consequently, while high degrees of coordination and decentralization within a hybrid force can produce high efficiency, a hybrid force cannot extract the maximum benefit from either variable if it cannot first ensure the survival of its regulars and the support of the local populace.

## **2. Other Tentative Conclusions Emerging from this Hybrid Campaign**

### **a. Problems with Multinational Hybrid Forces**

In the future, the U.S. may well form more hybrid forces like NCAC, with U.S. SOF serving as irregulars and a foreign power providing the regulars. Stilwell's campaign, however, should serve as a cautionary tale about such force combinations for U.S. political and military leaders. For the drive to Myitkyina illustrates that when U.S. leaders believe a foreign regime providing regular forces is geo-politically "indispensable," then that regime's leader, if so inclined, may ruin U.S. efforts to train and employ his forces. Such was the case with Chiang Kai-shek. Certain of a post-war fight with the Communists, Chiang's "every action and decision" throughout the Burma campaign was "molded by the principle of hoarding resources and waiting until one barbarian [the U.S.] should defeat the other [Japan]."<sup>88</sup> Consequently, he repeatedly ordered his NCAC commanders to slow their advance to limit casualties. Additionally, he agreed only after months of U.S. entreaties to send reinforcements to Stilwell, and to launch an offensive from western China into Burma to assist in opening the Burma Road.

Since the [entire Burma] campaign was designed to lift the siege of China and since the [troops of the western China offensive] had been American-equipped for that very purpose, the obvious course in view of Chiang's unwillingness to assist in his own rescue would have been to call off the effort. This, however, the United States was not prepared to do because of *the need for China in American strategy* and the persistent fear of a Chinese collapse.<sup>89</sup>

Chiang was well aware of the value the U.S. placed on China, and he "did not believe that the United States would ever take the risk of withdrawing support from him."<sup>90</sup> Thus, as Barbara Tuchman sardonically summarizes, occasionally "the United States thrashed about in the Chinese cobweb" by threatening to cut Chiang off, but invariably "the threads held."<sup>91</sup>

Two of NCAC's most serious deficiencies stemmed from Chiang's realization that the United States' was trapped in such a "cobweb." First, it was directly responsible for the lethargic Chinese advance. Despite the fact that American advisors had invested almost two years at the Ramgarh training center to create four divisions of adequate Chinese soldiers, Chiang's leverage over their commanders largely nullified this effort. Clearly, U.S. leaders planning future multinational hybrid efforts should be aware of the fact that training indigenous personnel to become disciplined regulars is a lengthy process,<sup>92</sup> but one which may be completely undone by politically-motivated indigenous commanders. Second, Chiang's stubborn refusal to commit his regular forces in turn contributed substantially to Stilwell's decision to employ his irregulars in the operations which eventually destroyed them. Might not a future U.S. commander in Stilwell's position be driven in frustration to the same decision? And if so, would the U.S. public tolerate the virtual destruction of the equivalent of a contemporary Army Special Forces Group? Just as importantly, how would such a significant loss of SOF personnel affect the U.S. defense posture?

#### **b. Irregular Operations in Hostile Terrain**

The Burma campaign of 1943-44 also highlights the difficulty of sustaining irregulars in hostile terrain. Lacking local popular support, both the Chindits and the Marauders were forced to rely on aerial resupply.<sup>93</sup> Although both groups were usually able to retrieve air-dropped supplies, surviving on such supplies weakened their soldiers and left them vulnerable to disease. Moreover, the lack of helicopters for aerial extraction meant that any non-ambulatory casualties became POWs.<sup>94</sup> Also, traversing inhospitable terrain in order to avoid detection extracted an additional toll. Even given the plentiful helicopter assets available today, U.S. leaders would do well to consider these difficulties before committing SOF to *sustained* operations in hostile territory.

Weather, particularly around the inhospitable terrain which even current SOF would use to avoid an unsympathetic local populace, can be adverse enough to prevent helicopter operations. This would leave modern SOF in hostile territory no better off than their Chindit or Galahad predecessors, and subject to the same attritional liabilities.

**c. Importance of Cultural Awareness for the Hybrid Commander**

NCAC would have been even less efficient were it not for General Stilwell's understanding of the Chinese. A fluent Chinese speaker who, as already mentioned, had served in China for ten years before WWII, Stilwell sincerely wanted to prove the worth of the Chinese foot soldier by having Chinese regulars succeed in Burma. Thus dedicated to NCAC's success, Stilwell spent the great majority of the campaign living at the front,

...in a basha or bamboo hut or sometimes a tent, with an underground dugout for a shelter, a packing case for a desk and only the luxury of two wicker chairs as a concession to rank. Here he slept on a cot or in a hammock stretched between two trees, shaved and washed from a helmet, stood in line for chow and ate C-rations from a mess kit.<sup>95</sup>

Not surprisingly, "Stilwell's presence at the front and his living close to the men made a strong impression on Chinese officers."<sup>96</sup> So too did his concern for Chinese welfare. Medical reforms implemented by Stilwell,

...reduced the death rate from wounds, ordinarily a limitless figure in the Chinese Army, to 3.5 percent. Chinese soldiers were not afraid of being killed in battle, they used to say, but only of being left wounded on the battlefield to die, which was the usual fate in China for those who could not walk away from combat. The feeling that they were being looked out for in NCAC gave the soldiers a new-found pride and confidence.<sup>97</sup>

This evident concern for Chinese soldiers, along with Stilwell's ability to communicate directly to Chinese subordinates without an interpreter, led to most Chinese commanders coming to believe that what Stilwell did, he did for China.<sup>98</sup> Consequently, in spite of Chiang's unmistakable efforts to undermine NCAC's progress, Stilwell was usually able to keep the Chinese advancing, albeit often at a snail's pace. And unlike 1942, they never retreated. It is likely that a hybrid force commander less schooled in Chinese culture would have failed to maintain even the slow advance which Stilwell achieved. In a campaign as close run as this, where the last irregular units were effectively wiped out in the drive for the final objective, such a failure with the regulars could have been decisive.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER V

<sup>1</sup> Stilwell as quoted in Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China: 1911-1945*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1971, rpt. Norwalk: Easton Press, 1994, p. 416.

<sup>2</sup> Tuchman, p. 416.

<sup>3</sup> Tuchman, p. 453.

<sup>4</sup> Tuchman, p. 417.

<sup>5</sup> Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*, New York: Vintage Books, 1985, p. 347-348. Also, R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History: 4<sup>th</sup> Edition*, New York: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 1274.

<sup>6</sup> Tuchman, p. 432-433. Also see Dupuy, p. 1274 and Spector, p. 355-356.

<sup>7</sup> Dupuy, p. 1240 and 1242.

<sup>8</sup> While "the British were determined to hold India against the Japanese and to reclaim the rest of their Asian empire...lost in the first weeks of the war," a senior American in India at the time believed "that the British were 'only half-hearted in their efforts to defend Burma' because that country was not essential to the defense of India and 'a strong China [the ultimate goal of U.S. strategy] was not in accordance with British policy'" (Spector, p. 324 and 333). Accordingly, British plans for action in the theater usually aimed toward an ultimate "attack on Singapore, [which was, in Churchill's words] 'the supreme British objective'" (Tuchman, p. 474).

China, specifically Nationalist China under Chiang Kai-shek, was also reluctant fight to retake Burma. Although Chiang "desperately wanted all the American help in arms, money and supplies that he could get," he did not want them "for use against the common enemy [the Japanese] whom he expected his allies would defeat in any event, but for the purpose which he, as its chief executive, considered most important for his country – survival of the Nationalist regime" (Tuchman, p. 3). Thus concerned primarily with the survival of his own political regime, "Chiang wished neither to risk loyal troops in costly battle against the Japanese nor [to] allow troops of doubtful loyalty to be trained, armed and equipped by the Americans lest some day they be turned against himself" (Tuchman, p. 3). Chiang thus hoped that the Americans and British would reopen the Burma Road, so that he could receive the benefits of its supplies with the least cost to his political power.

In contrast to the unwillingness of Great Britain and China, however, the United States was firmly committed to reconquering Burma. While Burma itself mattered little to the United States, Burma as the last land link to sustaining Nationalist China became critical to the U.S. As Barbara Tuchman notes, "the hope of a strong [Nationalist] China as one of the four cornerstones of the postwar peace had formed [American] policy from the beginning and dictated the effort to sustain China through the war....The collapse, surrender or collaboration of the Chungking Government, representing the last free nation of the Far East, might induce the other nations of Asia to come to terms with Japan, realizing Roosevelt's greatest fear. These were the reasons that dictated the long-bedeviled campaign to supply, invigorate and mobilize China and reopen the back door through Burma..." (p. 3).

Sustaining China was also important to the U.S. for reasons more immediate than the shape of the post-war world. Until MacArthur's Southwest Pacific campaign retook the Philippines in 1945, and Nimitz's Central Pacific offensive captured Okinawa that same year, "many Americans agreed with the *Christian Science Monitor* that 'China is the best bast, both geographically and politically, for any serious offensive against Japan'" (Spector, p. 329). "Other Americans, especially air-power enthusiasts, saw China as an ideal base....[from which] American planes could harass Japanese armies, destroy Japanese shipping, sever her communications, and...carry the war to the cities of Japan itself" (Spector, p. 329-330). Regardless of whether U.S. air or ground offensives could be mounted from China, keeping the Nationalists in the war was also important to the U.S. because they "would help divert Japanese forces and attention from the Pacific" (Spector, p. 342). Finally, even as the war wore on, and it became apparent that many American military plans for China would not come to fruition,

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sustaining a viable Nationalist force continued to be important in order to prevent the possibility "that the Japanese army in China might root itself into the mainland and continue to fight even after defeat of the home islands, prolonging the war perhaps for years before it could be conquered" (Tuchman, p. 467).

While one may question the validity of some or all of America's concerns in China, cataloging the number and intensity of those concerns makes it much easier to understand why the United States, and in particular General Stilwell, spent so much time and effort trying to obtain the support of two reluctant allies for the retaking of otherwise unimportant Burma.

<sup>9</sup> Spector, p. 327.

<sup>10</sup> In May, 1942, the month which saw the last Allied units retreat from Burma into India, General Stilwell said of the defeat, "I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back and retake it." Stilwell as quoted in an Associated Press dispatch in *The Stilwell Papers*, Ed. Theodore H. White, New York: William Sloane Associates, 1948, p. 106.

<sup>11</sup> Dupuy, p. 1240.

<sup>12</sup> Dupuy, p. 1240.

<sup>13</sup> Tuchman, p. 418.

<sup>14</sup> Without going too far into the social history of Burma, one should understand that the Burmese were the majority in a multiethnic society. While "the proud, warlike Burmese had never been exactly enchanted with British rule," (Spector, p. 330) the same could not be said for some of the minority groups in Burma. These groups received better treatment under the British colonial system than they had under the preceding Burman dynasties. Consequently, some minority groups favored the Allies over the Japanese. An example were the "Kachin Rangers, warlike tribesmen of north Burma who, unlike their hereditary enemies the Burmese, had sided with the Allies..." (Spector, p. 356). Overall, however, the majority of the population supported the Japanese. Consequently, Allied units in Burma generally worked in what is best considered hostile terrain.

<sup>15</sup> Tuchman, p. 416.

<sup>16</sup> Dupuy, p. 1262.

<sup>17</sup> Dupuy, p. 1278.

<sup>18</sup> Spector, p. 326.

<sup>19</sup> British Field Marshal Slim as quoted in Tuchman, p. 419. The reluctance of Chinese commanders to obey orders and take aggressive action dogged Stilwell for the duration of his command. This problem had its origins in the fact that "obedience to orders depends in the end on fear of sanctions, and [the Chinese commanders] were well aware that it was from Chiang Kai-shek not Stilwell that sanctions would flow" (Tuchman, p. 442). Chinese commanders genuinely feared sanctions from Chiang if they obeyed Stilwell because the latter's orders generally committed Chinese troops to battle, and Chiang wished to avoid this whenever possible. In fact, Chiang not only wished to prevent the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> Division from fighting, but also worked to prevent the reform and improvement of his armies both at the American-run Ramgarh training center in India and in China. He had at least two reasons for doing so.

First, Chiang wanted to preserve the strongest army possible. He was most "interested in surviving the war against Japan with...[his] armies intact, ready to deal with the generalissimo's rivals among the warlords [of China] and his far more dangerous enemies, the Chinese Communist forces of Mao Tse-tung" (Spector, p. 326). Therefore, Chiang had no wish "to risk loyal troops in costly battle against the Japanese..." (Tuchman, p. 3). This included the 22<sup>nd</sup> and 38<sup>th</sup> Divisions, as well as other formations being trained at Ramgarh, which Chiang may have "hoarded" for his own "purposes after the war" (Tuchman, p. 393). Moreover, he hoarded not only his troops, but the Lend Lease material sent to equip them (Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *United States Army in World War II: Stilwell's Mission to China*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1953, rpt. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 183).

Second, Chiang wanted to preserve the most loyal army possible. He was uninterested in the military reform promised by the training at Ramgarh or at other centers in China because, "while it might improve the combat effectiveness of the army, it would also destroy the

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generalissimo's power base..." by removing politically loyal yet militarily inept Chinese commanders (Spector, p. 338). Since "to Chiang[,] every unit trained by the Americans was one that loosened his [political] control," he had no interest in allowing "troops of doubtful loyalty to be trained, armed and equipped by the Americans lest some day they be turned against himself" (Tuchman, p. 3).

In essence, Chiang wanted to preserve the most troops and most Lend Lease equipment he could, while allowing the Americans to defeat the Japanese. Stilwell understood the very real and very detrimental implications this held for his offensive in Burma and worked ceaselessly to overcome them. Primarily, he did so by hiking miles of jungle trails each day to inspect Chinese commanders. "On one occasion he trudged 18 miles up and back [from his headquarters], on another it took three and a half hours to cover three miles, 'tripping and cursing at every step,' on another his party came under the concentrated shell fire with which the Japanese often raked the trails in the hope of catching a mule train or a file of troops, and a shell burst within ten yards of him" (Tuchman, p. 426). Aware that every Chinese commander feared execution if Stilwell "was shot or ambushed by a patrol" while on a visit to his location, Stilwell would take advantage of the fear (Stilwell, p. 422). "[I]n the case of a [Chinese] commander who delayed or stalled, Stilwell would hang around his command post and refuse to go away until the order to move was given" (Tuchman, p. 423). Perhaps the best summary of Stilwell's efforts to overcome Chiang's self-serving influence was written by the General himself: "Item: it pays to go up [to the front] to push. At least it's a coincidence that every time I do, they [the Chinese] spurt a bit" (Tuchman, p. 440).

<sup>20</sup> Tuchman, p. 422.

<sup>21</sup> Tuchman, p. 419

<sup>22</sup> LTC George Sliney as quoted in Romanus and Sunderland, p. 43.

<sup>23</sup> Tuchman, p. 422.

<sup>24</sup> Dupuy, p. 1229-1230.

<sup>25</sup> *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 138.

<sup>26</sup> Tuchman, p. 421.

<sup>27</sup> Spector, p. 348.

<sup>28</sup> Spector, p. 355-356.

<sup>29</sup> Tuchman, p. 433.

<sup>30</sup> "[Professionally] the important thing in Stilwell's mind when he started [the campaign of late 1943] was to open the land route to China for the sake of [an] eventual meeting with U.S. forces on the China coast, and in so doing to [personally] prove his old contention that the Chinese soldier, properly armed, trained and led, was the equal of any in the world." (Tuchman, p. 415-416).

<sup>31</sup> Tuchman, p. 416. The monsoon season in Burma usually runs from June to September.

<sup>32</sup> Spector, p. 333. See also Dupuy, p. 1244.

<sup>33</sup> Spector, p. 355.

<sup>34</sup> Tuchman, p. 428.

<sup>35</sup> Tuchman, p. 418.

<sup>36</sup> Dupuy, p. 1263.

<sup>37</sup> Dupuy, p. 1263.

<sup>38</sup> Tuchman, p. 420. One may question Stilwell's absence from the front during a major offensive by his command. As the senior American officer in the Far East, however, Stilwell wore multiple "hats" and found himself "simultaneously responsible to the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, to Chiang, and to the British commander in India" (Dupuy, p. 1238). Thus, he was frequently compelled to leave the front lines in order to attend to diplomatic, political, or military "crises" in Chungking, Delhi, or elsewhere.

<sup>39</sup> Spector, p. 356-357.

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<sup>40</sup> Dupuy, p. 1274.

<sup>41</sup> Tuchman, p. 432.

<sup>42</sup> Tuchman, p. 432.

<sup>43</sup> Spector, p. 357.

<sup>44</sup> Tuchman, p. 434.

<sup>45</sup> Spector, p. 357.

<sup>46</sup> Tuchman, p. 434 and Spector, p. 357.

<sup>47</sup> Spector, p. 357.

<sup>48</sup> Dupuy, p. 1274-1275.

<sup>49</sup> Previous three quotations from Dupuy, p. 1275

<sup>50</sup> Tuchman, p. 442.

<sup>51</sup> Spector, p. 358.

<sup>52</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>53</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>54</sup> Dupuy, p. 1275.

<sup>55</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>56</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>57</sup> Spector, p. 359-360.

<sup>58</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>59</sup> Dupuy, p. 1276.

<sup>60</sup> Tuchman, p. 453.

<sup>61</sup> Tuchman, p. 453.

<sup>62</sup> Dupuy, p. 1276.

<sup>63</sup> *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 302.

<sup>64</sup> Dupuy, p. 1276.

<sup>65</sup> Dupuy, p. 1276.

<sup>66</sup> Dupuy, p. 1274.

<sup>67</sup> At least three factors account for Stilwell's centralization of irregular operations. First, the absolute commitment to capture of Myitkyina. For Stilwell, seizing the allegedly impossible objective of Myitkyina would validate almost a lifetime of work with Chinese soldiers. Having served in China "as [a] language officer from 1920 to 1923 in the time of the warlords, as officer of the 15<sup>th</sup> Infantry in Tientsin from 1926 to 1929 at the time of the rise...of Chiang Kai-shek, [and] as Military Attaché from 1935 to 1939 at the time of the Japanese invasion," Stilwell had developed "a genuine respect for the much-abused Chinese soldier" (Tuchman, p. xi and Spector, p. 338). "If I can prove the Chinese soldier is as good as any Allied soldier," he told a correspondent, "I'll die happy" (Tuchman, p. 3). The campaign for Myitkyina gave him a chance to prove just that, even if Chinese soldiers played a less than satisfactory role. As one Marauder bitterly opined, "Stilwell had determined to make a record for the Chinese 'if necessary at the expense of the one American infantry unit in the theater.'"

Stilwell was nearly consumed with capturing Myitkyina for at least two other reasons. First, doing so would help to erase the memory of the Allied retreat from Burma in 1942, which he found "humiliating as hell" (*The Stilwell Papers*, p. 106). Second, it would prove an embarrassment to the British who, not only felt Myitkyina was an impossible goal, but also, according to Stilwell, had continuously undermined his efforts to train the Chinese and win in Burma. His contempt for the British is evident in his diary entry written immediately after learning that the Marauders had seized Myitkyina's airfield: "WILL THIS BURN UP THE LIMEYS" (*The Stilwell Papers*, p. 296).

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Second, Stilwell centrally controlled his irregulars because he felt compelled by political pressure to keep the Marauders engaged in high profile conventional combat (as opposed to obscure guerrilla operations) during the final phase of the campaign. As Ronald Spector notes, during the siege of Myitkyina,

Stilwell had little choice. He had repeatedly demanded that the British keep the tired Chindits, with their hundreds of sick and wounded in the field; he was constantly pressuring Chiang for more Chinese units to commit to the campaign. Under these circumstances the American general could hardly afford to place himself in a position where he appeared to be overly sparing of his own troops. "While Americans were in the battle, the expenditure of Chinese troops at Myitkyina could not be challenged. And while he continued to fight at Myitkyina, the need for the British below Mogaung could be demonstrated" (p. 360).

Finally, Stilwell's personality made it almost inevitable that any *reliable* unit, regardless of the use for which it was best suited, would become his shock troops. Intolerant of "do-nothing" attitudes, Stilwell's politically-motivated Chinese commanders nevertheless meant that he, "alone of all commanders, Allied or enemy in any theater on any front,...could not count on field commanders who would carry out his directions as a matter of course" (Tuchman, p. 425 and 443). As "a practical man whose motivating principle was 'get on with it,'" Stilwell was thus almost immediately frustrated with having Chinese soldiers -- "who can do anything if only given the breaks in leadership and equipment," -- directed by commanders whom he found worse than useless (Tuchman, p. 453). Accordingly, it is not surprising that such a personality, "given the delays and slowdowns" of the Chinese, and their "several failures to eliminate the 18<sup>th</sup> Division in battle," would overcontrol other units which he believed "would 'get things done'" (Tuchman, p. 444 and 433).

<sup>68</sup> Tuchman, p. 453 and Dupuy, p. 1276

<sup>69</sup> Tuchman, p. 446.

<sup>70</sup> Spector, p. 370, emphasis added.

<sup>71</sup> Tuchman, p. 437.

<sup>72</sup> Tuchman, p. 442.

<sup>73</sup> Dupuy, p. 1276.

<sup>74</sup> Dupuy, p. 1275.

<sup>75</sup> Spector, p. 359.

<sup>76</sup> *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 301.

<sup>77</sup> Tuchman, p. 433.

<sup>78</sup> Tuchman, p. 442.

<sup>79</sup> Tuchman, p. 449.

<sup>80</sup> Robert Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume I*, New York: Doubleday, 1975, p. 146.

<sup>81</sup> Tuchman, p. 434.

<sup>82</sup> Tuchman, p. 438-441 and *The Stilwell Papers*, p. 285.

<sup>83</sup> Spector, p. 361.

<sup>84</sup> Spector, p. 331, and Stilwell's diary entry of 10 May 1942, cited in Romanus and Sunderland, p. 148. One wonders if this first sour exposure to the Burmese did not deter Stilwell from future efforts at cultivating their support for the Allied cause.

<sup>85</sup> Tuchman, p. 418.

<sup>86</sup> John Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p. 5.

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<sup>87</sup> General Nathanael Greene in a letter to General Henry Knox, 17 July 1781, in *The Papers of General Nathanael Greene, Volume VIII*, Ed. Richard K. Showman and Dennis M. Conrad, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

<sup>88</sup> Tuchman, p. 490.

<sup>89</sup> Tuchman, p. 427, emphasis added.

<sup>90</sup> Tuchman, p. 460-461.

<sup>91</sup> Tuchman, p. 461.

<sup>92</sup> One will recall that it took Beresford a year to create acceptable Portuguese regular formations for Wellington. See Chapter III.

<sup>93</sup> Spector, p. 347 and 355, and Dupuy, p. 1275.

<sup>94</sup> Spector, p. 348.

<sup>95</sup> Tuchman, p. 421.

<sup>96</sup> Tuchman, p. 421

<sup>97</sup> Tuchman, p. 422.

<sup>98</sup> Tuchman, p. 507.

## VI. PRINCIPLES OF HYBRID WARFARE

### A. UNDER WHAT CONDITIONS IS HYBRID WAR BEST EMPLOYED?

The campaigns examined in this research indicate that the hybrid approach is best employed in situations where a hybrid force enjoys local popular support and minimum strategic vulnerability for its regulars. These preconditions create the best situation for employing hybrid forces because only when possessing local popular support and minimum strategic vulnerability does a hybrid force have the *potential* to achieve its maximum efficiency. Whether a hybrid force favored by both preconditions actually *achieves* its maximum efficiency is determined by how skillfully that force is employed. But, given two similarly sized hybrid forces with comparable leadership, the hybrid force lacking the preconditions – no matter how well employed – will be less efficient than the corresponding force favored by them. In fact, the experiences of the Boer commandos and Stilwell's NCAC indicate that the very survival of hybrid forces lacking these preconditions is doubtful over the long term.

#### 1. Local Popular Support

T.E. Lawrence's assertion that "irregular warfare...must have a...population...sympathetic to the point of not betraying rebel movements to the enemy" provides an initial description of what I mean by "local popular support."<sup>1</sup> The cases examined here, however, further clarify how this term applies to hybrid forces. First, "local popular support" describes a situation in which a sizable portion of the indigenous citizenry will not only not betray the movements of the hybrid force to the enemy, but in which it will also not actively oppose the movement of the hybrid force, either through direct force of arms or through sabotage. Additionally, "local popular support" means that natives will sell or give supplies to the hybrid force. Perhaps most importantly, "local popular support" implies sustained allegiance to the hybrid force – the civilians in the contested theater must *remain* unwilling to betray or resist the movements of the hybrid force, and willing to provide supplies, while subject to tremendous hardship or violent reprisals.

Having defined the minimum criteria for the precondition of local popular support, it is also important to note that as such support increases beyond the minimum level, the maximum possible efficiency for the hybrid force also increases. If a local

population, already willing to not betray or oppose the movements of the hybrid force, is also willing to report on the movements of the enemy, a hybrid force can increase the costs inflicted on the enemy and decrease friendly losses. Wellington, for instance, benefited from a sympathetic Spanish population which left him "rarely short of the latest news of French movements and strengths."<sup>2</sup> Such news formed the basis for his complex campaigns of maneuver which culminated in the stunning victories of Salamanca and Vitoria. Similarly, if a local populace will not oppose the movements of a hybrid force, but will actively oppose the movements of the conventional enemy, this also increases the potential costs the former may inflict on the latter. General Allenby's regulars benefited from this during their offensive in the fall of 1917, when Arab peasant resistance to Turkish forces became so effective that "the British forces advancing towards Jerusalem found themselves fighting in a friendly country, while the Turks who were defending their own territory found themselves fighting in the midst of a decidedly hostile population."<sup>3</sup>

The importance of local popular support to maximizing the efficiency of hybrid forces also suggests a caution for U.S. employment of this approach. Namely, when engaged in an overseas conflict, the U.S. has often been reluctant to cultivate close ties with a local population for fear of the political ramifications of the relationship after the conflict's conclusion. Such fears precluded meaningful cooperation between U.S. forces and the Chinese Communists against the Japanese in World War II. Such fears also prevented active support of the "marsh" Arabs in their ill-fated uprising against Saddam Hussein after the Gulf War. Consequently, given the critical importance of local popular support to an efficient hybrid campaign – and the assumption outlined in Chapter I that resource constraints make it foolish for the U.S. to prosecute war inefficiently – the U.S. should not seek to employ hybrid warfare in future situations similar to China in the 1940s or southern Iraq in the 1990s – anywhere, in other words, where it has reservations about closely supporting the indigenous population.

## **2. Minimizing Strategic Vulnerability of the Hybrid Regulars**

While the impacts of minimizing, and failing to minimize, the strategic vulnerability of a hybrid force's regular component have been analyzed in each of the campaigns studied, two closing comments are in order. First, the Duke of Wellington (positively) and various Boer commanders (negatively) all highlighted the crucial role of the theater commander in preserving his regular forces. Simply put, a hybrid commander cannot afford to "gamble" with his regulars ("gamble" here being defined as a chance taken from which, if it fails, recovery is impossible).<sup>4</sup> For if a hybrid commander loses a

large amount of his often outnumbered regulars through ill-advised maneuvers, like Boer Generals Cronje and Prinsloo, the remainder of his force is almost certainly doomed. Even hybrid commanders blessed with initial numerical superiority, like Generals Allenby and Stilwell, are often denied replacements for losses, and thus must also design campaign plans to minimize their regulars' strategic vulnerability.

Second, it is worth noting that geography and transportation assets can combine to create "sanctuaries" where hybrid regulars are essentially invulnerable. For example, control of the sea, easy access to multiple ports, and appropriate naval assets can allow regulars to be evacuated whenever seriously threatened. This was the case with the British in the Peninsular War and, with careful planning and plentiful aviation assets, *might* be duplicated by contemporary hybrid regulars lacking access to, or command of, the sea. Alternately, hybrid regulars may be able to withdraw into terrain which their conventional opponents cannot, or will not, penetrate. American General Greene, for example, hybrid commander in the Revolutionary South, evaded a superior British army under General Cornwallis by retreating from North Carolina into Virginia. Cornwallis did not possess adequate resources to establish a line of communication that far inland, so Greene's regulars were effectively invulnerable. Two centuries later, American forces found themselves in Cornwallis' position when fighting the Vietnamese Communist hybrid force. In that case, U.S. government refusal to authorize extensive operations in Cambodia or North Vietnam created a region where the Communist regulars were effectively invulnerable. Consequently, U.S. defense planners contemplating hybrid warfare should recognize that there are several methods for minimizing the strategic vulnerability of hybrid regulars.

### **3. Likelihood of Encountering the Preconditions**

If it is true that hybrid forces can only achieve their maximum efficiency if they enjoy these two preconditions, then U.S. defense planners should ask if those conditions will exist regularly for our forces in the future. For, "assumptions [preconditions] that never hold give rise to theories that operate only in an imaginary world, and [which]...cannot...generate policy prescriptions. The most useful theories are those whose [preconditions] match reality in at least some important cases."<sup>5</sup> If recent works like former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's *The Next War* and the Rand Corporation's *Sources of Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* are any indication, hybrid warfare should be a very "useful" theory for the United States. Both books suggest that the U.S. will not lack for opportunities in the near future to employ a hybrid force where it could expect to enjoy both local popular support and minimal strategic vulnerability.<sup>6</sup> Thus,

the U.S. should not be denied the opportunity to employ the highly efficient hybrid approach because of a dearth of situations offering the necessary preconditions.

## B. WHAT MAKES HYBRID FORCES MOST EFFICIENT?

### 1. Relationship Between Independent and Dependent Variables

The hybrid campaigns presented in this research demonstrate a clear correlation between the independent variables – coordination of efforts and decentralization of the irregulars – and the dependent variable – hybrid force efficiency. A high degree of both independent variables, as demonstrated by the Anglo-Iberians under Wellington and the Anglo-Arabs under Allenby, produced high force efficiency. A high degree of decentralization, but a limited degree of coordination, as illustrated by the Boers, produced limited force efficiency. Similarly, a high degree of coordination, but a limited degree of decentralization, as represented by NCAC under Stilwell, also produced only limited efficiency. Finally, limited degrees of both coordination and decentralization, as shown by the Anglo-Arabs during Murray's command, produced limited efficiency. Thus, it appears the most efficient hybrid force is one which maximizes coordination of efforts between its two components *and* decentralizes the operations of its irregulars.

This finding results in a change to the hypothesis matrix utilized up to this point. Based on the above, only a hybrid force which is integrated and gives great freedom of action to its irregulars could be *expected* to achieve high efficiency. Such a force could be called *complementary*, for its two components interact to create a force stronger than the sum of its parts. Any *other combination* of coordination and decentralization would be *expected* to produce limited efficiency. These hybrid forces could be labeled as *supplementary*, for their two components do not combine to create a force significantly stronger than if they operated separately. Hence, a revised matrix:




Figure 11. Revised Hypothesis Matrix

## 2. What Makes Complementary Hybrid Forces So Efficient?

Why specifically did highly coordinated and highly decentralized hybrid forces achieve such a high ratio of costs inflicted to resources expended? They achieved high efficiency because they presented their conventional opponents with a dilemma over whether to disperse or concentrate their forces. This dilemma was the key mechanism by which successful hybrid commanders – like Greene, Wellington, Allenby, and Giap – employed their dual-natured force to inflict the greatest costs on an often numerically and technologically superior opponent. Perhaps less obviously, but just as importantly, the same dilemma also reduced the costs incurred by these complementary hybrid forces. In short, the dispersion/concentration dilemma increased enemy costs *and* reduced friendly costs, thus producing tremendous efficiency

How did a complementary hybrid force create the dispersion/concentration dilemma? First, by closely coordinating the efforts of two components, it compelled the conventional opponent to deal with both threats on the least favorable terms, and often nearly simultaneously. Second, by allowing great freedom of action to its irregulars through decentralizing their operations, the complementary hybrid force created two distinctly different types of threat for the conventional opponent: a regular threat which compelled him to concentrate conventional force for traditional engagements; and an

irregular threat – “an intangible web of guerrilla bands” which did not present a “vulnerable military target” – which could be neutralized only through widespread dispersion.<sup>7</sup>


#### a. Inflicting Costs on the Conventional Opponent

How does the dispersion/concentration dilemma thus created by the complementary hybrid force inflict costs on the conventional opponent? This may be best explained by Andrew Mack, who, in considering the campaigns of Communist hybrid forces in China and Vietnam, wrote that,


Mao and Giap have repeatedly emphasized that the principal contradiction which the... [conventional] army must confront on the ground derives from the fact that forces dispersed to control territory become spread so thinly that they are vulnerable to attack. If forces are concentrated to overcome this weakness, other areas are left unguarded....Any attempt to resolve one contradiction will magnify the other.<sup>8</sup>

Thus, an integrated hybrid force which gives great freedom of action to its irregulars will inflict costs on the conventional opponent both when he is dispersed *and* when he concentrates. If he disperses, the hybrid regulars will be able to engage now-reduced concentrations of enemy regulars, or advance farther into territory which is now not as strongly defended. If the opponent instead concentrates, the hybrid irregulars can gain political and military control of the areas from which the conventional opponent withdraws his troops to concentrate them elsewhere. Since the conventional opponent can hardly avoid both concentrating *and* dispersing, the complementary hybrid force is actually inflicting costs on him *regardless of what he does*. This was the situation thrust on the French by Wellington and on the Turks by Allenby.

It is important to note that a supplementary hybrid force cannot inflict a comparable level of costs on its conventional opponent. If the hybrid force lacks coordination, like the Boers or the Anglo-Arabs before Allenby, the conventional opponent will *not* face regular and irregular operations timed to be the most inopportune for him. The conventional opponent is therefore often able to transfer his forces so as to defeat these sequential, not simultaneous, threats. If the hybrid force centralizes its irregulars, like NCAC or the Arabs before Allenby, the conventional opponent faces an almost uniformly conventional threat. This makes hybrid force actions more predictable and limits the conventional opponent’s requirement to disperse. Thus, as Figures 12 and 13 illustrate, a major key to the higher efficiency of complementary hybrid forces, in comparison to their supplementary counterparts, is that the dispersion/concentration dilemma allows the former to inflict much greater costs than the latter.




**Figure 12. Costs of Concentration to the Conventional Opponent**  
(above & beyond those incurred in traditional engagements with hybrid regulars)




**Figure 13. Costs of Dispersion to the Conventional Opponent**

#### b. Reducing Costs Suffered by the Complementary Hybrid Force

The other major key to the higher efficiency of complementary hybrid forces is that employing the dispersion/concentration dilemma also lowers the costs incurred by the hybrid force. As depicted in figures 14 and 15, a conventional opponent fully occupied with simultaneous requirements to disperse and concentrate is much less able to damage either component of his hybrid enemy than if that conventional opponent was not so distracted.




**Figure 14. Benefits of the Dispersion/Concentration Dilemma to a Complementary Hybrid Force's Regulars**



**Figure 15. Benefits of the Dispersion/Concentration Dilemma to a Complementary Hybrid Force's Irregulars**

### c. What Makes Hybrid Forces Most Efficient, A Summation

To close this discussion on what makes hybrid forces efficient, it is now clear that complementary hybrid forces, by exploiting the dispersion/concentration dilemma, inflict higher costs on the enemy, and suffer lower costs themselves, than do supplementary hybrid forces. Obviously, this maximization of costs inflicted on the enemy, and minimization of friendly resources expended, is what makes complementary hybrid forces the most efficient. This conclusion, so far depicted in Figures 12 through 15, could be alternately illustrated in a single diagram, presented on the following page as Figure 16.



**Figure 16. Efficiencies of Various Hybrid Forces**

- "CC" = Combat Capabilities Curve. Each curve represents an efficiency ratio which a *given size* hybrid force could achieve through differing combinations of decentralization and coordination.

- $CC_2$  represents greater efficiency than  $CC_1$  and so on.

- Convexity of the Combat Capabilities Curves represents the fact that for producing efficiency, additional coordination cannot substitute for a lack of decentralization, and vice versa. See below

- ..... = Supplementary force which is overcontrolled.

A hybrid force could try to substitute coordination for decentralization, but efficiency would begin to fall. An overcontrolled but highly coordinated force would present the opponent with a threat which did not compel great dispersion. This happened to NCAC, and to the Arabs before Allenby.

- - - - - = Supplementary force which is segregated.

A hybrid force could try to substitute decentralization for coordination, but efficiency would again suffer. A force giving great freedom of action to the irregulars, but not coordinating efforts, would give its opponent the benefit of facing sequential, not simultaneous threats. The Boers are an example.

- - - - = Complementary hybrid force.

Complementary hybrid force exploits dispersion/concentration dilemma to increase enemy costs and decrease friendly costs.

## C. HYBRID FORCE EFFICIENCY & OPERATIONAL SUCCESS


One can now turn to linking the preceding findings about the efficiency of hybrid forces to the original purpose of this research – determining how a hybrid commander should employ his force to achieve the highest probability for operational success. As a first step, one recalls that operational success results from inflicting intolerable costs on the enemy force before he can do the same to friendly units. Next, one understands that a complementary hybrid force inflicts the highest costs on the enemy, yet minimizes the costs it incurs itself. Consequently, a complementary hybrid force – because it is most efficient – accomplishes the very tasks which would give it the greatest probability of achieving operational success. A hybrid commander pursuing operational success would thus be best served by coordinating and decentralizing his force.

Just because a complementary hybrid force has the highest probability of operational success, however, *does not* mean that any hybrid force which is coordinated and decentralized will win. Indeed, many other factors besides force efficiency have a role in determining the theater victor. A lack of logistical support, or the opponent's overwhelming numerical superiority, for example, may condemn the hybrid force to defeat no matter how well it is employed. But a complementary hybrid force, operating with favorable preconditions, will always inflict the greatest costs on the enemy for a given amount of friendly resources. And sometimes these greater costs resulting from a complementary, efficient hybrid approach – versus those inflicted by a supplementary, inefficient hybrid approach – can in fact be decisive.

This relationship between hybrid force efficiency and operational success can be represented graphically. To do so, one accepts that any given conflict between a hybrid force and a conventional opponent could be characterized in only one of three ways: the conventional opponent could possess so much combat power\* compared to the hybrid force that it was assured of victory; or, each of the two forces could possess enough combat power relative to each other that the outcome would be in doubt; or, the hybrid force could possess so much combat power compared to the conventional opponent that it was assured of victory. From the perspective of the hybrid force, these situations are illustrated below:

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\* "Combat power is created by combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership." FM 100-5, p. 2-9



**Figure 17. Possible Outcomes for a Hybrid Force**

The left end of the diagram denotes that the conventional opponent possesses infinitely more combat power than the hybrid force. As one moves right, the former's combat power advantage over the latter steadily decreases to some ratio ( $x/1$ ) where the hybrid force is finally strong enough to have a chance at victory (represented by the line at  $x/1$ ). This region symbolizes any hybrid conflict where the conventional opponent maintains such overwhelming combat power superiority that the hybrid force, no matter how well employed, *cannot* win. Thus, the hypothetical hybrid force with the crippling logistics problems just mentioned would be placed here.

The next region begins at the point where the hybrid force has its first chance to win ( $x/1$ ), and continues to the point where the conventional opponent's combat power has decreased so much compared to the hybrid force's that the conventional opponent, no matter how well employed, no longer has a chance to win (represented by the line at  $x-?/1$ ). In this region would be placed the hybrid conflicts where either side has a chance to win. One would assume that the conventional opponent would be favored in conflicts tending toward the left of this region, since he would have a better ratio of combat power there. Conversely, one would assume that a hybrid force would be favored to win as one drew closer to the right side of this region. In the far right region, the situation is the exact reverse of the first region: the hybrid force's combat power is sufficient to ensure it *will* win.

A hybrid commander who employs his force efficiently can move it to the right on this graph, giving it a better chance for victory, or perhaps even a chance at victory where none was thought possible. Essentially, then, efficiency can directly increase combat power. A brief analysis of an historical hybrid campaign can demonstrate this relationship.

I think it is safe to assume that most military analysts would have placed Wellington's Anglo-Iberian hybrid force in the leftmost region of this graph when the Peninsular War began. After all, the Duke faced between three and four hundred thousand troops of the finest army in the world with only 40,000 British regulars and perhaps 40,000 far flung guerrillas. Even factoring in the unquestioned superiority of the Royal Navy, one would have to put the combat ratio between the two powers at about 4:1 in favor of the French. With half of Wellington's force being untested civilians, perhaps even this ratio is too low. But whether the ratio was 4:1, or greater, in favor of the French, it certainly seemed high enough to guarantee them success. Wellington's force consequently seemed so weak as to be assured of defeat, as depicted in the graph below:






Figure 18. Initial Expected Outcome for the Anglo-Iberian Hybrid Force

By forging a complementary hybrid force, however, Wellington ensured, as previously mentioned, "that the Allies never faced the bulk of Napoleon's armies."<sup>9</sup> Instead, the guerrillas operated against smaller French formations, keeping the overall French force continuously off balance. Wellington's smaller regular force was thus repeatedly able to operate at a local advantage, as at Salamanca, where "he had 70 percent of the total Allied regulars in the Peninsula on [the]...battlefield], [yet the French commander] Marmont had barely 20 percent of his overall French forces present."<sup>10</sup> Consequently, efficient operations transformed an overall ratio of combat power which appeared to doom the hybrid force to defeat into local ratios which instead favored the hybrid force. Over time, these recurrent local advantages so weakened the French that the overall ratio swung in favor of the Allies.

Graphically, Wellington had moved his hybrid force out of the region where it had no chance to win and into the region where it did have a chance *by employing it efficiently*. Thus, the Anglo-Iberian campaign illustrates how efficiency expands the region where a hybrid force has a chance to win. In effect, efficiency moves the initial point on the graph where the hybrid force first has a chance to win to the left.\* That region lying between the point where an adequately employed hybrid force would first have a chance at victory, and the point where an efficiently employed hybrid force would first have a chance at victory (shown on the following page with diagonal hash marks) is the "gain" that efficiency "buys" a hybrid force. While increasing costs inflicted on the enemy, and minimizing friendly resources expended to do so, is always of value, in this region it makes the difference between certain defeat and a chance at victory. One finds it difficult to imagine that any soldier would willingly forgo such a priceless opportunity. Thus, achieving efficiency should be among the foremost concerns of any hybrid commander.

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\* Perhaps just as importantly, an efficient hybrid force moves the initial point on the graph where it can first be assured of victory to the left as well.



**Figure 19. Marginal Increase in the Probability of Victory**

## D. OTHER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HYBRID FORCES

### 1. Preserving the Irregular Component

While it is critical for the hybrid commander to preserve his regular component by minimizing its strategic vulnerability, it is equally imperative that he preserve his irregulars. The obvious reason for doing so is that one cannot have a hybrid force without having both regulars and irregulars. An equally important reason is the fact that if the hybrid force is outnumbered to begin with, it is unlikely that either its regulars or irregulars could long survive on their own. Both the Anglo-Iberian and Boer cases highlight this unforgiving reality, but they are not the only campaigns which do. As John Richard Allen writes of General Greene's hybrid campaign in the American Revolutionary south,

It is clear that the patriots of the lower South, although they might have been able to continue guerrilla fighting indefinitely, could hardly have dealt effectively with the British and their Tory allies without the assistance of the regulars from the upper South and Delaware. On the other hand, Greene[']s regulars] could hardly have kept the field without the aid of Marion, Sumter, Pickens, Clarke, Huger, and the partisans.<sup>11</sup>

So, if the hybrid force wants to maintain resistance over the long term, it must preserve both its regular and irregular components. While the regulars are preserved through minimizing their strategic vulnerability, the irregulars are usually preserved through stealth and anonymity, provided in large measure by a sympathetic local population. The Chindits demonstrated the frightful losses irregulars can suffer without such support. But, because hybrid irregulars have often enjoyed anonymity from a supportive local populace, preserving them has usually not been an issue of protecting them from enemy attack. Rather, preserving the irregulars has usually been an issue of attitude of command – of allowing them to operate “irregularly.”

Often, as in the case of the Arabs before Allenby, the hybrid command structure has sought to “regularize” the irregulars – to train and direct them to fight as regulars.<sup>12</sup> But as that campaign demonstrated (as well as the Peninsular War and, to some extent, the U.S. experience training the Chinese in WWII), creating disciplined regular formations out of indigenous personnel is not a simple nor swift process. It took Beresford more than a year to forge effective conventional units out of Portuguese conscripts during the Peninsular War, and even two years of American supervision at the Ramgarh training center could not produce consistently reliable Chinese divisions for the campaign in Burma. Hybrid commanders facing an active enemy threat may not always have the luxury of such time.

Moreover, it is important to note that regularizing indigenous manpower can be less efficient than using them as irregulars. On the one hand, fighting as conventional troops may run counter to the natives' character. This was certainly true of the Spanish guerrillas in the Peninsular War and of the Arabs in WWI. On the other hand, converting irregulars into regulars robs the hybrid force of its dual nature, making it much less troublesome for the conventional opponent. Consequently, future hybrid commanders, *and* their superiors in the national security community, would do well to remember that: indigenous personnel are often most effective fighting as irregulars; and that preserving irregulars is usually not up to the *actions* of the enemy, but to the *attitude* of the hybrid command.

## 2. Importance of Cultural Awareness

The hybrid campaigns examined here demonstrated that cultural awareness is highly beneficial to the hybrid commander for at least two reasons: cultivating and/or maintaining local popular support for the hybrid force; and improving the relationship with foreign irregulars. Additionally, cultural awareness is just as critical for the conventional opponent seeking to defeat a hybrid enemy

### a. Cultivating and/or Maintaining Local Popular Support

Since the importance of local popular support to a hybrid force has already been established, this section will discuss how a hybrid commander might establish and preserve such support. Foremost among his tools for doing this is cultural awareness. The Duke of Wellington provides an outstanding example of how a culturally conscious commander can build and sustain local popular support.

In Wellington's first combat deployment in 1794, "he saw the effects of...local inhabitants who preferred the enemy to their allies...."<sup>13</sup> Having, he later wrote, "learnt [from that campaign] what one ought not to do,"<sup>14</sup> in both "[his campaigns in] India and the Peninsula, he sought to retain the goodwill of the locals."<sup>15</sup> In the former, he demanded that "[n]ative customs...always...be respected," and as a consequence, "[t]he 'native inhabitants'... regard[ed] his justice and fairness with 'wonder'."<sup>16</sup> Wellington converted such amazement into tangible benefits in the form of outstanding local intelligence and logistics support. He continued this emphasis in Spain where, upon assuming command, he lamented that "I should begin immediately but I cannot venture to stir without money."<sup>17</sup> Unlike Napoleon, whose "armies lived off the country, by forcible requisitioning amounting to robbery," Wellington refused to launch an offensive until he could purchase supplies from the locals with cash.<sup>18</sup> Only through essentially honest dealings with Spanish and Portuguese inhabitants could he maintain

their support, which, he knew from Flanders and India, was indispensable to his eventual success.

Similarly, the Arab Revolt demonstrates the importance of cultural awareness in just *launching* a successful hybrid campaign. For prior to the Revolt, cultural ignorance almost lost the British the benefits of an Arab uprising before it ever began. This occurred when the senior Arab leader, Sharif Hussein, responded to British calls for an alliance by respectfully demanding to know whether the British would support an independent Arab nation.<sup>19</sup> Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, underestimated the importance of this issue to Hussein, and almost responded to him with vague promises. Had McMahon done so, it is likely that Hussein would have recognized the worthlessness of such assurances and ended the negotiations.

Fortunately, for the British, an Arab deserter from the Turkish Army, Muhammad Faruqi, gained the confidence of McMahon and his staff. After Faruqi explained the crucial role that Arab nationalism would have to play in precipitating and sustaining an Arab movement against the Turks, "McMahon and his advisers had enough knowledge of the background [of Hussein's request] to...[evaluate] it with a fuller understanding. The note which McMahon [then] dispatched in reply....contains the pledges which brought the Arabs into the War, openly on the side of the Allies."<sup>20</sup>

#### **b. Improving the Relationship with Foreign Irregular Combatants**

From the above examples, it is evident that cultural awareness can play a major role in obtaining and sustaining the support of a local population for a hybrid campaign. Such awareness similarly loomed large, in the Anglo-Iberian and Anglo-Arab campaigns, in maximizing the contributions of the foreign irregulars once they joined the fight. Wellington, for example, "proved capable of cooperating with the most diverse guerrilla leaders."<sup>21</sup> His willingness to let them fight their war, their way – even to the point of paying for the still "gruesomely bloodstained" French dispatches which they brought him – undoubtedly endeared them to him. One also recalls the earlier discussion about the role that T.E. Lawrence's understanding of Arab culture played in transforming the performance of the Arab tribesmen. It is worth repeating that had men like Major Garland – who thought it "quite useless for the Britisher to endeavor to introduce military ideas" to the Arabs – continued to supervise their fighting, the Anglo-Arab force would likely not have advanced out of Palestine and Arabia.<sup>22</sup> It is also hard to imagine a more potent recommendation for the value of cultural awareness.

### c. Role of Cultural Awareness in Defeating a Hybrid Force

Finally, the role which a lack of popular support played in limiting the efficiency of both the Boers and NCAC is a point U.S. commanders should keep in mind if *opposing* a hybrid force. The U.S. may not always find itself fortunate enough to be in the role of the Japanese in Burma – fighting a hybrid force which the local population voluntarily opposes. Cultural awareness on the part of a conventional commander, however, manifested through astute interaction with the local population, can limit their support for an opposing hybrid force.

The British effort to deny popular support to the Boer commandos, for example, was not entirely a story of herding civilians into disease-ridden, overcrowded concentration camps. The British also weakened popular support for the rebels “by setting up an effective administrative machine and an efficient police organization, and by financing reconstruction.”<sup>23</sup> Much more well-managed population relocation programs also contributed substantially to the defeat of Communist irregulars in Malay during the 1950s, and in Guatemala in the 1980s. Some of the best guidance on swaying the allegiance of the local population away from indigenous combatants comes from the words of French “General Joseph Simon Gallieni, who made his name [fighting guerrillas] in Indochina and Madagascar at the end of the last century,”

Every time that the necessities of war force one of our...[units] to take action against a village or an inhabited center, [the commanding officer’s] first concern, once submission of the inhabitants has been achieved, should be the reconstruction of the village, creation of a market, and establishment of a school.<sup>24</sup>

Thus, if seeking to defeat a future hybrid opponent by eliminating one of his most significant assets – local popular support – U.S. commanders would do well to remember that, if shaped by a reasonable concern for the native culture, population control does not always have to be unpopular.

Of course the opposite is also true; a conventional commander with no appreciation nor regard for local culture can *create* support for a hybrid opponent. The southern campaign of the American Revolution, for instance, clearly illustrates the ramifications of a *lack* of cultural awareness on the part of a conventional commander. In that campaign, General Sir Henry Clinton, the British theater commander, completely misinterpreted southern colonial sentiments after the overwhelming British victory at Charleston in May, 1780. As historian Paul Smith observes,

The fall of Charleston...shattered American resistance in the South. Within three weeks the last organized groups in arms...accepted terms;....Undoubtedly convinced that further resistance was impossible, the...rebels acknowledged their defenselessness and everywhere appeared ready to accept the return of royal government.<sup>25</sup>

While the senior British civilian official in the south, sensing this Patriot disheartenment, wanted to establish a Royal civilian regime as quickly as possible, Clinton refused. As a military commander, he "was reluctant to restore civil authority...quickly....Self government was a blessing too great to be bestowed at once: 'It will intoxicate,' he declared."<sup>26</sup>

Consequently, acting on his guarded outlook, Clinton issued a proclamation declaring that anyone who "failed to take an oath of allegiance to His Majesty's government would be considered in rebellion and treated accordingly. 'This proclamation was the point upon which *the continuance of the Revolution* in South Carolina turned....'"<sup>27</sup> The reason is summarized by Russell Weigley: "this compulsion of a clear choice between loyalty and a return to rebellion, when *many would have preferred a neutrality which might have served Clinton just as well*, perversely helped drive men back into rebellion."<sup>28</sup> As Lord Rawdon, one of Clinton's subordinate commanders, sardonically summarized at the time,

That unfortunate Proclamation...has had very unfavorable consequences. The majority of the Inhabitants in the Frontier Districts, tho' ill disposed to us, from circumstances were not [previously] actually in arms against us:... freed [by the Proclamation] from the Paroles [which would have excused them from fighting]...nine out of ten of them are now embodied on the part of the Rebels....<sup>29</sup>

Undoubtedly, a better understanding of colonial attitudes on Clinton's part could have dramatically altered the outcome of this hybrid campaign in the British favor. Although accepting this clear implication, contemporary U.S. commanders might still be tempted to dismiss Clinton's mistake as one that they, being more globally aware, would never make. But as Larry Cable warns, even the American military has recently followed in Clinton's footsteps:

Viewing British actions in the southern colonies, the popular perception of provocation is obvious. Far from coercing the almost passive southern population, the actions of [the British]...*like the U.S. use of airpower in Vietnam* (1965) and the Israeli security forces in the Occupied Territories, incited a profoundly hostile response from the target population.<sup>30</sup>

In conclusion, one may question such an extensive discussion regarding cultural awareness. But at least three factors justify its serious consideration in an analysis of hybrid campaigns. First, the absolute indispensability of cultural awareness

in grooming an effective hybrid force ought to now be unquestionable. Second, and of specific concern to Americans, is the fact that many foreigners view them as having "a 'superiority complex,' which expresses itself...and displeases foreigners."<sup>31</sup> Possessing sufficient cultural awareness will go a long way toward minimizing those traits with which Americans so alienate their possible allies. Finally, even given these benefits, cultivating and maintaining cultural awareness is often disregarded by conventional military commanders until after the crisis requiring it has erupted. By then, it is obviously too late.

## **E. IMPLICATIONS**

### **1. Hybrid Warfare is a Costly Form of War**

It is clear that hybrid warfare is often costly in terms of both physical devastation and time. As for the former, the contested theater is usually ravaged, and non-combatants frequently become targets for reprisals. Often, serving as irregulars, they also become combatant casualties. In the cases of the Iberians and the Arabs, as well as many other historical hybrid campaigns, nationalism was a motivating factor for enduring such hardships. Nationalism, however, will not motivate foreign regulars, or foreign SOF fighting as irregulars, serving in a multinational hybrid force. Foreign military commanders in such cases would need troops with the disciplined willingness of Wellington's regulars, Merrill's Marauders, or the Chindits.

Hybrid warfare is also costly in terms of the time it takes to reach a conclusion. As Liddell-Hart noted when analyzing the Anglo-Arab hybrid campaign, "if national conditions make a quick issue imperative," hybrid warfare is not the approach to take.<sup>32</sup> Consequently, the local populace in the contested theater which supports a hybrid force must be willing to maintain that support over a lengthy period. Similarly, the population of any foreign country which is providing troops for a hybrid force must not strongly oppose a long-term involvement for those troops.

This last point seems particularly applicable to the U.S. Is the American public willing to support U.S. military participation in a lengthy hybrid campaign? The U.S. Army's own doctrine seems to indicate that they will not: "The American people expect decisive victory.... They prefer quick resolution of conflicts and reserve the right to reconsider their support should any of these conditions not be met."<sup>33</sup> Might this characteristic of the American public make U.S. military forces participating in a typical hybrid campaign – which will not be resolved swiftly – vulnerable to loss of support

back home? With substantial public support as the sine qua non of U.S. military commitments since Vietnam, this issue should be thoroughly addressed before introducing U.S. forces to a hybrid campaign.

## **2. Increasing a Hybrid Force's Degree of Coordination or Decentralization**

Given that coordination and decentralization are the keys to creating the most efficient hybrid force, how can a hybrid commander improve these two variables within his force? As future hybrid commanders consider this, it may be useful to remember that most hybrid forces which were inefficient became that way through a lack of coordination. Consequently, a hybrid commander should concentrate first on improving his force's coordination. Improving cultural awareness would seem a useful avenue for increasing the coordination in a multinational hybrid force. Unfortunately, however, cultural awareness cannot be enhanced "overnight."

But while improving coordination may be a long term, effort-intensive process, problems with too much centralization in a hybrid force might be repaired much more quickly. After all, a hybrid commander could give greater freedom of action to his irregulars simply by decree. But as some of the campaigns analyzed here clearly show, hybrid commanders can be loathe to issue such a decree.

## **3. Hybrid Warfare and 21<sup>st</sup> Century Weaponry**

Some may be tempted to claim that modern military technology, by overmatching less sophisticated opponents, will paralyze indigenous irregular forces and make hybrid warfare obsolete. As Lewis Gann wrote of the Boer hybrid force,

The Boers had the good fortune to fight at a time just before the combustion engine had revolutionized the art of war. Had the Boer War broken out twenty years later, armored cars and aircraft, supported by motorized infantry and mechanized supply services, would swiftly have put an end to the depredations of horsemen on the open veldt.<sup>34</sup>

Are irregular forces without access to the latest technology as vulnerable today as the Boers would have been fighting against armored cars and aircraft? Contemporary conflicts suggest otherwise. Vietnamese Communist irregulars maintained bitter resistance against the best of French and American technology. And while the Vietnamese benefited from tremendous cover and concealment provided by jungle foliage, irregular resistance to modern technology is also possible in more open terrain. As James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi observe,

Afghan resistance fighters....fought a guerrilla war in an area where guerrilla war was thought (by outsiders) to be impossible, or at least very difficult. Afghanistan is largely devoid of forests, or cover of any kind. But the Soviets found out that the traditional Afghan costume of dark-colored clothing made people invisible from the air whenever they simply lay down on the ground and remained still. They made maximum use of whatever cover was available. When Afghan fighters moved with munitions-laden pack animals, they either moved only at night, or always stayed near whatever cover there was, and listened carefully for any low-flying aircraft or helicopters.<sup>35</sup>

Thus it appears that the potential for determined opposition by "low tech" irregulars will continue for some years to come, and with it the viability of hybrid warfare.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER VI

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<sup>1</sup> T.E. Lawrence, "Guerrilla Warfare," in the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 1957, Volume 10, as quoted in Robert B. Asprey, *War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume I*, New York: Doubleday, 1975, p. 292.

<sup>2</sup> David Chandler, *On the Napoleonic Wars: Collected Essays*, London: Greenhill Books, 1994, p. 159.

<sup>3</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1938, p. 227.

<sup>4</sup> Department of the Army, *Field Manual 100-5, Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993, p. 2-2.

<sup>5</sup> Stephen Van Evera, *Guides to Methods for Students of Political Science*, Cornell University Press, 1997, p. 28-29.

<sup>6</sup> Caspar Weinberger and Peter Schweizer, in *The Next War*, Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1996, forward at least two scenarios about future conflicts where the U.S. could enjoy the preconditions discussed above and employ a hybrid approach. First, they present a scenario hypothesizing that a resurgent Russia will use armed force to reestablish a buffer between it and western Europe. Emboldened by possession of an anti-ballistic missile defense system, the Russians attack to subdue at least Poland and the Baltic states. Hybrid campaigns would appear a viable method for opposing a Russian advance or, if the Russian attack initially succeeds, for resisting and eventually expelling the aggressors. Second, describe a scenario where a future reactionary Mexican government encourages both large-scale illegal immigration to the United States (on the scale of hundreds of thousands per month) and terrorists acts by Mexican drug-runners in Texas and California. Moderate Mexican politicians establish a new government and violence breaks out within Mexico over who will rule. The moderate Mexican faction invites American armed forces into Mexico to assist in restoring order. American forces end up waging a hybrid campaign with Mexican irregulars against the remaining supporters of the reactionary government.

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Zalmay Khalilzad and Ian O. Lesser, in *Sources of Conflict in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1998, suggest two other future conflicts which would present both an opportunity to employ the hybrid approach and preconditions favorable to a U.S.-backed hybrid force. First, they depict a civil war in Ukraine between ethnic Russians, seeking to secede and join with Russia, and ethnic Ukrainians, seeking to preserve the sovereignty of their increasingly Western-leaning nation. Hybrid campaigns could be employed by either or both sides in this conflict. With "continued talk in the West about admitting the...Ukraine to the [NATO] alliance," this outcome of this conflict could be very meaningful to the United States. Next, Khalilzad and Lesser speculate that in the first decade of the next century, "[a] series of rapid successions to the [Saudi] throne..., each accompanied by internal power struggles and positioning .... contribute ... to the propagation of a number of fissures within Saudi Arabia." These fissures lead to the outbreak of civil war within Saudi Arabia. Iran provides initially covert support to one of the largest factions in the civil war, the Shi'a minority of the Eastern Province. Saudi Arabian regulars, or Iranian conventional forces, would have the potential to unite with competing factions in the civil war to create a hybrid forces. Once again, the outcome of this conflict, given Saudi Arabia's strategic location and natural resources, seems vitally important to the United States.

<sup>7</sup> B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York: Signet, 1967, p. 110.

<sup>8</sup> Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," in *World Politics*, January, 1975, p. 187.

<sup>9</sup> John Tone, *The Fatal Knot: The Guerrilla War in Navarre and the Defeat of Napoleon in Spain*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994, p. 4.

<sup>10</sup> Chandler, p. 177.

<sup>11</sup> John Richard Allen, *The South in the Revolution: 1763-1789*, p. 267.

<sup>12</sup> This term was introduced to me by Eliot Cohen's *Commandos and Politicians*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed., 1978, rpt. Harvard: University Press of America, 1993.

<sup>13</sup> Elizabeth Longford, *Wellington: The Years of the Sword*, New York: Harper & Row, 1969, p. 36.

<sup>14</sup> Longford, p. 37.

<sup>15</sup> John Keegan, *The Mask of Command*, 1987, rpt., Norwalk: The Easton Press, 1994, p. 134.

<sup>16</sup> Longford, p. 99.

<sup>17</sup> Longford, p. 185.

<sup>18</sup> Longford, p. 186.

<sup>19</sup> Antonius, p. 168.

<sup>20</sup> Antonius, p. 169.

<sup>21</sup> Chandler, p. 164.

<sup>22</sup> Jeremy Wilson, *Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorized Biography of T.E. Lawrence*, New York: Atheneum, 1990, p. 375.

<sup>23</sup> Lewis Gann, *Guerrillas in History*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1971, p. 37.

<sup>24</sup> Gann, p. 41.

<sup>25</sup> Paul H. Smith, *Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy*, Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1964, p. 128.

<sup>26</sup> Smith, p. 130.

<sup>27</sup> Smith, p. 132 [emphasis added].

<sup>28</sup> Russell Weigley, *The Partisan War: The South Carolina Campaign of 1780-1782*, Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1970, p. 12 [emphasis added].

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<sup>29</sup> Lord Rawdon in a letter of 7 July 1780. Smith, p. 132-133.

<sup>30</sup> Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Autumn, 1993, p. 230, emphasis added.

<sup>31</sup> Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda*, New York: Knopf, 1965, p. 70.

<sup>32</sup> Liddell-Hart, p. 182.

<sup>33</sup> FM 100-5, p. 1-3.

<sup>34</sup> Gann, p. 37.

<sup>35</sup> James F. Dunnigan and Albert J. Nofi, *Victory and Deceit: Dirty Tricks at War*, New York: William Morrow and Company, 1995, p. 307.

## VII. HYBRID WAR IN THE INFORMATION AGE

### A. INTRODUCTION

#### 1. Typology

"We live in an age that is driven by information. Technological breakthroughs...are changing the face of war and how we prepare for war."<sup>1</sup> If this claim by former Secretary of Defense Perry is valid, then the importance of any conclusions drawn about the conduct of war today depends upon their continued relevance in the Information Age. Thus, to ensure the preceding explication and analysis of conducting and winning hybrid campaigns is worth the reader's consideration as more than just historical explanation, this chapter will consider how the future might affect such campaigns. Specifically, this chapter hypothesizes that while Information Age technologies (IAT) may substantially transform the appearance of hybrid campaigns, they will not affect the key to victory in those campaigns: effective combination of the regular and irregular components through coordination and decentralization.

In considering the impact of the Information Age on hybrid campaigns, this chapter will seek to reduce an almost infinite array of possibilities into a manageable portion through a simple typology -- those impacts which would be most evident from a political/cultural frame of reference versus those impacts which would be most evident from a military frame of reference. The first category corresponds roughly to all of the strategic level of war, and some of the operational level of war. The second category would include the remainder of the operational level of war and all of the tactical level of war.<sup>2</sup> Within the first category, the political/cultural grouping, IAT could significantly alter the use and impact of propaganda on hybrid campaigns, as well as the acquisition of the cultural awareness which has often been critical to forging efficient hybrid campaigns. Within the military frame of reference, IAT may materially transform the application of three of the four components of combat power: maneuver, firepower, and leadership.<sup>3</sup>

#### 2. Caveats

Before examining these specific impacts on hybrid war, it is important to address two caveats. First, although most of the historical examples cited below come from past hybrid campaigns, some points are most aptly illustrated with anecdotes from non-

hybrid campaigns. One should not infer, however, that a point illustrated with a story from a non-hybrid campaign does not apply to hybrid warfare.

Secondly, one must understand that logical clarity dictates that only one impact of IAT can be addressed at a time. Given the almost limitless number of applications for IAT which can be imagined, and the many which have already been demonstrated to have reasonable validity, this “one at time” approach could leave one open to a charge of failing to appreciate the revolutionary impact which the Information Age could have across *all* phases of military operations. Nothing could be farther from the truth. I readily agree that today’s prognosticators may not even begin to understand the changes IAT will make. Moreover, I understand that I cannot imagine all the implications of IAT on even just hybrid war, and even just in the areas I have chosen to emphasize. Thus, the reader should keep in mind that the postulations given below do not imply that only the IATs discussed for a given area could be used in that area. Moreover, just because a given IAT is discussed in only one area does not mean that it could not have applications in other areas. In other words, what follows is meant to be credible and informative, not exhaustive and definitive.

## **B. HOW IAT MAY IMPACT HYBRID WAR POLITICALLY**

### **1. Propaganda**

At least two potential applications for combining propaganda with IAT present themselves as useful to both a hybrid force and its opposition: influencing international opinion and increasing popular support within the contested nation. Before investigating these applications, however, it is necessary to first define “propaganda.” This chapter will adopt the definition forwarded by Jacques Ellul in his work, *Propaganda*:

Propaganda is a set of methods employed by an organized group that wants to bring about the active or passive participation in its actions of a mass of individuals, psychologically unified through psychological manipulations and incorporated in an organization.<sup>4</sup>

One anticipates that recent and future IATs, like wider access to television and the Internet, and the near real-time broadcast of events by both mediums, could significantly improve the capability of “an organized group” to “psychologically manipulate” a “mass of individuals.” With public support so crucial to either sustaining or thwarting a hybrid campaign, improvements in so manipulating masses of individuals might have tremendous impact. Keeping in mind propaganda as defined by

Ellul, and the importance of public support to hybrid campaigns, one can move to exploring how IAT might improve the former's influence on the latter. The first area considered will be utilizing propaganda to influence international opinion.

a. **Influencing International Opinion**

(1) **Hybrid Forces Seeking Tangible Aid.** A brief review of past uses of propaganda by hybrid forces trying to sway international opinion reveals at least two potential future applications: seeking tangible aid and moral deterrence. Colonial envoys to France during the American Revolution, for example, sought to manipulate the French into providing tangible aid by portraying only the most promising aspects of the American cause. Their presentation of Gates' victory at Saratoga in 1777, despite significant defeats in the same year for Washington, convinced the French to commit money, equipment, and troops to the Americans.<sup>5</sup> One wonders if IAT would not allow future "colonial envoys" to manipulate future equivalents of France even more insistently. Will the tools exist to create a "Saratoga" out of a much more minor victory? At the same time, could simultaneous defeats be "doctored" to appear instead as stalemates or even victories? One has to believe that such tasks have already been researched and gamed by professional firms such as Hill & Knowlton, who so aggressively sought "to mobilize American support for...[the Kuwaiti] cause and to channel it into military action..." after the 1990 Iraqi invasion.<sup>6</sup>

Other hybrid forces have also employed propaganda in their pursuit of tangible aid internationally. But neither the Confederate States of America, in courting primarily the British and French, nor the Boers of South Africa, in courting all of continental Europe, received any aid approaching the French support of the American colonists.<sup>7</sup>

(2) **Hybrid Forces Seeking Moral Deterrence.** The Boer case, however, reveals a second type of assistance hybrid forces can seek through international propaganda: moral deterrence. For "although [British] commanders...did not have to deal with televised images of the battlefield transmitted home, plenty of journalists and war protesters were prepared to recount the brutality of colonial warfare...."<sup>8</sup> Thus, by disseminating propaganda about British "farm burnings and concentration camps,...[the Boers made the war] a moral issue in Britain and throughout the world....Now being labeled as child killers and oppressors, British government leaders sought for a way out...."<sup>9</sup> The Boers, through international propaganda, sought to create enough moral outrage over British conduct of the war to deter the latter from

continuing. Although the widespread revulsion of the British which ensued did not end up securing victory for the Boers, the technique was nonetheless established.

Americans in particular are bitterly familiar with the effects of using international propaganda to create moral deterrence. The Communist Vietnamese, although defeated repeatedly in conventional engagements, reaped tremendous returns from propaganda in the United States about the war. Recognizing sometime after the Tet Offensive that "U.S. domestic public pressure was pushing for an end to U.S. involvement and for a withdrawal of U.S. forces,"<sup>10</sup> the North Vietnamese modified their strategy accordingly. They clearly recognized the value of extending the struggle while their propaganda, enhanced by independent media reports favorable to their cause, manipulated American public opinion into opposing the war. While the Boers succeeded at labeling the British "child killers," but failed to secure strategic victory, the North Vietnamese used propaganda to stir domestic discontent in the homeland of their enemy and then adapted their campaign plan to "wait out" the effects of that propaganda. As Maurice Tugwell observes,

By portraying the National Liberation Front as nationalist and independent, [the North Vietnamese] undermined the [American ability to label them as an] evil enemy...; by depicting the U.S. military effort as genocide and institutionalized brutality, they weakened the [American ability to label themselves as] good...; and by denying the United States a quick victory...they eroded hope that victory could ever be won. In the United States...two end-the-war movements [consequently resulted]: an intellectual and patriotic lobby that accepted that the war should be ended because victory was not in sight, and a disloyal, radical movement that painted the North Vietnamese as the good guys and the Americans as the evil enemy. The *second group* [those convinced that America's efforts were morally incorrect,] extended the conflict into the United States in full revolutionary manner.<sup>11</sup>

One again muses over the potential for this type of propaganda strategy in the information age. Would not emerging IATs allow future "Boers" or "Viet Cong" to appeal much more directly and with more impact to a large international audience? Similarly, could that audience, once roused, be manipulated much more directly by operatives of the hybrid force itself? "Recent events in Mexico during the Chiapas rebellion provide a concrete example of how the Internet can be exploited to mobilize both media attention and political support within Mexico and the *rest of North America* for political and economic goals...."<sup>12</sup> In light of the Chiapas scenario, one wonders what the effect of Internet sites run by the North Vietnamese would have been on American anti-war sentiments. Ho Chi Minh himself could have appeared "on line" to bond with, and rally, international supporters. Having been victimized by a

propaganda strategy of moral deterrence in the past, U.S. decision makers ought to conduct a more than casual analysis to ascertain the United States' current vulnerability to this strategy before committing the nation to either side of a future hybrid campaign.

**(3) Conventional Opponents Seeking Moral Deterrence.** At the same time, the Information Age improvements which will allow more effective propaganda campaigns by hybrid forces will also be available to their conventional opponents. Widespread availability of media outlets such as television and the Internet appears to create the perfect conduit for propaganda seeking to turn moral deterrence right back against the proponents of a hybrid campaign.

A first example might be found in an alternate French response to the violent Spanish resistance of 1808 to 1814. Might not Napoleon, if equipped with IATs, have unhinged the hybrid combination of Wellington's regulars and the Spanish guerrillas through manipulating the sensibilities of the British masses? One has little trouble imagining that repeated daily images of the mutilated corpses of French soldiers held aloft by celebratory Spanish villagers would turn the stomachs of average Britishers. It is not a stretch to envision the British rapidly accepting the notion that the Spanish were nothing more than "terrorists." As Brian Jenkins writes, "use of the term [terrorist] implies a moral judgment; and if one party can successfully attach the label 'terrorist' to its opponent, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint. Terrorism is what the bad guys do."<sup>13</sup> Given such a propaganda campaign, could Britain have provided 50,000 regular soldiers and significant funding for a six-year hybrid campaign, as it did historically?<sup>14</sup>

A second potential technique for the conventional opponent to utilize international propaganda in creating moral deterrence against a hybrid force would be to portray one of the hybrid partners as a "foreign aggressor." Recalling that future scenarios might find American regular forces fighting alongside foreign irregulars in a hybrid coalition (see Chapter VI, note 6), could not the conventional opponent claim that American "imperialists" were interfering with "internal" or "regional" affairs just like "the colonial powers of the last century"? One imagines that IAT would improve the conventional opponent's ability to proclaim the "anti-imperialist" message both within the contested theater and around the world. With this improved ability, might the United States, as a hybrid partner supplying a smaller regular contingent, receive less support from the undecided population within the theater, and more international pressure to pull its forces out?

Having twice mentioned a possible American vulnerability to IAT-enhanced propaganda campaigns aimed at morally deterring her from either supporting or opposing a hybrid campaign, it is probably appropriate to briefly assess the degree of that vulnerability. Eric V. Larson's four bases of American public support for military operations – perceived benefits, prospects for success, costs, and consensus support from political leaders – might be a useful place to start this assessment.<sup>15</sup> A first glance at two of these bases indicates that America's vulnerability to moral deterrence is only increased by IAT. First, hybrid campaigns are generally lengthy and the *prospects for success* are usually not evident early in the campaign. If the chances for failure could be amplified early with the American public through IAT, the U.S. might never be able to marshal enough public support to enter the fray. Second, Americans have recently viewed with skepticism the *perceived benefits* of extended military involvements. They viewed horrific images from Rwanda and Bosnia (in that case for years) without supporting any initiative for deploying U.S. troops – presumably because they remained unconvinced of any compelling benefits from American involvement. In the case where America did conduct an extended involvement, Somalia, 57% of the American public disapproved of the U.S. presence abroad within ten months of the initial deployment (*before* the bloody firefight of 3 October 1993). These examples suggest that an IAT-based propaganda campaign seeking to morally deter American involvement could find a ready source of discontent in the American public's disdain for extended military involvements. Any IAT-enhanced propaganda playing on this discontent, as well as amplifying the dim prospects for early success, would appear to have a reasonable chance of discouraging American involvement in supporting or opposing a hybrid campaign. It would thus probably not be wise for current American decision makers to discount the impact of a future Ho Chi Minh "on line."

To review, IAT may increase the impact on hybrid campaigns of internationally-focused propaganda efforts in at least three ways: tangible aid might flow more quickly to a less successful hybrid force, moral deterrence might cause a conventional opponent to break off the fight, or the same deterrence might cause one of the hybrid partners to drop out. Having considered potential international effects of propaganda during the Information Age, one can move to examining propaganda effects at the level of the contested nation itself.

#### **b. Increasing Popular Support Within the Contested Nation**

Within the contested nation itself, the targeted "mass" would be the populace who could become irregular combatants and/or their supporters, and the

sentiment to be manipulated would be their allegiance. A useful example is the launching of the Arab Revolt, which of course ended up producing the irregulars for the Anglo-Arab hybrid force. Reviewing the events preceding the outbreak of the Revolt, and the difficulties of sustaining it, will reveal a multitude of opportunities for the employment of propaganda.

As previously discussed, the British negotiated for almost a year and a half trying to convince the Arab tribesmen to turn upon their Turkish masters. British agents relied heavily on psychologically unifying the Arabs through a purported British commitment to an independent Arab nation. Arab nationalism was a fertile avenue for manipulation because, in the words of Sharif Hussein, whether the Arabs would revolt or not depended “solely upon whether you [the British, would] reject or admit the proposed frontiers [for a new Arab nation].”<sup>16</sup> Indeed, many Arab tribal chiefs initially resisted participating in a revolt on the grounds that defeat of the Turks would only see the British and French installed as new colonial masters.

Opposing the British, the Turks sought to drive both the Arabs Muslims in Ottoman territory, as well as those in Egypt and Sudan, to rise up against the “infidel” Europeans in a holy war. In the end, the propaganda of nationalism overcame the appeals to religious unity and the Arabs joined the British cause.

Even after the outbreak of the Revolt, however, propaganda assaults upon the allegiances of Arab tribesmen and peasants continued. A striking example was the release in late 1917, by the new Communist rulers of Russia, of the previously secret Sykes-Picot Agreement. This was the agreement discussed in Chapter II, wherein the French and British, at the same time that the latter were manipulating Arab nationalist sentiments, divided the Arab lands into sectors to be ruled by the European partners. When Czarist Russian government copies of this document were forwarded by the Bolsheviks to the Turks, the latter wasted no time in disseminating the news throughout the Arab provinces. This news “work[ed] havoc with the Anglo-Arab alliance....”<sup>17</sup> Soon the British generated propaganda to counter this potentially crippling blow. Assuring the Arabs “that Great Britain had been...and would continue to work for the liberation of [Arab] countries from Turkish rule [and]...also for their freedom and independence,” the announcement also pledged “...that no regime would be set up in any [Arab countries] that was not acceptable to their populations.”<sup>18</sup> Not surprisingly, “a wave of jubilation swept the Arab world as the contents of the [British] statement became known.”<sup>19</sup>

This scenario clearly demonstrates potent uses for propaganda at the national level in a hybrid campaign. While the hybrid side will seek to rally the local population to its side to fight as irregulars, or at least to passively support those combatants, the conventional opponent will seek to discredit the motives of the “outside” power and discourage any local support. Such a competition will doubtless occur in any future hybrid campaign. IAT would allow a widespread release of a complete, or appropriately edited, version of future equivalents of Sykes-Picot agreements. Mass media forums would allow outside (i.e. British), indigenous (Arab), and conventional (Turkish) leaders to communicate directly with the contested population almost without interruption.

Another possible use of IAT-enabled propaganda to manipulate local civilian support in favor of a hybrid force is suggested colonial General Greene’s hybrid southern campaign. Greene did not win any tactical victories with his regular component during the first six months of his command. During that same period, however, “British power in the Carolinas had been broken, their entire chain of posts had been swept away, and they securely held only the area immediately around Charleston.”<sup>20</sup> One analysts suggests that Greene’s ability to sustain his resistance to the British and rapidly triumph, despite such disappointments in conventional battles, had much to do with propaganda:

...[The Americans] particularly the revolutionary hardcore, understood that the... struggle was far more political and psychological in nature than military. Ultimately, the Americans relied upon reinforcing domestic perceptions of legitimacy and thus the political will to continue the war.... As a result, the British military operations were co-opted by the [Americans], as both defeats and victories could be manipulated by appropriate psychological operations to reinforce the domestic consensus....<sup>21</sup>

Might IAT make similar efforts to remind a population of their political goals, or to diminish the disappointment their conventional defeats, even easier in the future? Would the ability to get information rapidly into all but the most remote locations make it easier to repeatedly rally a local population without whom a “fight, get beat, rise, and fight again” strategy like Greene’s is doomed to fail?

Where might these potential international and national applications of propaganda lead the Information Age protagonists or opponents of hybrid war? At least two points emerging from the historical scenarios considered above may begin to answer that question.

### c. Considerations for Using Propaganda in Information Age Hybrid Campaigns

First, propaganda is a weapon available to both sides. This may seem an obvious point, but it is important to emphasize. While the French in the example of the Spanish uprising might have manipulated the sensibilities of the English populace, the English could have simultaneously released information of countless French atrocities as well. None of the examples above, by focusing only on the actions of the hybrid or conventional side, are meant to imply that a given use of propaganda precludes a countering response, or even an unrelated initiative, by the opponent. Indeed, as the Arab Revolt demonstrated, the Turks lost the first propaganda "battle" over who the Arabs would support, but were later able to respond with a potentially crippling "counterattack" against the Anglo-Arab alliance in the form of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Thus, opponents in future hybrid campaigns must remember that propaganda planning, to be effective in manipulating populations, ought to assume an enemy who will respond intelligently and attack unexpectedly.

Second, propaganda as a means for gaining the support of the indigenous population appears to be an essential consideration for any force seeking to prosecute a hybrid campaign. Simply put, one half of the campaign's combat power rests with an irregular force. Indigenous peoples may become those combatants. Additionally, a sizable portion of those who do not fight must be supportive enough to not betray the irregulars to the conventional opponent. Even if foreign SOF fulfill the first role (of irregulars), the native population must still fulfill the second (of supporting them). Consequently, winning and holding the allegiance of the contested population is essential. Propaganda could be a very useful tool for doing so. Thus, the hybrid campaigner ought to closely examine the effectiveness of propaganda in shaping popular preferences.

When considering such shaping, one would be wise to again consult Ellul. For in shaping popular preferences to support irregular combatants, one is essentially attempting to motivate, or agitate, a population. Propaganda designed to agitate "is particularly suited for use among..." those populations who are "less educated and informed..."<sup>22</sup> For any future hybrid campaigns fought in the Third World, Ellul's evaluation thus appears as an advantage. But planners should remember that many lesser developed, lesser educated peoples are tribalistic. These tribal loyalties can be fierce impediments to any attempts at unifying population groups containing more than

one tribe. As George Antonius notes, such tribal loyalties dogged the expansion of the Arab Revolt from the moment it was launched:

The attribute of disunion...between one tribe and another, was inherent in the structure of the Arabian society with its clannish organization and numerous divisions and fractions....[N]o...bond united one tribe to the other, and the resulting dissociation was rendered still more pronounced by the stringent codes governing blood feuds, the laws of retaliation and the rights of way....[The Revolt's leaders] could see before [them]...an interminable jungle of feuds and antagonisms, of old scores to be paid, of debts to be written off in blood.<sup>23</sup>

Is propaganda consequently useless for agitating such tribal peoples, even if there are "less educated?" No, for as Dr. Anna Simons has pointed out, moral authority can trump tribal loyalty.<sup>24</sup> Thus, the agitation propaganda (agitprop) should be targeted to manipulate the leaders whom a tribe feels morally compelled to obey, and these leaders would then influence the tribes. When such leaders exist in a society, this can be effective, as it was key Moslem leaders whom the British first co-opted in the Revolt.

But what if a hybrid campaign is to be fought in the developed world, and a sophisticated population is asked to support the irregular component? Ellul again provides appropriate counsel in noting that "propaganda will turn a normal feeling of patriotism into a raging nationalism. It not only reflects myths and suppositions, it hardens them, sharpens them, invests them with the power of shock and action."<sup>25</sup> Regardless of economic development then, nationalism would appear to be a ready-made conduit toward which to direct IAT-enhanced agitation propaganda. Given the success nationalism has had in motivating populations to endure tremendous hardship while supporting irregular efforts (the Boers, the European resistance of World War II, etc.), this makes intuitive sense.

Finally, one should not conclude considering the implications of using agitprop in the Information Age without remembering four important cautions about such use. First, agitprop, despite the increasing reliability of ever more invasive IATs, cannot be used continuously. As Ellul notes, "a people or party cannot be kept too long at the highest level of sacrifice, conviction, and devotion."<sup>26</sup> The hybrid force should thus not count too often on the effects of agitation to compensate for actual military progress.

Second, although "it is extremely easy to launch a revolutionary movement based on hatred of a particular enemy,"<sup>27</sup> it may not be easy to keep such a

movement within accepted levels of violence. A hybrid force relying on agitprop should be wary of the potential for violent excesses on the part of its irregulars.

Third, the embarrassing position of the British government upon the release of the Sykes-Picot Agreement points out the caution a foreign power involved with a hybrid campaign must exercise in implementing agitation. Any agitation produced by false promises is liable to collapse when such duplicity is revealed.

Finally, although IAT may enhance the effectiveness or reach of agitprop, neither side in a hybrid campaign should feel advantaged in using such propaganda just because its opponent is technologically-deficient. Returning again to Ellul,

In order to make propaganda of agitation, it is not necessary to have the mass media of communication at one's disposal, for such propaganda feeds on itself, and each person seized by it becomes in turn a propagandist....Any statement whatever, no matter how stupid, any 'tall tale' will be believed once it enters into the passionate current of hatred.<sup>28</sup>

Thus, while agitprop may become a better tool in the hands of an Information Age-savvy practitioner, its powerful potential will always remain available to rally even the most "backward" of peoples.

## **2. Cultural Awareness**

A second impact for IAT on hybrid campaigns that would be evident from a cultural/political frame of reference would be improving cultural awareness. The previous chapter stressed the necessity of local popular support to forging an efficient hybrid fight, and the critical role which cultural awareness can play in obtaining such support. Ellul further highlights the importance of cultural awareness when he notes that, in order to make the propaganda suggested above effective, one "must know the sentiments and opinions, the current tendencies and the stereotypes among the public he is trying to reach."<sup>29</sup> Given the undisputed importance of cultural awareness, this section will postulate on not only how IAT may make such awareness easier to obtain, but also on several points worth considering before using IAT to do so.

### **a. Using IAT to Improve Acquisition of Cultural Awareness**

How could IATs help in acquiring cultural awareness? Perhaps in three straightforward applications. First, the key to understanding and accessing any culture is its language. Existing technologies like recordable compact discs and portable disc players make high-quality elementary foreign language education less expensive and more available to military members than ever before. Second, the proliferation of videocassette tapes and laser discs have created a perfect medium to rapidly introduce military members to the sights and sounds of foreign culture. "Do's" and "don'ts"

which before had to be painstakingly described by the written word can now be visually demonstrated to thousands of soldiers. Finally, rugged data collection networks make the "overnight" polling of even rural populations entirely possible. One wonders if a few days' worth of such polling data might not have changed General Clinton's mind before he issued his ill-fated proclamation to Carolina colonials.

Fine, one might then concede, cultural awareness is important and IATs might make acquiring it, at least at a rudimentary level, simpler and quicker. At this point it seems a rather basic point. Is there anything else to consider? Yes, there are at least three points to keep in mind before reducing cultural awareness to a travel movie and language tapes.

**b. Implications of Using IAT to Acquire Cultural Awareness**

First, cultural awareness is not something acquired in a single session, like an inoculation, prior to deploying to a theater. Those who received the greatest benefit from foreign populations, Wellington and Lawrence, continually exercised and improved their understanding of the culture in which they were operating, and from which they needed assistance. Future leaders of hybrid campaigns seeking to maximize the benefits of cultural awareness should look for ways in which IAT could develop that awareness once soldiers were in a theater, not just prior to deploying.

Second, cultural awareness is as important to smooth cooperation between junior soldiers of different nationalities as it is to that between generals and statesmen. While the British High Commissioner for Egypt, Henry McMahon, needed to make the right decision to get the Arabs into the conflict, independently operating junior officers like Lawrence had to translate that participation into combat power. Too many Major Garlands at the tactical level and even the wisdom of a Wellington at the operational level could be wasted. Thus, IATs for enhancing cultural awareness ought to be envisioned as widely distributed assets, not limited numbers of sophisticated solutions.

Third, even the most effective IATs could never, and should never be designed to, replace in-country experience. Although this point may be obvious, one is not reluctant to highlight it for fear of sounding ingenuous, but for fear of giving senior leaders a justification for not taking the marriage of IAT to cultural awareness seriously. For if the "best" cultural awareness can only be acquired "in country," than those leaders who are prone to dismiss its importance in the first place may be doubly skeptical of directing any Information Age resources toward acquiring or teaching it. But to me, such a marriage appears to promise a low-cost, high-payoff prospect imminently

worthwhile of IAT. Cultural awareness simply has too much demonstrated military worth, particularly in hybrid campaigns, to be neglected.

## C. HOW IAT MAY IMPACT HYBRID WAR MILITARILY

Viewed from a military frame of reference, properly employed IATs could certainly weight the balance of combat power toward whichever force best exploits them. According to FM 100-5, *Operations*, "combat power...[is] the ability to fight....[which] decide[s] the outcome of campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements."<sup>30</sup> Combat power achieves decisiveness by "combining the elements of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership," and bringing them violently "to bear quickly, giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with coordinated or effective opposition."<sup>31</sup> With tremendous potential to impact the exercise of maneuver, firepower, and leadership, IATs figure to significantly affect the combat power applied in hybrid campaigns.

### 1. Maneuver

In the maneuver component of combat power, IAT could alter the conduct of hybrid campaigns through the opposing concepts of dispersion and concentration. IAT-enhanced efforts at manipulating the enemy's dilemma over whether to disperse or concentrate could magnify the hybrid force's combat power.

#### a. Forcing the Conventional Opponent to Concentrate

Take, for example, a hybrid force possessing a relatively weak irregular component. It could be to that force's advantage to drive its opponent to concentrate. This could give the weaker irregular component greater relative combat power (than before) in the areas which the conventional opponent vacates while concentrating. The irregulars would then have a greater chance of success at recruiting new members or conducting combat operations against a now-reduced conventional contingent. How might a conventional opponent be "informationally" forced to so concentrate?

One method could be to update the centuries-old concept of a demonstration – "a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought."<sup>32</sup> "Physical" information, in the form of decoys, could force the enemy to concentrate. An early example of using IAT to do this is the Israeli air raid on the Bekaa Valley of central Lebanon in June, 1982. Here, "a wave of remotely piloted vehicles [used] as decoys..." captured the Syrians' attention and led them to take actions which left them unprepared for the subsequent attack by manned Israeli aircraft.<sup>33</sup> Could not a similar application

of alternative technologies force a conventional ground opponent to focus on the wrong threat just as the Syrians did? Perhaps an actual small regular component of the hybrid force could be augmented with robotic decoys or signal makers to focus the enemy's attention away from upcoming irregular activities. Perhaps this effort could be enhanced with other IAT, like holograms.

One can clearly argue that an enemy would not be deceived for long by this, and thus would not concentrate much of his force in response. Such a contention, however, does not invalidate informationally-enhanced demonstrations as a potential tool for the hybrid force. Instead, the contention might highlight such demonstrations as more effective in convincing an opponent to disperse, rather than to concentrate. Dispersal, of course, would not favor a hybrid force seeking to decrease the combat power arrayed against its widespread irregular component. Rather, dispersing the conventional opponent would aid a hybrid force's usually outnumbered regular component.

#### **b. Forcing the Conventional Opponent to Disperse**

How might IAT encourage dispersion? One method might be to utilize the exact same steps described above – an information operation encouraging the opponent to concentrate. Accepting the contention that such an operation could not deceive the opponent for long would be the key to this method's success. Imagine a series of informationally-enhanced "demonstrations" against a conventional opponent, encouraging concentration and employed over time, which the hybrid commander knew would fail. Eventually, might not the conventional commander come to disregard all signals indicating a need for him to concentrate, *even those which were legitimate?* Then, like Porus' Indians who were lulled by Alexander's daily visits to the River Hydaspes, the conventional commander might not be able to concentrate his forces quickly enough when he finally recognized a genuine need.<sup>34</sup> The conventional force would thus be at a combat power disadvantage.

Similarly, a host of spatially dispersed but simultaneous information signals, all indicating a pressing need to disperse, might lead a conventional opponent to dissipate his combat power just prior to an offensive by the hybrid's regulars. While a conventional opponent might quickly see through one large-scale deceptive effort aimed at forcing his concentration, it might be much more difficult to discern the dissembling nature of this multitude of signals clamoring for dispersion.

In closing this consideration of using IAT to affect the maneuver component of a conventional force's combat power, the primary point emphasized is

that IAT may offer new ways to aggravate an age-old dilemma: to disperse or to concentrate. I am not arguing that IAT makes "demonstrations" invincible, but that the former may make the latter much more effective in enhancing the combat power of a hybrid force.

Finally, it is important to note that although this section has focused on techniques to be used against a conventional force, IAT could also be well utilized by it to hamper the maneuver of a hybrid force. Information operations indicating an enhanced monitoring capability on the part of the conventional force could compel the hybrid's irregulars to limit or cease their operations in certain sectors for fear of counterstrikes. Conversely, one can imagine numerous information operations designed to lure the hybrid's crucial, but small, regular force into battle on terms wholly favorable to the conventional opponent. Thus, just as with the uses of propaganda, success involves planning for an intelligent, aggressive opponent.

## **2. Firepower**

In addition to reducing conventional opponent's combat power by manipulating its maneuver component, IAT could be used to increase a second component of the hybrid force's combat power – firepower. This analysis envisions accomplishing such an increase in firepower through offensive applications of IAT in attacks which complement the effects of direct fire weapons. While one could probably conceive of an almost limitless variety of offensive applications for IAT, this discussion will narrow the focus to command and control warfare attacks. Given the importance of coordination to a hybrid force, and to the force opposing one, such attacks would appear to be high payoff endeavors.

For this discussion, command and control warfare attacks include offensive information operations directed against the enemy through any or all of five components: "operations security [OPSEC], military deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction...."<sup>35</sup> While these components might not have been known by their current names to historical hybrid commanders, their desired effect – to "degrade, or destroy [an] adversary['s] C<sup>2</sup> capabilities" – is certainly not new.<sup>36</sup> Consequently, this section will first look at historical examples of attacks on an enemy's C<sup>2</sup> system. It will then hypothesize how current and future information advancements might modify such attacks.

### **a. Historical Hybrid Attacks on the Opponent's C<sup>2</sup> System**

One area of command and control warfare where several hybrid campaigns have succeeded is in restricting or preventing the conventional opponent's

information flow. The Peninsular Campaign of 1808-1814 provides a striking example. "As [Spanish] guerrilla activity intensified [in 1809]...the French had to revert to sending two or three copies [of a dispatch] to ensure that one got through...."<sup>37</sup> But as the conflict grew more bloody and the guerrillas more bold, by 1813 "an escort of [1000] cavalry was required to guarantee a dispatch getting through."<sup>38</sup> As a French cavalry officer later wrote, "the daily loss of the French, in many parts of Spain, in their attempts to...keep up their communications, were at least equal to any they could have sustained if they had had to struggle with an enemy who could have met them in open battle."<sup>39</sup> A century later, the Turks in Palestine encountered a similar experience, as evidenced by their commander Liman von Sanders's comment, cited in the last chapter, that "the Turks who were defending their own territory found themselves fighting in the midst of a decidedly hostile population."<sup>40</sup>

**b. IAT-Enhanced C<sup>2</sup> Warfare by Hybrid Forces**

Applying these historical examples to information age hybrid campaigns might begin with considering the electronic warfare component of command and control warfare. For both these historical examples and electronic warfare center around denying the enemy the means to transmit information. Previously, this meant physically impeding the progress of a messenger. Today, and in the future, it will mean denying or controlling the enemy's use of the electromagnetic spectrum.<sup>41</sup> But a revolutionary change in the medium may not invalidate the highly effective tactics of old.

Both the French and the Turks, due to the actions of Spanish and Arab irregulars, had to expend significant resources just to maintain the flow of information necessary for command and control. Any resources so expended were unavailable for other offensive or defensive actions against the hybrid opponent. Such a result would be just as beneficial to future hybrid campaigns.

But could a modern hybrid force hope to hamper its opponent's command and control with hordes of dagger-wielding guerrillas seeking to ambush pony-mounted couriers? Certainly not, but modern information technologies might be applied in a similar fashion. Jamming or destruction of transmitters by directed energy weapons, for example, could force a hybrid's conventional opponent to expend extra resources in protecting his information just to ensure that it "got through." Computer viruses might have a similar or even more damaging effect.

None of these techniques, one could argue, would cost the conventional commander actual troop losses, as suffered by the French or Turks. While this contention might be true if one only counted deaths of combat troops caused directly by

electronic warfare weapons, on at least two other levels it is false. It is false first because a commander facing an aggressive and continuous electromagnetic attack would almost certainly have to devote the energies of extra troops to defeating that attack. These troops, although probably not be pulled from front line combat units, would still be unavailable for other uses, some of which might be as damaging to the hybrid force as a conventional attack by front line troops. Second, a contention that modern electronic warfare would not cause losses akin to those suffered by the French or Turks is false because it fails to see that electronic warfare methods can lead to, or enhance, the effects of two other components of command and control warfare: deception and physical destruction.

Deception consists of those "actions which mislead the enemy and induce him to do something counter to his interests."<sup>42</sup> If viewed in this perspective, electronic warfare operations conducted through IAT could damage a conventional opponent just as severely as Spanish and Arab guerrillas did theirs. Electronic warfare attacks could induce the enemy to spend his time and energy just trying to maintain his command and control. And a conventional opponent expending resources as important as time and concentration trying to defeat a hybrid's electronic warfare attack will be left much more vulnerable to attacks causing physical destruction. The recent exercises by U.S. government-sanctioned computer "hackers," which temporarily paralyzed the U.S. Pacific Command, would be a clear example.

Although this section is focusing on command and control warfare, the physical destruction which could be visited upon such a distracted conventional opponent would not have to be limited to his command and control network. Certainly, this could be one option. But the destruction could be much more devastating. With ever more lethal firepower being packaged in ever smaller delivery systems, and accuracy ever less dependent on range, even a small hybrid force could cause tremendous destruction to the regular formations of a conventional opponent occupied with just maintaining basic command and control functions.

It may be important to note that such a combination of three of the components of command and control warfare – electronic warfare, deception, and physical destruction – could be effective in spite of recent and anticipated advances in a fourth, OPSEC. In other words, the recognition that computer-aided encryption may result in a truly "unbreakable" code does not invalidate attempts to hamper enemy command and control. A hybrid force completely unable to "read" the conventional opponent's transmissions could still seek to slow or prevent their delivery. Such delay

or denial of information would still allow the deception and destruction postulated above.

### 3. Leadership -- Coordination

Finally, in combination with constricting the maneuver of the conventional opponent and increasing the firepower of the hybrid force, IAT could enhance a third component of combat power – leadership. The particular dimension of leadership envisioned here would be the *coordinated* response of a hybrid force to the intent of a visionary commander. New communication systems such as low earth orbit satellite-based cellular phone networks will make it possible to command and control multiple, simultaneous, widely dispersed military forces. In the specific case of hybrid forces, this could exaggerate the dispersion/concentration dilemma for a conventional force. Whereas before conventional forces faced hybrid ones operating on orders days or even weeks old, in the future, regulars and irregulars will be able to coordinate their operations in near real time.

Past campaigns again provide good illustrations of the possible of future technologies. The telegraph, for example, was as new to American Civil War commanders in the 1860's as the cellular systems described above are to today's generals. While the telegraph revolutionized the coordination of conventional military efforts across different geographical regions, an application where the telegraph was not utilized to its maximum potential reveals how future technologies might be used to their most devastating effect.

Specifically, the Confederacy failed to coordinate the efforts of their horse-mounted raiders with the operations of their conventional forces. Although sent well into the Union rear and wreaking much havoc, the raiders actions were never designed to closely complement conventional operations.<sup>43</sup> Imagine if the succession of Confederate commanders in the West had directed the efforts of irregular cavalry leaders toward acting in concert with the Southern conventional armies. Given the success of irregular leaders like Nathan Bedford Forrest, the number of Confederate irregular units available in theater, and the tenacity of Southern conventional forces in combat, one wonders if exploiting the technology existing at the time to coordinate these elements might not have made the Union advance to Atlanta so difficult as to be abandoned.<sup>44</sup>

Another missed opportunity occurred almost a century later in the Sino-American war against the Japanese in China.<sup>45</sup> As alluded to earlier, Chiang Kai-shek refused to extensively arm the Chinese population for fear of internal political ramifications, and the U.S. leaders refused to force Chiang to *efficiently* mobilize China

for fear of losing the only remaining "democratic" leader in Asia. These refusals resulted in a complete failure to tap the potential of a Chinese *irregular* campaign. Just utilizing the radio and telephone technologies of the 1940's, the possibilities for tormenting the Japanese seem almost infinite if one imagines that Chinese irregular forces – perhaps guided, advised, and supplemented by forces like Merrill's Marauders and the SACO "Pirates" – had been fielded. The increase in Allied combat power resulting from a *coordinated* campaign prosecuted by a small number of American regulars under Stilwell, Chenault's 14th Air Force,<sup>46</sup> and hundreds of thousands of Chinese irregulars, might very well have defeated the Japanese in China without the problematic aid of the Soviets which was employed historically.

These two counterfactual scenarios highlight the already proven benefits of coordination for the combat power of a hybrid force. If these scenarios point out great returns which could have been reaped from coordination enabled by existing technology, one can only imagine the returns from IAT-enhanced coordination. With communications systems capable of transmitting information in real time, regardless of the terrain occupied by the sender or receiver, a hybrid commander could exaggerate the dispersion/concentration dilemma faced by his conventional counterpart to a degree never before imagined.

A future hybrid force, for example, may be able to order and coordinate theater-wide irregular attacks upon its conventional opponent almost immediately after the latter shows any signs of concentration. Such attacks could effectively pin the conventional force down in a dispersed mode, vulnerable to successive piecemeal attacks by the small regular component of the hybrid force – a "death by a thousand cuts" scenario. Conversely, the hybrid force could use IAT to coordinate its actions so closely as to force the conventional opponent to almost always remain concentrated. This could be particularly useful for allowing irregular forces a respite, or a freer hand to build up support in territory previously dominated by the conventionalists.

At least four noteworthy implications emerge when one considers the improvements to coordination bestowed on a future hybrid force by IAT. First, future hybrid force commanders who exploit the value of coordination may be able to substantially reduce the size of their regular component. After all, better coordination of irregulars would increase not only their effectiveness, but the effectiveness of the regular forces supporting them. One presumes that increased effectiveness would allow a smaller regular component to accomplish the same mission. Such a consequence of coordination would appear to be nothing but welcome in an era where shrinking budgets

are constraining the number of professional, conventional combat units available for deployment. And the smaller the regular force deployed, the less casualties it could incur – significant in light of the recent reluctance of Western political leaders to commit their militaries to scenarios with large casualty forecasts.

Second, improvements in coordination could fundamentally alter the sustainment of irregulars. Real-time information links, combined with air assets, may allow the use of the “just-in-time” (JIT) logistics systems for irregulars. A JIT system would reduce the amount of equipment, ammunition, and resources which irregulars would have to carry, perhaps making them even more nimble in comparison to their conventional opponent. Additionally, a JIT system might reduce the amount of supplies that irregulars would have to acquire from, or store with, the local population. This would have a host of benefits. A local population which did not have to give as much to the irregulars, for instance, might be more supportive. And for those local civilians who did support the irregulars, not having to store equipment or resources for the combatants would leave them less afraid of searches by the conventional power and less prone to being the target of reprisals. Of course, JIT logistics systems are critically dependent on stable communications. Any interruption of communications could leave JIT-supported irregulars cut off and vulnerable. Moreover, the experience of the Chindits – who essentially relied on a JIT logistics system in Burma – demonstrates that JIT logistics systems can be woefully inadequate in regions where irregulars possess *no* local popular support.

Third, improvements in coordination could certainly lead to overcontrol of either or both components of a hybrid force. This consequence could be more likely for the American military, which has a history of being as tightly controlled as the technology will allow. As H.R. McMaster notes, during the 1960's,

the desire to control military operations more closely at the civilian level in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the White House coincided with advances in communications technology that made possible the detailed monitoring of military activities in faraway theaters. During the Cuban missile crisis, communications equipment established in the White House after the Bay of Pigs incident allowed the president to monitor and control military operations from his desk in the Oval Office.<sup>47</sup>

The trend continued into the 1970's, as evidenced by Secretary of State Kissinger giving verbal instructions from the White House to helicopter pilots participating halfway around the globe in the *Mayaguez* rescue mission.<sup>48</sup> Although a rekindled respect for allowing the military to “run their own show” began with President Carter's lack of

interference during the attempted rescue of the Iranian hostages, and later produced the Goldwater-Nichols Act, one wonders if decreased civilian interference will continue to be the norm. Moreover, one asks if improving communications technology will not allow senior American military leaders to supplant their civilian masters as mavens of overcontrol. As one Marine analysis postulates, helmet mounted cameras and real time voice communications may allow battalion commanders to tell platoon leaders which tree to hide behind.<sup>49</sup>

The point here is simply that the same technology which enables increased combat power through better coordination will also allow overcontrol – and the theater of a hybrid campaign appears particularly ripe for such interference. Requiring as they do great interaction with foreign civilian populaces, hybrid campaigns may have daily or weekly political ramifications. These ramifications may reawaken the American civilian leadership's past tendency to overcontrol, and technology will only enhance their ability to do so. This same technology will also improve the ability of a hybrid force commander, or his superiors in Washington, to tightly control American advisors working with irregular forces. And, as Chapter VI explained, centralization of irregulars will reduce the efficiency of a hybrid force.

Fourth, and last, one must again remember that the same IAT which will enable better coordination on the part of the hybrid force may also give advantages to the conventional opponent. It may well become easier for a conventional opponent to get a clearer picture of the location, intensity, and design of a set of widely dispersed irregular efforts. One imagines that this would make a coordinated and more effective response well within the grasp of the conventional commander.

#### **D. CAUTIONS ON THE USE OF IAT IN HYBRID CAMPAIGNS**

The intent of sections B and C has been to demonstrate the potential effects of IAT on future hybrid campaigns. From a political/cultural perspective, IAT may enable much more effective programs for employing propaganda or developing cultural awareness. From a military viewpoint, IAT could significantly alter the relative balance of combat power between a hybrid force and its conventional opponent through the components of maneuver, firepower, and leadership. In closing, two final issues loom over any use of IAT in these campaigns.

## 1. Over-reliance on IAT

First, one can probably not stress enough the potential pitfalls of an over-reliance upon new technologies. Although IATs promise to fundamentally change, if not revolutionize, all of warfare, they should not be viewed as a panacea. Any force which places too much emphasis on the utilization of IAT would weaken themselves in two ways. First, a force counting heavily on IAT-enabled strategies would be crippled if such technologies failed. Since current IATs have not demonstrated a high degree of survivability, not planning for their failure appears unwise. Consequently, I would recommend that developing strategies for the use of IAT should be accompanied by techniques, tactics, and procedures for operating without them.

A second vulnerability created by over-reliance could be a loss of "doctrinal" surprise. Developing strategies for using IATs to achieve military victory is still very much in the conceptual stage. When such strategies are eventually employed, they will no doubt unbalance their victims psychologically as well as militarily. But such effects are not long lasting, and the force which relies on them repeatedly does so at its own peril. While German airborne operations achieved brilliant success in their initial use in the spring of 1940, a year later non-elite Allied troops on Crete fought the *fallschirmjager* almost to a standstill. Early opponents had been temporarily paralyzed by the mere concept of an infantry opponent descending from the sky. Later opponents were not only not paralyzed, but took descending paratroopers under fire. This episode should be instructive to those recommending repeated use of closely related IAT strategies over the course of a protracted campaign.

Both of the weaknesses inherent in over-reliance on IATs would appear particularly troubling for a hybrid force. Facing, as they usually do, greater conventional combat power, hybrid forces would seem even less able to afford a heavy dependence on plans built around "finicky" technology. Neither Greene nor Wellington nor Lawrence counted on advanced technology as the key to their success. Their approach offers a lesson.

## 2. Indirect Effects on Civilian Populations

A second and final concern over the use of any IATs in hybrid campaigns is their potential effect on the civilian population in the contested country. Hybrid forces cannot survive without a sizable base of non-combatant support. IAT strategies could endanger that support.

A specific example could be offensive information operations targeted against the conventional opponent which might also affect civilians in the surrounding

area – an attempt to shut down the power at an opposition military base for instance. One would have to carefully discriminate which power sources were affected, so as not to deny a valued commodity of life to the local civilians. A less direct consequence of equal concern would be the prospect of reprisals. Reprisals against both the lives and property of civilians in a contested theater have often been a distinguishing feature of historical hybrid campaigns. Thus, one feels safe in assuming that a conventional opponent to a future hybrid force could attempt to deter information operations through the threat of reprisals. In either case, the hybrid force leaders would have to carefully consider the targeting and consequences of offensive information operations.

## NOTES ON CHAPTER VII

<sup>1</sup> Secretary of Defense William Perry, as quoted in Roger C. Molander, et al., *Strategic Information Warfare: A New Face of War*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1996, p. xi.

<sup>2</sup> The definitions utilized for "strategic," "operational," and "tactical" were taken from the Glossary of FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993.

<sup>3</sup> "Four primary elements -- maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership -- combine to create combat power -- the ability to fight." FM 100-5, p. 2-10.

<sup>4</sup> Jacques Ellul, *Propaganda*, New York: Knopf, 1965, p. 61.

<sup>5</sup> Frank L. Goldstein and Daniel Jacobowitz, "Psychological Operations: An Introduction," in *Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies*, Ed. Frank L. Goldstein, Maxwell AFB: Air University Press, 1996, p. 12.

<sup>6</sup> Jarol Manheim, *Strategic Public Diplomacy & American Foreign Policy*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 45.

<sup>7</sup> As Professor John Arquilla of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School has pointed out to me, the effectiveness of propaganda does not depend entirely on how well it is designed or delivered. For although all of the hybrid combatants mentioned here utilized propaganda in seeking to acquire tangible aid, only the American colonists enjoyed a strategic situation where they could actually receive such aid.

In that case, French naval power rivaled Britain's, so tangible aid could be shipped to American shores. Russian pressure on Great Britain during the American Civil War, however, countered Confederate propaganda and resulted in Britain refraining from supporting the Confederates. Since the Royal Navy dominated the world's oceans, and Britain had decided that if she would not support the Confederates, no one else could either, then no other nations could provide aid to the Confederates – regardless of how convincing Confederate propaganda was. The Royal Navy also prevented the Boers from receiving tangible aid.

So the point is not that hybrid combatants should disregard producing propaganda, but that other factors besides the persuasiveness of the propaganda may significantly influence whether it produces any material returns.

<sup>8</sup> Douglas Porch, "Introduction to the Bison Books Edition of *Small Wars*," in *Small Wars*, 1<sup>st</sup> ed. 1906, rpt. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996, p. xiv.

<sup>9</sup> Bevin Alexander, *The Future of Warfare*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1995, p. 98.

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<sup>10</sup> Harry Summers, *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War*, Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1982, p. 176.

<sup>11</sup> Maurice Tugwell, "Terrorism as a Psychological Strategy," in *Psychological Operations and Political Warfare in Long-Range Strategic Planning*, Janos Radvanyi, Ed., New York: Praeger, 1990, p. 73 [emphasis added].

<sup>12</sup> Molander, p. 22, emphasis added.

<sup>13</sup> Brian Jenkins, "The Study of Terrorism: Definitional Problems" in *Behavioral and Quantitative Perspectives on Terrorism*, Yonah Alexander and John Gleason, eds., Pergamon Policy Studies, no date, p. 3.

<sup>14</sup> One could clearly argue that it is anachronistic to have the British public equating the actions of Spanish peasants with "terrorism." Furthermore, one could contend that the "pressure" which the British public could bring to bear on their government in the early nineteenth century was significantly less than today. To the first concern, I would respond that although a different term might have been applied, the savagery of the Spanish peasants could still have disgusted the English public, had the latter been widely aware of it. To the second concern, I would point out that public activism in England over Corn Laws and Catholic Emancipation in the decade and a half after the defeat of Napoleon did affect English policy.

Even if one contends, as Professor John Arquilla has when reading a draft of this paper, that the British "might have just loved seeing" French casualties because "they hated the French," Napoleon might have been able to use IAT to disgust England's continental allies with images of Spanish brutalities. If Austria or Russia had refused to join in coalitions with England against France, Napoleon would have been able to focus much more effort on Spain, and the result could well have been the same as if the English public had forced the English government to withdraw its forces from the Peninsula.

Most importantly, I would contend that regardless of the applicability of this hypothetical example, the analogy to modern politics, where many governments do respond to public opinion and election cycles, is completely appropriate.

<sup>15</sup> Eric V. Larson, *Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U.S. Military Operations*, Santa Monica: Rand, 1996, p. xvii-xviii.

<sup>16</sup> George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement*, Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1938, p. 168.

<sup>17</sup> Antonius, p. 270.

<sup>18</sup> Antonius, p. 270.

<sup>19</sup> Antonius, p. 270.

<sup>20</sup> Fred Cook, "Struggle for the South," from *The American Revolution*, American Heritage, 1959, in *From Troy to Entebbe: Special Operations in Ancient and Modern Times*, John Arquilla, Ed., New York: University Press of America, 1996, p. 89.

<sup>21</sup> Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency, Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," in *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Autumn 1993, p. 231.

<sup>22</sup> Ellul, p. 74.

<sup>23</sup> Antonius, p. 218-219

<sup>24</sup> Author's notes of Dr. Simons' lecture to SO/LIC students at U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, undated.

<sup>25</sup> Ellul, p. 41.

<sup>26</sup> Ellul, p. 72.

<sup>27</sup> Ellul.

<sup>28</sup> Ellul, p. 74.

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<sup>29</sup> Ellul, p. 34.

<sup>30</sup> FM 100-5, p. 2-10.

<sup>31</sup> FM 100-5, p. 2-9.

<sup>32</sup> FM 100-5, p. 7-8.

<sup>33</sup> Frank Barnaby, *The Automated Battlefield*, Free Press, 1986, p. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Harper Encyclopedia of Military History, Fourth Edition*, New York: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 57-58.

<sup>35</sup> FM 100-6, *Information Operations*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996, p. Glossary-3.

<sup>36</sup> FM 100-6, p. Glossary-3.

<sup>37</sup> Chandler, 1994, p. 174.

<sup>38</sup> Chandler, p. 174.

<sup>39</sup> Albert J. M. de Rocca, *In the Peninsula with a French Hussar*, 1st ed. 1815, rpt. London: Greenhill Books, 1990, p. 106

<sup>40</sup> Antonius, p. 227.

<sup>41</sup> FM 100-6, p. Glossary-5.

<sup>42</sup> FM 101-5-1, *Operational Terms and Symbols*, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985, p. 1-22.

<sup>43</sup> Asprey, p. 177-178, 181.

<sup>44</sup> One could question whether commanders at that time, unaccustomed to a new paradigm of coordinating their actions while separated geographically, could have harmonized their actions appropriately enough to gain any military effect. Moltke the Elder's campaign against the Austrians in 1866 serves as clear proof, however, that armies of the time could coordinate their efforts within hours, with convincing effect.

<sup>45</sup> This historical illustration refers to only the fight in China, not the Burma campaign detailed earlier.

<sup>46</sup> To be thorough, postulating a coordinated campaign between Stilwell and Chenault would require a major assumption that the two Generals could swallow their bitter interpersonal feud.

<sup>47</sup> H.R. McMaster, *Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam*, New York: HarperCollins, 1997, p. 31.

<sup>48</sup> Professor John Arquilla, classroom anecdote.

<sup>49</sup> *Operation Verbal Image*, uncoprighted report attributed to the USMC, handed out in MN 3105 by Professor Erik Jansen.



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